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Abstract 
 
This thesis argues that the development of ideas of nation in the 1950s and 
1960s strongly tied questions of Japanese national identity to the changing 
international environment and to the everyday lives of the people. A growing 
commercially driven mass media helped broaden representations of nation beyond the 
overtly political and ideological concepts of the immediate postwar period. During the 
1950s, the promotion of consumption became tied to the goal of national economic 
development. This conflicted with calls for rationalisation and thrift and at the same 
time brought out the contradictions of Japanese economic development under US 
hegemony. During the 1950s and 1960s, popular magazines, radio and television were 
put to use promoting consumption through advertising. The same goal was evident in 
the burgeoning mass circulation magazines, which grew with and in response to 
consumer society. Articles in these magazines addressed issues of national identity 
not simply through the advertising of consumer goods, and magazines aimed at young 
people such as Shūkan Heibon and Heibon Punch and graphic magazines such as the 
Yomiuri Graph and Mainichi Graph as well as magazines aimed at housewives all 
created ideals of what Japan represented and what it meant to be Japanese. Through 
discussion of political and social issues, ideas of nation were flagged in ways which 
tied those representations to consumption. These ideas of nation reflected the 
ambiguity and contradictions of the country’s relationship with the United States and 
the changing nature of the Cold War. By examining the ways in which important 
political issues were presented in these magazines, this thesis argues that ideas of 
nation became deeply connected to consumer society and popular culture, making a 
separation between political and cultural ideas of nation much more difficult. 
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Introduction 
 
Pleasure lies in wasting things, time, the body, money. I think waste is the best 
kind of accumulation. Me, I put as much effort in to waste as possible. 
Ishihara Shintaro, Heibon Punch, May 1965 1 
 
This thesis argues that the concerns of the 1950s and 1960s, an era which embodied 
the deep connection between the Cold War, America and Japan’s domestic political 
and economic development, strongly tied questions of national identity to the 
changing international environment and the domestic lives of the Japanese population, 
situating representations of ideas of nation within a rapidly expanding consumer 
society. The growing commercially driven mass media, particularly the mass 
circulation magazines, helped to broaden those representations beyond the overtly 
political and ideological nation of the immediate postwar and early Cold War years. 
Consumption as a national goal in the 1950s connected the Japanese state with 
intellectuals, and citizens’ groups. These debates centred on the applicability to Japan 
of universal economic ideals, which had emerged out of, and in response to, the 
depression of the 1930s and the tragedy of war in the early 1940s. If consumption 
gradually emerged in prewar Japan as the promotion of middle-class lifestyles, during 
the period outlined in this thesis it became a defining feature of life for the majority of 
people. Scott O’Bryan has recently demonstrated the centrality of consumption to the 
debates of economists and policy makers of the 1950s and 60s.2 Nevertheless, much 
of the emphasis in postwar accounts of Japan’s consumer culture in the 1950s and 
1960s remains on the rationalization of daily life and the need to urge women in the 
home and men in the workplace to work hard to create national power.  
In 1959, the leader of the Housewives’ Association Oku Mumeo proclaimed, 
‘We must thoroughly eliminate waste in daily life and cultivate many people who will 
curb the dissipation of national power.’3 The active role of women’s groups in 
                                                
1 ‘Shinkairakushugi no Seikatsu Kakumei-“Mainichi ga Taikutsu da” to iu Nijū dai e no Panchi 
aru Adobaisu’, Heibon Punch, May 3rd, 1965, p. 24. 
2 Scott O’Bryan, The Growth Idea: Purpose and Prosperity in Postwar Japan (Honolulu: 
University of Hawai’i Press, 2009). 
3 Sheldon Garon, Molding Japanese Minds: The State in Everyday Life (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1997), pp. 186-187. 
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promoting the rationalization of home life means that discussion of the postwar 
growth in consumption is dominated by the gendered nature of that consumption and 
its connection to the transformation of the Japanese housewife. As Penelope Franks 
and Janet Hunter have recently pointed out, this has meant that ‘the place of 
consumption…is limited to the “rational” use of “modern” goods, within the context 
of the particular ambivalence of Japanese people towards the desirability and 
appropriateness of consumption, at least until the latter part of the twentieth century.’ 
On top of this, institutional accounts of Japan’s postwar history see the story of the 
growth of production in terms of the need for foreign currency satisfied by a rapidly 
growing export market.4 
Yet as Simon Partner notes, and Yoshimi Shunya demonstrated, with the 
beginnings of high-speed economic growth in the mid-1950s, corporations promoting 
the consumption of labour saving devices and the benefits of increased leisure time 
meant that calls for thrift and economy through rationalisation tended to be 
overshadowed by the brighter light of consumer culture. During the 1950s and 1960s, 
popular magazines, radio and television were put to use promoting that culture, in 
particular through advertising.5 Yet this goal was also evident in the burgeoning mass 
circulation magazines, which grew with and in response to consumer society. Articles 
in these magazines spoke to issues of national identity not simply through the 
advertisement of consumer goods. Magazines aimed at young people such as Shūkan 
Heibon and Heibon Punch, graphic magazines such as the Yomiuri Graph and 
Mainichi Graph as well as magazines aimed at housewives, all created 
representations of what it meant to be Japan and to be Japanese. Through discussion 
of political and social issues, ideas of nation were flagged in ways which tied 
representations to consumption. In this period, ideas of nation reflected the ambiguity 
and contradictions of the country’s relationship to the United States and the changing 
nature of the Cold War as much as state exhortations to thrift or the ‘rational’ use of 
consumer goods.  
                                                
4 Janet Hunter and Penelope Franks, ‘Introduction: Japan’s Consumption History in Comparative 
Perspective’, in The Ambivalent Consumer: consumption and everyday life in Japan (London: 
Palgrave MacMillan, 2012), p. 6. 
5 Simon Partner, ‘Taming the Wilderness: The Lifestyle Improvement Movement in Rural Japan, 
1925-1965’, Monumenta Nipponica, Vol. 56, No. 4 (Winter, 2001), p. 489-514; Yoshimi Shunya, 
“Made in Japan”: The Cultural Politics of “Home Electrification” in postwar Japan’, in Steffi 
Richter and Annette Schad-Seifert Eds. Cultural Studies and Japan (Leipzig: Leipziger 
Universitatsverlag, 2001), pp. 103-117. 
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In February 1952, in an interview published in the housewife’s magazine 
Fujin no Tomo, the governor of the Bank of Japan Ichimada Hisato pointed out the 
different and challenging circumstances Japan found itself in. ‘Japan is a very 
different country from the one before the war. Just losing the war means we can no 
longer think of Japan as the Japan of old.’ The Japan of 1952 had been reduced to 
‘just 4 small islands’, and having lost Korea, Taiwan and Okinawa, the rapidly 
increasing Japanese population of 84,000,000 would ‘have to restrict their lifestyles to 
this small country.’ The natural resources of the Japanese colonies were gone. 
Understanding the important role of the economy in the future development of the 
country was central to helping the people come to terms with the new conditions. 
According to Ichimada, Japan was a small, narrow country, economically 
inconvenient, and not blessed with natural resources beyond an abundance of water. 
Because of this, earning foreign currency would be central to Japan’s future economic 
success. It would help to pay for the vital imports needed to continue trade, and also 
to improve the welfare of the people by providing capital for social and cultural 
projects. To this end, the essential task was ‘to get people working’ and to ensure they 
were employed usefully.6 However, the Japanese people were poor at working 
efficiently. According to Ichimada, an eight hour working day was often equivalent to 
only two or three hours’ work, citing an observation that in Japan when women 
carried documents around the office they often took their time, speaking to people on 
the way and taking the most circuitous route possible. This was something Ichimada 
had never seen in America where ‘documents are taken to the target desk via the 
shortest distance, quickly, looking only straight ahead.’ Furthermore, in the business 
districts of New York one did not ‘see people walking aimlessly around!’ For the 
head of the Bank of Japan, the end of the US Occupation provided an opportunity to 
rebuild Japan’s economy and culture. Creating an independent country entailed 
putting peoples’ time and energy to the most effective use, and this required a change 
in working culture.7  
Former Finance Minister and chief San Francisco Peace Treaty negotiator 
Ikeda Hayato was of a similar opinion to Ichimada. He used a New Year interview in 
the popular daily newspaper Asahi Shimbun to explain to the people that after the end 
                                                
6 ‘Subete no Hito ga Kono Yō ni Kyōiku Sare, Sō Seikatsu Sureba, Kuni to Hito wa Kanarazu 
Tomu.’ Fujin no Tomo. February, 1952, Vol 46, No 2, pp. 25-26.  
7 Ibid.  
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of the Occupation it would be important to work even harder than previously to 
achieve improvements in the nation’s standard of living. Interviewed on the 3rd of 
January 1952, Ikeda stressed that the best way to deal with Japan’s new economic and 
political situation was to get the people working together to cultivate an independent 
spirit. ‘While everybody wants to know what will happen to the Japanese economy, or 
economic cooperation between Japan and the US, the tune doesn’t come from the 
East, West, North or South but from within. Everybody dances in their own time, but 
life will get better if everyone pulls together.’8 As the newspaper noted, life for the 
people of Japan had certainly improved since the end of the war and fashionable areas 
of Tokyo such as Ginza and Shinjuku were places where there was no shortage of 
luxury goods and fine restaurants.  
The economy had returned to 80% of prewar levels, but much of the benefit of 
this was concentrated in rural areas. Away from places like Shinjuku and Ginza the 
cities in general were much worse off, and this was a problem for the professional 
classes struggling to get by on their wages, which were much lower than before the 
war. Industrial workers, salarymen, teachers, and intellectuals were subsisting on 
salaries roughly one third of pre-war levels.9 As economist Tsuru Shigeto put it in 
Fujin Kōron, ‘in reality we have chewing gum but no bananas, we have nylon 
stockings but no nappies.’10 The Asahi urged the government to make the people 
aware of the real economic situation of the country and to build a new, more 
autonomous national lifestyle (jiyū kokumin seikatsu). Economists and politicians 
were, unsurprisingly, more concerned with continuing the re-building of the country 
as the Occupation came to an end.  
Within the space of two decades, the Japanese economy became the second 
largest in the world, and by 1976 it accounted for around 10 per cent of the world’s 
economic activity. In 1955, the Japanese economy stood at only 7 per cent of the 
American level, yet by 1973 it had reached one third of the American total. Japan’s 
                                                
8 ‘Kotoshi no Kokumin Seikatsu o Kataru,’ Asahi Shimbun, January 3rd 1952. Ikeda Hayato had 
been Finance Minister in 1950 under Yoshida Shigeru, and would become Prime Minister in 1960 
advocating the ‘income-doubling plan’, which is seen as bringing on the era of high-speed growth 
in Japan. In 1952, he was responsible for making agreements with the US over military bases in 
Japan, and, while working in the Finance Ministry for about a month in late 1952, made a series of 
comments regarding the economic difficulties faced by small business and the poor. He was 
eventually forced to resign in December 1952. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Tsuru Shigeto, ‘Watashitachi no Seikatsu Suijun.’ Fujin Kōron, March 1952. 
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GNP in dollars had overtaken that of France and West Germany, as well as the UK by 
the early 1970s. The percentage of the workforce involved in farming fell from almost 
half in 1950 to 17 per cent by 1970, as large numbers of young people were attracted 
to the cities to work in the factories and expanding service industries. At the same 
time, the cities expanded outwards making metropolitan lifestyles the ‘defining 
experience of “modern” postwar society.’11 The challenges of rebuilding the Japanese 
economy and the political policies, economic plans, finance and business structures 
put in place to achieve rapid economic growth have been well documented. Both 
general and in-depth economic, political, managerial and intellectual histories of 
Japan since 1945 stress the prewar continuities and postwar context of political, 
economic and social reconstruction.12 Yet it was not only a question of export growth 
and political stability.  
In their respective interviews, Ikeda Hayato and Ichimada Hisato did not just 
ascribe Japan’s future success to concrete policies and plans for achieving economic 
growth. Ikeda also invoked a communal spirit, tying the individual to the nation in a 
quest for reconstruction. Coming from a politician and wartime bureaucrat, this 
unsurprisingly echoed prewar and wartime calls for individual sacrifice in the name of 
national progress. As Oguma Eiji has noted, before Japanese politicians and 
intellectuals could start importing foreign rhetoric, ‘the language of the war period 
had to be re-read and given new meaning.’13 So, while many of the calls for the 
rebirth of the people and invocations of national culture were reminiscent of wartime 
ideology, they were also couched in the postwar terms of democracy and peace.14 
Ikeda’s comments also hinted at the instability of both the domestic and international 
                                                
11 Andrew Gordon, ‘Society and Politics from Transwar through Postwar Japan’, in Merle 
Goldman and Andrew Gordon Eds. Historical Perspectives on East Asia (Cambridge M.A, 
Harvard University Press, 2000), p. 273. 
12 See for example Nakamura Masanori, Sengoshi (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2005); Nakamura 
Takafusa, The Postwar Japanese Economy: its development and structure 1937-1994 (Tokyo: 
University of Tokyo Press, 1995); Chalmers Johnson, MITI and the Japanese Miracle: the growth 
of industrial policy 1925-1975 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1982); Laura Hein, Fuelling 
Growth: The Energy Revolution and Economic Growth in Postwar Japan (Cambridge M.A: 
Harvard University Press, 1990) and Reasonable Men Powerful Words: political culture and 
expertise in twentieth century Japan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004); Andrew 
Gordon, The Wages of Affluence: labour and management in postwar Japan (Cambridge M.A, 
Harvard University Press, 1998).  
13 Oguma, Eiji, ‘Minshū’ to ‘Aikoku’: Sengo no Nashonarizumu to Kōkyōsei (Tokyo: Shinyōsha, 
2002), p. 67. 
14 Carol Gluck, ‘The Past in the Present’, in Andrew Gordon Ed. Postwar Japan as History 
(Berkeley: University of California, 1991), p. 69. 
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situation facing the country in 1952. To achieve economic growth and stability, the 
important thing was for everyone to pull together, despite circumstances that were at 
best ambiguous, in the name of national reconstruction.  
Ichimada had already raised the issue of workplace culture as one aspect of 
daily life that would need to be transformed. Both Ikeda and Ichimada made appeals 
to an imagined community via the burgeoning postwar media.15 At the same time, 
they exposed the inescapable connections between the political, economic and 
cultural aspects of the daily lives of the Japanese people. It was at the level of 
everyday life that the postwar transformations became most evident, a place where the 
nation could be re-imagined over the period of high-speed economic growth within a 
rapidly expanding popular media. This national re-imagining began with the aim of 
bringing democratic freedoms to the Japanese people and linking the wartime 
rationalization movement to the goals of the US Occupation.16 But as Carol Gluck has 
noted, if the Occupation put a great deal of emphasis on electoral politics and 
democratic freedoms, then eventually the ‘pursuit of the good life through 
consumption overwhelmed town-meeting democracy in the evolving definition of the 
lifestyle modern.’17 This shift reveals the importance of the international as well as 
national factors in shaping the debate and discussion over ideas of nation in Japan in 
the postwar period. Far from bringing stability and security by firmly linking the 
Japanese nation to the rise of an economically powerful and culturally influential 
Japan, the process of political, social and economic transformation throughout the 
1950s and 1960s relied on the ambiguous and contested nature not only of ideas of 
nation generally, but also of the historical meaning and contemporary definition of 
that nation in Japan’s specific context. 
 
Consumption as a National Goal 
Ichimada’s comments in the housewives’ magazine Fujin no Tomo came during an 
interview with Hani Motoko. Founded by Hani in the early twentieth century, Fujin 
no Tomo sought to ‘transmit practical knowledge indispensable for the improvement 
                                                
15 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism 
(London: Verso, 2006).  
16 Mariko Asano Tamanoi, Under the Shadow of Nationalism: Politics and Poetics of Rural 
Japanese Women (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1998), pp. 180-190. 
17Carol Gluck, ‘The “End” of the Postwar: Japan at the Turn of the Millennium’, Public Culture 
10(1), 1993, p. 12.  
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of our daily lives, basic information useful to everyone.’18 In the pre- and postwar 
periods, Hani was deeply involved in efforts to improve the daily lives of urban 
women, a project which united women’s movements and state bureaucrats in a 
commitment to ‘modernizing the mores of and habits of ordinary women.’19 These 
movements to improve lifestyles reached out to the rural communities as well as the 
urban housewife, and took on an important role in wartime after the formation of the 
National Spiritual Mobilization Campaign in 1937 to fight against luxury, waste and 
the consumption of foreign goods.20 This alliance between women’s groups and the 
state continued after surrender as postwar women’s groups worked with the 
bureaucracy on projects to improve daily life. 
In the 1950s, Japanese corporations also took up ideas of lifestyle 
improvement as a means of delineating gender roles to achieve better productivity 
from their male employees. By the end of the decade, over fifty corporations had 
initiated programs with similar goals.21 Patricia Maclachlan has emphasised the role 
of the housewives’ associations in consumer advocacy and the ways in which, in the 
early postwar period, the issue of food rationing and survival brought these groups 
into cooperation and conflict with the state.22 After the war, the process of lifestyle 
improvement began to redefine the citizen and the consumer and gradually blurred the 
boundaries between the two. It also connected the Japanese citizen to the global Cold 
War. As Matthew Hilton has demonstrated, the link between consumption and the 
state was not unique to Japan but was tied in with the geopolitics of the late 1940s and 
early 1950s. Throughout the 1950s and the 1960s, state officials liaised with women’s 
and housewives’ organisations as politicians on both sides of the Iron Curtain 
promised their people a better life. Consumer society was promoted as the way 
                                                
18 Chieko Irie Mulhern, ‘Hani Motoko: the journalist educator’, in Chieko Irie Mulhern Ed. Heroic 
with Grace: legendary women of Japan (Armonk: East Gate, 1991), p. 262. Writing of the 1980s 
Mulhern notes that the magazine ‘has preserved its journalistic integrity…and remains a 
refreshing and reassuring, if somewhat didactic, source of practical wisdom in daily life’ (p. 229) 
read by well-educated women of all ages with upper middle class status and family standing. 
19 See Garon, Molding Japanese Minds, p. 132. 
20 Simon Partner, ‘Taming the Wilderness: The Lifestyle Improvement Movement in Rural Japan, 
1925-1965, Monumenta Nipponica, Vol. 56, No. 4 (Winter, 2001), pp. 497-500. 
21 Andrew Gordon, ‘Managing the Japanese Household: The New Life Movement in Postwar 
Japan’, Social Politics, Vol. 4, No. 2, 1997. p. 247. 
22 Patricia L. Maclachlan, Consumer Politics in Postwar Japan (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 2002). 
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forward.23 In Japan, as elsewhere, providing for necessities in the early postwar period 
gradually gave way to creating affluence for all. 
Of course, postwar consumer society did not emerge from a historical vacuum. 
During the Taishō period, the expansion of Japan’s economy, urbanisation, and the 
growth of the popular media created spaces and images of consumption for an 
emerging middle-class.24 Barbara Sato has shown how images of the ‘modern 
woman’ in the media presented a graphic illustration of the rise of consumerism in the 
1920s that also reflected the changing role and status of women.25 Yet, in the prewar 
period, this consumer society was not open to all, and unlike the situation in the 1950s 
and 1960s, it was not necessarily connected by the state to ideas of nation. Louise 
Young notes how in 1920s Japan the department store presented the modern as 
reflected in the collection of consumer goods on offer inside. This substituted the 
daily practices of private life for earlier definitions of modernity associated with the 
public institutions of the nation-state such as railways, parliamentary democracy or a 
colonial empire.26 In contrast to the flowering of consumption in the Taishō and early 
Shōwa period, from the mid-1950s the Japanese state, as with other states around the 
world, openly took on the role of promoting domestic consumption. The promise of a 
solid middle-class identity often noted in the 1920s finally fell within the grasp of the 
post-World War II housewife.27 Yet consumer goods and their use not only came to 
define the private lives and social roles of the Japanese people, but also to shape the 
representation of ideas of nation in the mass media. In this context, ideas of nation in 
postwar Japan became difficult to separate from consumer culture.  
Kristin Ross has examined the way the end of French colonial power led to the 
adoption of American lifestyles by French citizens during the period from the mid-
                                                
23 Matthew Hilton, ‘Consumers and the State since the Second World War’, The Annals of the 
American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 6, No. 11 (May, 2007), p. 67. 
24 Andrew Gordon, ‘Consumption, Leisure and the Middle Class in Transwar Japan’, Social 
Science Japan Journal, Vol. 10, No. 1, 2007, pp. 239-266; Harry Harootunian, Overcome by 
Modernity: History, Culture and Community in Interwar Japan (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2000).  
25 Barbara Sato, The New Japanese Woman: Modernity, Media, and Women in Interwar Japan 
(Durham: Duke University Press, 2003), see pp. 45-47. Also see Miriam Silverberg, ‘The Modern 
Girl as Militant’, in Gail Lee Bernstein Ed. Recreating Japanese Women, 1600-1945 (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1991). 
26 Louise Young, ‘Marketing the Modern: Department Stores, Consumer Culture and the New 
Middle Class in Interwar Japan’, International Labor and Working Class History, No. 55 Spring 
1999, pp. 52-70. 
27 Sato, The New Japanese Woman, p.163. 
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1950s to the mid-1960s. With the colonies gone, France had to import from 
alternative sources, most notably the US, leading to the Americanisation of French 
culture through imported goods, which brought with them imported cultural 
influences. The contradictions inherent in this displacement became evident in the 
nature of the goods consumed, which gradually came to give shape to everyday life.28 
A similar process occurred in Japan in the same time period, but as Yoshimi Shunya 
has argued, this occurred in Japan to a greater extent than in France, under the 
hegemonic presence of American cultural power. In postwar Japan, the subjectivity of 
the housewife was altered by the introduction of the American way of life to the 
Japanese people, and Japan’s nationalistic image of technological excellence was born 
through the lens of a ‘world’s eye’, in which ‘the domestic, the national and the 
global’ were ‘complicatedly entangled with each other.’29 This thesis will highlight 
those entanglements and the contradictions inherent in the way they shaped Japanese 
national identity in the postwar period by examining the way national and 
international issues were debated and discussed in the popular written media, which 
itself diversified and segmented in response to and in pursuit of heightened 
consumerism, clarifying Japan’s position in relation to the Cold War.  
For many scholars, Japan finally embraced consumerism with the 
consumption boom of the 1980s. Jordan Sand, discussing the New Breed (Shinjinrui) 
in the 1980s and 1990s, has concluded that their ambivalence developed from a 
paradox of sensibilities. ‘Young Japanese of the 1980s longed for something outside 
Japan’s managed consumer society, yet they were captive to its fashions’. They 
sought the vernacular spaces of the city as an antidote to the ubiquitous exhortations 
to consume, and in response to the commodification of all aspects of youth culture.30 
Although not so constantly bombarded by advertising or targeted by surveys and 
lifestyle guides as their counterparts in the 1980s and 1990s, the youth of the 1950s 
                                                
28 Kristin Ross, Fast Cars, Clean Bodies: decolonization and the reordering of French culture 
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and 1960s were no less plagued by ambivalence and ambiguity.31 So whilst the New 
Breed sought out Tokyo’s vernacular spaces while yearning for a nostalgic rural 
landscape, the young people of the 1950s and early 1960s looked to the city’s future 
instead. Meanwhile, photo spreads and discussions in magazines such as Mainichi 
Graph and Asahi Graph, and magazines such as Shūkan Heibon and Heibon Punch 
(whose 1950s and 1960s readership consisted of young Japanese from all parts of the 
country) clearly demonstrated that the late 1950s and early 1960s were witnessing the 
growth of an increasingly self-conscious consumer culture.  
In their account of women and the media in Japan, Lise Skov and Brian 
Moeran see a crucial rupture in the early 1970s, a paradigm shift resulting from the 
‘diverse changes’ of the 1960s, student riots, demonstrations against environmental 
pollution and the Osaka Expo in 1970, which ‘together with the oil crisis in 1973, led 
to the restructuring of the Japanese economy.’32 For this reason they chart the 
development of consumerism and popular women’s magazines from the 1970s 
onwards. This adds to the impression in much of the literature that the 1950s and 
1960s are better seen as a transition period as far as the connection between consumer 
society and the mass media is concerned. As Sakamoto Hiroshi has noted, the 1950s 
most often appears as a polarised period of Molotov cocktails or Heibon.33 Skov and 
Moeran see the main trend of the 1970s as ‘marked by a rediscovery of tradition’. As 
Marilyn Ivy has argued, advertising turned this concept into a pervasive national mass 
phenomenon. In this context the past, typified by the popularity of academic works by 
medieval historian Amino Yoshihiko, or the countryside, through the successful 
‘Discover Japan’ campaign, can be seen as a play on tradition by the Japanese media 
accompanied by the revitalisation among thinking elites of nihonjinron (theories of 
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Japaneseness) throughout the 70s. 34 For Skov and Moeran, the nihonjinron discourse 
can be explained as the work of ‘tradition-mongering neo-conservatives bent on re-
establishing the norms of earlier industrial capitalism: discipline, authority, the work 
ethic and the traditional family.’35 Yet to better understand the popular appeal of a 
vast array of literature subsumed under the heading Nihonjinron in the 1970s, we 
need to understand the way popular representations of nation in the expanding mass 
media of the 1950s and 1960s framed the political issues of the Cold War. Both 
democracy and consumption were in the process of becoming ‘Japanese’ as the 
transwar period gave way to the postwar and new defining social, political and 
economic patterns emerged. 
These conditions were not necessarily unique to Japan, yet they offered a 
means of integrating cultural ideas of nation into an apparently de-politicised popular 
culture. Ideas of national uniqueness could continue to inform ideas of nation even as 
Japan immersed itself economically and politically in a universal vision of modernity 
closely tied to American hegemony. Connecting the emergence of a dominant 
discourse on consumption and its relation to everyday life with the gradual de-
politicisation of ideas of nation complicates our understanding of the nature of 
nationalism and national identity. Of course state-led economic development 
dominated plans and policies for economic and social recovery from the trauma of the 
war. The transformation of the cities and the depopulation of the countryside brought 
about social problems such as housing, pollution and congestion that would have to 
be dealt with at the level of the state. In the same way, the question of the availability 
and quality of food in the early 1950s required state policies to improve supply and 
bring about the end of the rationing system, as will be discussed in chapter two. 
Nevertheless, precisely because ideas of nation based on rationalisation appealed to 
everyday life, everyday life became more and more tied to consumption and as the 
money spent on essentials declined, national identity itself became commodified 
through the popular media.  
This was in no way unique to Japan but, as this thesis shows, the rapid growth 
of the postwar consumer economy opened up many more ways in which to express, 
discuss, and relate ideas of nation because of this nexus of nation, state, consumption 
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and everyday life. This de-politicisation of national consciousness was a consequence 
of government policy, although the process was not controlled by the state. The role 
of the state and intellectuals in defining the parameters of everyday life in postwar 
Japan gave way to market forces, consumption and an emerging popular culture, a 
process that resulted in ambiguity and cynicism more often than consensus and 
homogeneity. Nevertheless, the contradictions in ideas of nation in postwar Japan 
have often been elided in favour of overly cultural, ethnic accounts of the 
development of national identity with an emphasis on economic, state-led, and top 
down notions of nation. 
 
All Things to all People. 
Kevin Doak has recently refuted fears over the apparently statist nature of the 
nationalism espoused by Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. ‘The first and most 
important thing to understand about Japanese nationalism is that there are two words 
for nationalism in the Japanese lexicon (and kokkashugi [statism] is not one of 
them): minzokushugi and kokuminshugi. When a person speaking or thinking in 
Japanese makes reference to “nationalism,” he must choose which of these two terms 
to employ. And that choice makes a difference.’36 For Doak, the two forms of 
nationalism, minzokushugi and kokuminshugi, have their own political and cultural 
history in modern Japan. Choosing one word over the other is to select ‘explicitly or 
implicitly, a particular understanding of what nationalism is.’37 Doak notes that 
Marxists and ‘the left’ remain quite strongly attached to nationalism. In his view, the 
left is wedded to a nationalism of ‘the ethnic variety, whereas more conservative 
intellectuals and media outlets (e.g. Yomiuri newspaper) are more inclined toward 
civic nationalism.’ Simply put, ‘the former (minzokushugi) is best understood as 
“ethnic nationalism” and the latter (kokuminshugi) as “civic nationalism”’.38 Doak 
acknowledges, without examining, the explicitly ideological nature of the division of 
the two terms. He notes that ‘ethnic nationalism has been positioned as “Asian 
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nationalism” at least since the 1955 Bandung Conference; in contrast, civic 
nationalism has from its very beginning in modern Japan and throughout East Asia 
been seen as the favourite of pro-Western governments, Christian minorities and 
intellectuals thought to be tainted by Western ways of thinking.’39 The civic versus 
ethnic divide in studies of nationalism is, in Doak’s opinion, an East/West split, and at 
the same time a fundamental aspect of any explanation of Japanese nationalism.  
 In response, Tessa Morris-Suzuki points out that the separation into 
good=civic (kokumin) and bad=ethnic (minzoku) ‘has been very effectively criticised 
by many scholars who argue that the notions of race, culture, tradition and citizenship 
bound up in nationalism are far too complex to be isolated and captured in this easy 
formula.’40 As Bernard Yack has argued, separating the political from the cultural in 
defining the nation is practically impossible.41 Moreover, as chapter one of this thesis 
demonstrates, in the 1950s the terms kokumin and minzoku were often conflated. 
Minzoku nationalism (minzokushugi) itself was not considered a negative expression 
of nation. The good=civic and bad=ethnic distinction within theories of nationalism 
has to be viewed as a product of the postwar debate on the rejection of totalitarianism 
and exclusionist myths of national destiny. The debate brought Japanese ideas of 
nation into the emerging modernisation discourse, which sought universal values and 
individual subjectivity within the Cold War battle for ideological allegiance. The 
notion that ideas of nation and expressions of nationalism can be either ‘civic’ or 
‘ethnic’ with a clear understanding of the separation and differing genealogies of what 
those terms represent, has informed most of the debate over nation and nationalism, 
not only in Japan, but also in more general theoretical terms. Yet the problem lies in 
the origins of the theoretical separation of the two terms as distinct ideas of nation. 
This division, first presented theoretically by Hans Kohn in the 1940s, was a useful 
way of separating state from nation, but more importantly of finding a place for a 
liberal tolerance within the particularistic cultural nature of various extreme 
nationalisms, which had emerged in the 1930s. The idea of nation could exist outside 
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the state in its ethnic and cultural embodiment.42 At the same time, it could find its 
place in a liberal democracy by linking the individual as a member of the nation to the 
institutions and ideals of the democratic system. Sharing such ideals would take the 
place of, or at the very least temper, the organic relations of blood, language, and 
culture, which had by the end of the Second World War (at the time of Kohn’s 
writing) amply demonstrated the negative, exclusivist potential of ethnic and cultural 
nationalism.  
Given the historical context of the mid-late 1940s, Kohn’s dichotomy between 
‘civic’ and ‘ethnic’ nationalism soon took on pejorative connotations. The connection 
of liberal democratic ideas to the concept of a ‘civic nation’ contrasted with the more 
‘backward’ concepts of cultural nationalism, which were exclusivist in their 
promotion of blood and language. In the early Cold War era, the idea of the nation as 
a voluntary grouping of people, who as individuals are governed by the same laws 
through common consent, came to be seen as a western model of nationalism, tied to 
the values of the enlightenment, and inherently good. The popularity of modernisation 
theory after 1945 helped to deepen this pejorative distinction. As Anthony Smith has 
put it, ‘Historic territory, legal-political community, legal-political equality of 
members, and common civic culture and ideology; these are the components of the 
standard, Western model of the nation.’ In the ethnic conception of nation, on the 
other hand, ‘the place of law in the Western civic model is taken by vernacular 
culture, usually languages and customs.’43 Such a conception is seen as leading to 
cultural exclusivism and discrimination. 
The idea of a ‘good’ modernity drove much debate about Japan after its defeat 
in 1945. In the postwar period, much of the debate over the development of Japanese 
nationalism became tied up with a constant striving towards a good nationalism in the 
form of the ideal of a ‘civic nation’. In his study of the history of nationalism in 
modern Japan, Kevin Doak makes a plea for the development of such nationalism, 
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now apparently found in the administration of Shinzo Abe.44 For postwar liberal 
intellectuals, the ‘civic nation’ had been continually denied in Japan through the 
actions of the autocratic state. With popular sovereignty inscribed in the postwar 
constitution under the term kokumin, and Marxist intellectuals framing the debate in 
terms of minzoku, both sides sought to distance the nation from the state. In postwar 
Japan, many such intellectuals picked up the prewar and Meiji era debates in an 
attempt to escape from the ‘dark valley’ of the immediate past and explain their own 
actions in the war years through the lens of an oppressive state which had left them 
little choice but to support the emperor system.45 They found ‘Japan’ in opposition to 
the state, much as young writers of the 1880s had emerged in search of the essence of 
‘Japaneseness’ to counter the excessive westernisation of the Meiji government.46 
The issue neatly set out in Doak and Morris-Suzuki’s articles gets to the 
essential nature of nationalism. Despite Doak’s insistence on the need for 
terminological precision when discussing Japanese nationalism, it is precisely the 
ambiguous nature of nationalism and national identity and the terms used which gives 
them their appeal. For a state seeking to motivate and control a given population, 
nationalism offers a means of connecting ideological goals to wider cultural traits. 
Through this link to culture, it also connects the political to the everyday life of the 
people. In this way, in the context of the period of high-speed economic growth 
beginning in the mid-1950s, Laura Hein’s account of the shift in postwar Japanese 
nationalism from ‘developmentalist nationalism’ to ‘cultural nationalism’ merely 
shifts the problem from the analytical to the temporal. As such it becomes another 
expression of modernisation theory.47 Where Doak asserts the civic/good, ethnic/bad 
dichotomy, Hein’s account sees the shift from political to cultural nationalism in 
relation to the political economy.  
Emerging alongside modernization theory, ‘developmentalist nationalism’ for 
the most part rejected cultural uniqueness because exceptionalism was associated with 
wartime disaster. The difficulty facing the Japanese in light of the 1945 defeat was in 
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casting back for ideas of nation which could unite the people as the country was 
rebuilt. The usual symbols of national identity — the flag and the national anthem, for 
example — were tainted by association with wartime, and while the experience of 
Occupation brought social, political and economic reforms, it left many issues vague 
and unresolved. Developmental nationalism was a transnational project. The Cold 
War political goal of creating a role model for Free Asia linked the universal and the 
particular, and worked as an explanation for the structural problems of the Japanese 
economy and the pressures of pursuing economic growth.  
For this reason, Hein has argued that cultural nationalism remained muted 
during the period of structural transformation in the 1950s. In her view, nihonjinron 
discourse became more predominant in the 1970s as Japan gained status as an 
economic power.48 Yet Hein also claims that this turn towards cultural nationalism in 
Japan happened, unlike in other places, ‘before the onset of any crisis in Japan’s 
developmental strategy and before neoliberal economic policies were adopted.’49 As 
Radhika Desai concludes, ‘in Japan developmental nationalism, nation and the 
national economy were treated as identical…the discourse of Japanese uniqueness 
returned, brazenly reinstating pre-surrender themes as well as overturning 
developmentalist critiques.’50 The emerging focus during the 1950s on consumerism 
as a driving force for the development of the economy and the connection of 
economic growth to the transformation of everyday life provides the key to 
understanding the shift from developmental nationalism to cultural nationalism. In 
this way Nihonjinron can more easily be seen as an extension of the interconnection 
of ideas of nation with a broader, international focus on consumption and culture as 
the ultimate symbols of national identity. 
As Brian McVeigh has noted, ‘Effective nationalism is like religion: it must 
offer something shared yet transcendent, abstract yet visible, mundane yet profound, 
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reasonable-sounding yet inexpressible, and demonstrable yet not provable.’51 In 
postwar (or postimperial Japan as McVeigh puts it) ‘Japan’s version of economic 
progressivism has been inextricably bound up with the “capitalist developmental 
state” and the bureaucratic elite’s view that economics is fundamentally a moralistic 
endeavour concerned with renovating the nation.’52 In this context, McVeigh has 
examined the ways in which various institutions present different versions of 
nationalism that serve to make ideas of nation ambiguous. Moreover, Michael Billig 
has shown how the nation insinuates itself into daily practices and habits. In this sense 
the nation is mundane, ‘banal’ in Billig’s famous assertion. The flag not waved is as 
important as the flag waved or saluted. In this context, the national flag hanging on a 
public building ‘or decorating a filling station forecourt’ illustrates what Billig terms a 
‘forgotten reminding’. ‘Thousands upon thousands of such flags each day hang limply 
in public places. These reminders of nationhood hardly register in the flow of daily 
attention, as citizens rush past on their daily business.’53 Billig’s point is important but 
needs to be expanded beyond state symbols and institutions usually understood to 
dictate representations of nation.  
National identity is about how individuals make sense of their everyday 
experience. The present is a lived experience while the past is constantly relied on to 
provide meaning and stability. The nation provides a spatial and temporal context for 
the everyday. Here I follow Tim Edensor in seeing the multiple, changing and 
contesting meanings of popular cultural forms and practices as they contrast with a 
national identity that is commonly presented as looking toward the common past.54 In 
the case of Japan in the 1950s and 1960s, the nature of the common past was of 
course highly contested, and the developmental ideas of nation outlined by Hein 
looked more towards a common future. Nevertheless, it is useful to look to popular 
representations of nation in order to understand how the cultural ingredients of nation 
are mediated, contested and subject to change. In the period covered by this thesis the 
mediation of ideas of nation was tied up with the politics of development, the Cold 
War and everyday life. Tessa Morris-Suzuki suggests that, ‘identity is not a thing 
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which individuals carry with them through life, like a scar on the soul. Instead, it is 
something that we make in the present moment out of an interweaving of our cultural 
resources, as we talk to others, listen, write, or read…’55 This reworking in the present 
of both culture and individual identity is a central part of the process of identification 
with ideas of nation. The nature of the popular media means that it provides the ideal 
source through which to examine this process. 
Method, Materials and Chapters 
Barbara Sato has pointed out that in relation to urban young women in the Taishō 
period, the development of journalism and the mass media in the years after World 
War 1 was interrelated with the changing context of urban women’s social roles. ‘The 
development of a communications industry in the form of newspapers, magazines, 
movies, radio, and records coupled with the increasing numbers of readers, viewers, 
and listening audiences became a major component of this expanding 
consumerism.’56 In the postwar period consumption and the mass media expanded at 
a much greater rate and to a much greater extent than in the period covered by Sato’s 
work. Sarah Frederick has noted that the act of creating ‘a community of readers’ in 
the housewife magazines of the Interwar period was also designed to create a national 
imaginary for their readers.57 As Benedict Anderson has argued, the nation is an 
imagined community, and postwar debates and discussion within popular mass 
circulation magazines in Japan helped to provide a sense of shared belonging, or at 
the very least a means of framing such belonging.  
In the postwar period, ideas of nation were not only encouraged and spread by 
imposing narratives that secured the interests of particular individuals or groups onto 
society, but were also subtly woven into discussions that sought to effectively 
represent the experience of urban life in relation to the nation. Precisely because of 
Japan’s position in the Cold War, representations of what it meant to be Japanese 
gained relevance and meaning only through the conditions set both by the historical 
moment and by the restraints imposed upon it by the international situation. In the 
growing mass media of the 1950s and 1960s these representations brought out the 
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contradictions of the national and international. Appeals to the nation are usually an 
attempt to provide certainty and anchor the present to the past and the future. The 
desire was to convince newspaper, magazine and journal readers that the discursive 
Japan and the objective Japan were or at least could be one and the same, and this 
thesis shows how that desire was complicated by the ambiguity of the Cold War and 
the equally ambiguous nature of the terms of the debate.58  
The changing nature of the mass media in Japan during the 1950s influenced 
the representation of ideas of nation. According to Sato Takumi, by the mid-1950s 
kokumin zasshi such as King, which had helped to overcome class, generation and 
gender to unite the nation during the prewar and wartime eras, had had their day. 
Having worked for thirty-three years to ‘hold back the tendency towards 
segmentation’ the advent of television in 1950s began to supplant the role of the 
magazine as a beacon of national culture (kokumin bunka). As Takumi opines, ‘the 
“national culture” nurtured by King was restructured by the cathode ray tube’.59 
Indeed as Jayson Makoto-Chun has noted: ‘Television, alongside institutions such as 
schools, the workplace, the family, and other mass media, became one of the 
important carriers of a mainstream common culture in postwar Japan…it played a key 
role in propagating values and imposing a degree of order and standardization.’60 The 
rapid growth in the popularity of television was in many ways driven by the need to 
rebuild a sense of nation as well as to combat the evils of communism.61 The 
‘disneyfication’ of the imperial family in the coverage of the wedding of the crown 
Prince Akihito to Michiko Shoda in April 1959 and the self-congratulatory nature of 
the Tokyo Olympics in 1964 helped to represent standardized narratives of postwar 
reconstruction. Yet the so-called ‘Michi-boom’, which followed the announcement of 
Akihito’s engagement, tells us as much about the role of consumption in the 
formation of postwar ideas of nation as about attitudes towards the imperial family.  
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The market for weekly magazines increased rapidly during the late 1950s and 
early 1960s. Tracing the development of publishing in the 1950s and 1960s, the 
number of new publications which appeared is striking. Between 1954 and 1971, the 
total number of published magazines doubled, and the number of weekly magazines 
almost tripled. The number of magazines aimed at women doubled, as did ‘general 
interest’ magazines.62 In the late 1950s, as economic growth began to accelerate, there 
was a boom in magazine publishing in Japan. Magazines became larger and more 
stylish as weekly magazines came to take up a larger share of the market. By 1958 
around 8 million copies were being produced each week, amounting to around 35 
million copies per month. In all, by 1960 598 million copies of weeklies and 481 
million copies of monthly magazines were being produced. Growing economic 
prosperity supported this rapid increase, and the appeal of these magazines to the 
public lay in their ability to move hand in hand with the ‘fast changing contemporary 
society’.63 
Of course, the role of the media in a modern information society is complex. 
In her discussion of youth and media, Ishida Saeko points to the prominent role given 
to media in the formation of identity. Extending the discussion beyond the 
problematic wedding of ‘discourse on youth’ to ‘discourse on media’, Ishida points 
out that ‘today large numbers of people live within a lifestyle environment composed 
by the media’. Moreover, for those who live in the cities, the ‘lifestyle environment 
constructed by the media covers every area of daily life.’64 In that context, this thesis 
examines housewife magazines such as Fujin Kōron, Fujin no Tomo, Fujin Gahō as 
well as news magazines such as Mainichi Graph and Asahi Graph. These publications 
help to reflect the emphasis on everyday life in the media and, along with major daily 
newspapers the Asahi Shimbun and the Yomiuri Shimbun, help to frame the 
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representation of ideas of nation in relation to international political and economic 
developments.  
The boundaries drawn by these more serious magazines are juxtaposed to the 
growth of consumer society through Shūkan Heibon and Heibon Punch. As the most 
popular magazines were specifically aimed at the younger generation, the articles help 
to emphasise the changing nature of national identity in the context of the huge social, 
political and economic changes of the 1950s and 1960s. By juxtaposing media with 
ostensibly different target audiences I hope to achieve two things: firstly to show that 
the relationship of ideas of nation to everyday life can best be understood by taking 
into account the changing nature of consumption and the consumer in the period of 
the thesis, and secondly to draw out the contradictions raised by the relationship 
between the international situation and the historical constraints imposed upon 
representations of nation in postwar Japan and how these contradictions were 
connected to the growth of consumer society.  
The magazine Heibon was published from December 1945 until its closure in 
1985. The forty years of the magazine’s existence saw vast economic and social 
changes in Japan. During the 1950s it was the most widely read entertainment 
magazine among young people.65 From 1948 onwards, its publishers decided to focus 
the magazine on movies and music. As the founder of the magazine put it ‘that’s it, 
there is nothing more entertaining for the masses!’66 The layout of the magazine was 
changed from A5 to B5 to allow the printing of larger pictures of popular actresses. 
Sakamoto Hiroshi estimates that, throughout the 1950s, 70% of both genders aged 
from the late teens to the twenties read Heibon. Its readership was spread evenly 
across large cities and the rural areas, and ‘the magazine was read nationwide by both 
male and female workers.’67 Shūkan Heibon was published from 1958 onwards and 
Heibon Punch from the spring of 1964, and the shifting appeal of the magazine 
reflected the domestic changes taking place in Japan.  
High-speed economic growth reflected and entailed changes to production 
systems, the structure of employment, an increase in the urban population, the number 
of nuclear families, and the rise of a middle-class consciousness. The growth of mass 
society (taishū shakai) as a result of the decreasing gap between white collar and 
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blue-collar workers led to the weekly magazine being read by university students as 
well as young working people, who had read the magazine from its outset. University 
students would initially be embarrassed to be seen reading it, yet, this situation 
changed over the course of the 1960s and provides the key to understanding the 
commercialisation of national identity.68 The changes brought a certain ambiguity to 
the cultural lives of young people with huge population movements and increasing 
rates of university education.69 This ambiguity was reflected in ideas of nation as they 
were represented in the magazines.  
Shūkan Heibon began as an entertainment magazine in 1959, aimed at male 
and female readers. Alongside interviews with celebrities and other icons of popular 
culture, the magazine dealt with political issues and carried articles discussing the 
international problems caused by the Cold War. Most issues carried a roundtable 
discussion featuring two readers and an academic or journalist, who discussed 
important political and social issues. There were also short explanations about 
particular topics related to contemporary events. Aimed at male high school and 
university students, Heibon Punch began in May 1964 seeking to bring articles filled 
with ‘speed, thrills and sex’ to these young men, and at the same time take the ‘dull 
daily lives and culture of male high school and university students and inspire them 
with a new, money-driven lifestyle’.70 The magazine was more satirical than Shūkan 
Heibon in the way it approached serious topics. Nevertheless, its tongue-in-cheek 
attitude reflected important aspects of ideas of nation and nationalism, and when 
examined alongside the opinions of intellectuals, journalists, and commentators 
writing in the daily newspapers and housewives’ magazines over the time period 
covered by this thesis, the sources chosen help to highlight the way in which national 
consciousness became deeply intertwined with the development of a consumer 
society.  
In choosing the themes for each chapter, rather than taking a quantitative 
approach compiling statistics and looking for trends I have tried to tease out the 
hidden assumptions behind certain stories and issues as they appeared in the 
magazines and newspapers. It is not always clear when representations of ideas of 
nation are being put forward in the media, and for this reason the wider historical 
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context is important. For this kind of research qualitative analysis is more flexible 
than quantitative approaches. Statistically examining the number of articles referring 
to ideas of nation in the 1950s and 1960s would, from the outset, impose restrictions 
on the type of article used and require a definition of the concept of nation, something 
that as the first chapter of this thesis demonstrates, was in any case constantly being 
contested. By juxtaposing the different types of magazines and newspapers I am able 
to bring out a level of comparative complexity that remains true to the actual 
complexity and contradictory nature of media artifacts. The media is ambiguous, open 
to interpretation and added to and expanded on by other media representations within 
a system of production, circulation and, importantly for this thesis, consumption. 
After all, ‘the really significant item may not be the one which continually recurs, but 
the one which stands out as an exception from the general pattern — but which is also 
given, in its exceptional context, the greatest weight’. 71  
The first chapter outlines the way in which intellectual debate and discussion 
regarding the nature of nation and nationalism in postwar Japan underlined the 
difficulty of definition. The terms of the debate were not only difficult to define in 
any concrete way but they were also explicitly linked to the Cold War and Japan’s 
role in it. This chapter demonstrates the centrality of the international in setting the 
boundaries for representations of ideas of nation in the media. Following on from this, 
the second chapter examines the debate and discussion on food and nutrition as the 
Occupation came to an end. By looking at the housewives’ magazines and the major 
newspapers, this chapter seeks to understand how the contradictions of Japan’s 
position in the postwar global order brought out the contingent nature of ideas of 
national culture and national identity. Through the tropes of diet and nutrition, the 
meaning and importance of food as a marker of national identity was brought into 
question, and the connection of ideas of nation to consumption in everyday life was 
simultaneously exposed as both political and cultural. Through this connection to 
everyday life the media represented ideas of nation as being flexible and contingent 
on the developing Cold War.   
Chapter three goes on to look at the coverage of the mass protests against the 
renewal of the US Japan Security Treaty in 1960, examining how the media 
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discussion was framed by an emphasis on the growth of consumer society. This 
helped to depoliticize the nature of the US-Japan relationship and direct the wrath of 
the people towards the state rather than America. By the time of the protests, the 
image of America in the popular media had been softened through its connection to 
everyday life and the consumer goods being touted in the magazines and newspapers. 
The apparent thaw in the Cold War made the need for the treaty ambiguous, and by 
making clear Japan’s subordinate relationship to the United States, it demonstrated 
the need for a Japanese consumerism that a younger generation could identify with. 
Chapter four then looks at the Tokyo Olympics as a consumer event deeply embedded 
in the politics of the Cold War. As the world turned to watch Tokyo, the 
transformation of the city as it was represented in the popular media offered a new 
way for young Japanese to relate to ideas of nation. At the same time, the emphasis on 
national culture saw the emergence of critiques of consumer culture, which sought to 
shape Japanese national identity in relation to the perceived waste inherent in 
American culture. Increased domestic production and the increasing importation of 
foreign made goods also allowed comparisons to be drawn which helped to further 
emphasize cultural ideas of nation.  
The final two chapters take in the increasingly contradictory nature of Japan’s 
postwar development. As consumer society continued to spread, student protesters 
began to violently question the relationship between Japan and the United States as 
well as the increasingly consumption-oriented everyday lives of the Japanese people. 
Within the popular media the contradictions between the increasingly structured and 
organized nature of social life was juxtaposed against the apparent freedom of 
consumer society. In this context, postwar ideals of peace and democracy were 
violently brought into question in the media, yet a detached apathy was apparent in 
the search for new ways of representing ideas of nation. The final chapter looks at the 
way the escalation of the Vietnam War brought these contradictions to a head and 
brought into question the US-Japan relationship in the popular media. Yet the media 
debate and discussion provoked a deeper questioning of the nature of postwar Japan 
and the meaning of nation and national identity as the Cold War came to an end in 
Asia.  
Finally, an examination of debate and discussion of the meaning of national 
symbols — the Hinomaru flag and the anthem Kimigayo — concludes that by the late 
1960s media representation of Japan had come to be defined by consumption. Student 
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and anti-war protests exposed the serious nature of the issues facing the county and 
the popular media juxtaposed this against the ephemeral and detached nature of 
popular consumer culture. The magazines of the 1960s created successive 
representations of Japan, which created an abstract concept. The representation of 
nation in the 1950s and 1960s took place within the growth of popular mass 
circulation magazines, and was both constrained by yet created through this 
connection of consumer culture with national development. 
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Chapter 1 
Defining the Nation 
 
‘From now on there will be huge differences in the historical role nationalism is to 
perform. At times it will provide great energy for freedom and development, at other 
times it will be a fortress for reaction and conservatism.’ 
Gushima Kanesaburō.72 
 
In order to trace the changing nature of ideas of nation during a period of economic 
growth and rapid social change, it is important to note the ambiguity inherent in the 
terms used to discuss nation and nationalism in postwar Japan. Throughout most of 
1957, in a section devoted to the liberal arts, the Asahi newspaper carried a series of 
weekly articles devoted to ambiguity. Entitled ‘Ambiguous Words’ (aimai kotoba), 
the column set out each week to define the meaning of an array of different concepts 
in the humanities and social sciences. The articles made clear the domestic and 
international concerns of the 1950s, and the column dealt with words such as feudal, 
progressive, modern, authority, postwar, neutrality, humanism, political power, 
culture, freedom and subjectivity.73 But the July 5th article examined the word 
nationalism (nashonarizumu).  
Written in katakana, the headline itself provided an indication of the linguistic 
difficulties ideas of nation could pose for Japanese intellectuals, journalists, 
commentators, politicians, and the newspaper’s readers. The article explained that the 
word nashonarizumu could be used to identify ‘wartime national purity 
(Kokusuishugi)’ or ‘today’s Asian and African national (minzoku) liberation 
movements.’ It was its combination of ‘good things, bad things and old things, as well 
as new things all mixed up together’ that made the word ambiguous. ‘The difficulty of 
defining the concept of “nationalism”’ made it ‘a messy and ambiguous word, with a 
wide range of meanings.’ As the sub-heading put it: ‘its character depends upon the 
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person defining it.’74 Nevertheless, as this chapter will show, the ambiguity of 
nationalism in all its guises had its uses in the 1950s. As Japanese intellectuals, 
journalists and commentators sought to re-construct ideas of nation, the ambiguity of 
the terms they used was reflected in media coverage of the developing Cold War and 
reinforced by domestic concerns.  
As Victor Koschmann has pointed out, nation, together with class and 
humanity, was intimately connected to the wider context of postwar reconstruction.75 
As the Cold War developed, a more flexible attitude towards redefining ideas of 
nation became necessary. In 1950, Marxist historians had split over the historical 
nature of the Japanese nation. According to Curtis Anderson Gayle, the so-called 
minzoku faction saw the ethnic nation as the product of long historical processes 
developing from a pre-modern ethnie. The modernisation faction, on the other hand, 
saw the ethnic nation in Japan as being formed through the contemporary 
modernisation process, the development of capitalism and the rise of Western 
colonialism.76 Writing in the highbrow journal Shisō in May 1952, Marxist historian 
Inoue Kiyoshi noted that the word minzoku had many uses and was ‘mostly the same 
as race, nation, nationality, and also people.’ A member of the modernisation faction, 
Inoue believed that Minzokushugi was equivalent to the modern ideology of 
nationalism. The idea of a cultural nation (minzoku) only emerged and developed as a 
means for the Japanese people and the state to confront the threat of domination by 
the West and excessive westernisation in the Meiji period. Inoue saw the importance 
of ethnic national consciousness in its role in modernising Japan and defending the 
country against external interference.  
Despite acknowledging the importance of the cultural nation and its profound 
influence on the modernisation of Japan, Inoue had trouble with the definition of 
nation and noted that the same problem was evident in Europe. ‘Some think it is the 
love of and loyalty to a free nation (jiyūminzoku e), while for others it is more than 
that, and aims towards elevating the profit of a (particular) nation above all other in a 
                                                
74 ‘Aimai na Kotoba’, Asahi Shimbun, July 5th 1957.  
75 J. Victor Koschmann, Revolution and Subjectivity in Postwar Japan, (Chicago: The University 
of Chicago Press, 1996), pp. 4-5. 
76 Curtis Anderson Gayle, Marxist History and Postwar Japanese Nationalism, (London: 
RoutledgeCourzon, 2002), p. 86. 
34 
 
world of free nations (jiyūminzoku).’77 Other people applied the term ethnic 
nationalism (minzokushugi) to subordinated nations in Asia and Africa which were 
fighting for their independence from colonial rule. In Inoue’s opinion, the term was 
clearly ambiguous, and as the 1957 Asahi Shimbun article pointed out, its definition 
was very often a matter of personal choice.  
Also writing in 1952, historian Eguchi Bokurō emphasised that the ‘nation 
problem’ (minzoku no mondai) had been, along with peace and fascism, an important 
topic of debate within Japanese academia and the press for over a year. Eguchi 
thought the problem had to be considered from two different angles and found it 
necessary to separate what he labelled the ‘subjective’ and ‘objective’ existence of the 
nation. The problem of the nation should first be examined from an objective position. 
He saw a Japanese ethnic national consciousness continuing to develop along with 
postwar national transformation. Because world history, especially modern history, 
had most often been expressed as national history, in Eguchi’s view the problem of 
ethnic nationalism was closely tied to the history of the nation and the establishment 
of the modern state. ‘Those large countries of the West which were able to create a 
strong modern state’, had been at the heart of modern history. 
However, the process of modernisation had not benefitted everyone equally, 
and the continual subjugation of nature, reaching its apogee with the atomic 
bombings, had brought only fear and unease to many people. By adopting a pattern of 
rational thought from the Western enlightenment, Japan had played a role in this 
process. ‘Over the last fifty years Japan has achieved its development as a modern 
country only through the great sacrifice of many nations (minzoku).’78 As a modern 
imperial power, Germany had to deal with its own problem of nation after defeat in 
the Great War, and the more recent Nazi occupation of France had to be opposed by 
the nation, what Eguchi described as the resistance of the people (kokuminteki teikō). 
In 1952, with almost half of the world’s capitalist production under the control of the 
United States, Eguchi saw it as no surprise that the question of national independence 
had begun to be raised in many countries.  
For Eguchi, ‘the oppositional and subordinate relations within world history’ 
were brought together in the national problem (minzoku mondai). It was world history 
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that brought the ethnic nation to the attention of the masses as a subjective entity. The 
various crises which were directly affecting many nations (minzoku) in the capitalist 
world were ‘forcing them (the masses) more and more to become conscious of 
nationalistic things (minzokuteki na mono).’ Eguchi didn’t go so far as to outline what 
might constitute minzokuteki na mono, indeed he claimed that the question of what 
comprises the nation (minzoku wa nanzo ya) was in desperate need of an objective 
definition. What was certain was that ‘if one nation does not have the consciousness 
of being one nation the ‘national problem’ cannot arise.’79 The question Eguchi posed 
was how the nation perceives the crises with which it is faced. This was not just a 
question of subjectivity but was linked to the particular concrete historical 
circumstances of each nation. If Japan wanted to discuss the future of its own nation, 
it would be necessary to understand the concrete historical circumstances which had 
given rise to the subjective existence of that nation — the feeling among the people of 
belonging to the nation. Given the international situation that pertained at the time, it 
was important for Japan, in Eguchi’s words ‘to believe that it is a nation (minzoku 
toshite no jishin).’ This was not simply a question of understanding the difference 
between what was western and what was Japanese. Japan had to learn how to interest 
the masses in what was traditionally Japanese. The problem was the objective 
circumstances of Japan’s development meant that this revival of tradition carried with 
it many complicated connotations. Eguchi believed that after the Meiji restoration the 
idea that the people should free themselves from the problems they faced was very 
weak. In Japan cultural production was controlled by the upper classes, and the gulf 
between real ‘ethnic/cultural national things’ (tadashī minzokuteki na mono) and the 
ways of politics and culture had widened. The best example of this gap was the use of 
the concept of bushido as an ideal of honourable death during the war. The insistence 
on this warrior ethic appeared more as ‘a return to feudalism’ than a search for 
tradition.80 The development of the ethnic nation entailed a process of differentiation 
along cultural lines and objective historical circumstances, which Eguchi saw as 
essential to an ethnic idea of nation, and which had resulted in an oppositional 
relationship with the west. But those circumstances had also separated the everyday 
life of the people from ideas of nation. 
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In Chūō Kōron, in the same month, another historian specialising in Japanese 
thought and cultural history, Matsushima Eiji, also pointed out that the word 
nationalism had been used ‘up to now with many different meanings.’ But for 
Matsushima, the problem lay simply in a conflation of terms in modern society. 
‘Minzoku consciousness (minzokuishiki) is the same as kokumin consciousness 
(kokuminishiki), indeed it is possible to say the same as kokuminkanjō.’ He even went 
so far as to claim that minzokuishiki was the same as patriotic feeling (aikokushin).81 
People could freely choose their definition of minzoku and minzokushugi, but 
different definitions produced different evaluations, giving rise, as Inoue pointed out, 
to problems and mistakes. Such ambiguity was a reflection of the domestic need to 
come to terms with the actions of the Japanese wartime state and the international 
situation during the early years of the Cold War.  
The Anti-nationalist Nation 
Within the context of postwar Occupation plans for the democratisation and 
demilitarisation of Japan, the choice for the Japanese people was between a clean 
break with the past and the question of continuity. The perceived power of Japanese 
nationalism and its apparently vehement anti-western racism also helped to convince 
the Supreme Command for Allied Powers (SCAP) that all traces of Japanese 
militarism had to be stamped out. Prewar and wartime Japanese nationalism had been 
tied to a militaristic pan-Asian ideology, creating a chauvinistic nationalism centred 
on the image of a pure Japanese race (Yamato Minzoku).82 In going to war, Japanese 
leaders had shown they were ‘determined to part, once and for all, from an earlier 
definition of national life that had underlain Japan's external affairs since the Meiji 
Restoration.’ The rapid industrialisation of the Meiji period had accompanied efforts 
to integrate the country into the world economy. Japan had regained tariff autonomy, 
developed its exports, encouraged emigration and colonisation, and otherwise tried to 
act like a member of the community of advanced industrial nations, only to find the 
                                                
81 Matsushima Eiji, ‘Minzokuishiki to Sono Ugoki’, Chūō Kōron, Vol 67 No. 4, 1952. 
82 John Dower, ‘Race, Language, and War in Two Cultures: World War II in Asia’, in Ways of 
Forgetting and Ways of Remembering: Japan in the Modern World, (New York: New Press, 
2012), pp. 46-102; Eri Hotta, Pan-Asianism and Japan’s War: 1931-1945, (New York: Palgrave 
MacMillan, 2007), pp. 6-7. 
37 
 
international situation had altered by the late 1920s.83 Postwar national life would 
need to tie the nation’s history to the guiding principles of the Occupation-a peaceful 
and democratic Japan. After 1945, as John Dower has noted, wartime ideals of purity 
and purification became focused on the goals of the US Occupation. The purging of 
militarism and feudalism harnessed militaristic ideology, but ‘universal ‘democratic’ 
values now became the touchstone of purity.’84  
The early period of the American-led Occupation of Japan, beginning in 
September 1945, focused on the ideological conversion of the Japanese people to 
these universal values. Revulsion at Japan’s wartime actions and the jingoistic 
ideology, which had guided imperial expansion, entailed social engineering by the 
allies to change Japanese social values.85 Gradually, the realisation of defeat and the 
growing recognition that the Occupation troops were not as bad as wartime 
propaganda had alleged helped dissipate the pervading anti-western, emperor-centred 
nationalism. As one scholar put it looking back in 1960, immediately after the war the 
Japanese had become anti-nationalistic. At the end of the war it appeared necessary to 
completely eradicate Japanese nationalism in order for democracy to take root. This 
meant that most Japanese people became, in Sakamoto Yoshikazu’s opinion, 
‘democratic anti-nationalists (minshushugiteki han-nashonarisuto).’86 Even Nosaka 
Sanzo, an early postwar leader of the Japanese Communist Party saw the allied 
victory as having set the course of Japanese history towards possibilities for future 
democracy. The Occupation had freed the Japanese people ‘toward a realization that 
democracy was in their grasp.’87  
The purge of wartime leaders and the dismantling of the coercive institutions 
of the wartime state mandated by the Occupation authorities played an important part 
in this process. As Mark E. Caprio and Yoneyuki Sugita point out, by erasing 
‘dehumanizing wartime images and prejudices, the Occupation administration sought 
to remold Japan and its people in order to create democratic and representative 
organisations that honoured individual liberties and respect for fundamental human 
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rights.’88 In SCAP’s view, the destruction of the military state was essential. Prime 
Minister Katayama Tetsu’s 1947 call for the creation of ‘a democratic nation of 
peace, a nation of culture,’ 89 was not only an important goal for the establishment of 
postwar Japan, it was also a timely reflection of the quest of many intellectuals to 
overcome the issue of wartime guilt.90 The distinction between a healthy nationalism 
and the evils of chauvinistic ethnic ideas of nation was essential to this goal.  
The whole process of remaking the nation was deeply linked to the questions 
of the relationship between Japanese nationalism and democracy, responsibility for 
the war and the future basis of the political system.91 As Oguma Eiji has shown, much 
of the language used to discuss ideas of nation in the early period of the Occupation 
came out of wartime concerns with morality. 92 Indeed, the intellectual formulations 
and values of many postwar thinkers reflected a ‘basic existential engagement’ with 
the modes and structures of thought from the old imperial system.93 Nevertheless, 
during the Occupation, the question of how best to reconstruct the principles uniting 
the Japanese as a nation was juxtaposed with the issue of how to rebuild the country 
after the devastation of total defeat.  
In this context, postwar intellectuals were deeply divided over the nature of 
the nation and how it should be imagined. The terms of the debate undoubtedly had 
prewar associations but the changing nature of the international situation also became 
a focal point for journalists, commentators and intellectuals. As the scientist and 
essayist Nakaya Ukichiro saw it, during the wartime images of the soldiers fighting 
on the frontline helped bring the Japanese nation (kokumin) together, but in the 
postwar period there was a need for the ‘reality of a new myth’ that could unite the 
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people as a nation.94 In this context, the struggle and challenge for many postwar 
intellectuals lay in the definition of nation (minzoku) and the extent to which it could 
include ‘universal characteristics’. As Andrew Barshay has noted, with the collapse of 
the imperial regime, the old hegemonic nation disintegrated. 95 Questions of 
universality and subjectivity, at the very root of ideas of nation, could no longer 
appeal to the shared destiny of the empire or the superiority of the people on the 
Japanese mainland. The difficulty of defining the terms kokumin and minzoku was 
deeply connected to both the imperial past and the Cold War present.  
In attempting to tackle the problem of how to define the nation, the 1957 
Asahi Shimbun took a historical approach. The newspaper cited historian Kinoshita 
Hanji who asserted that the basis of nationalism was the existence of an ethnic nation 
(minzoku). Living within a shared territory, with a shared culture, religion and 
language, each minzoku shared the same history. They also shared an economy. As 
happened in 17th century Europe, with the decline of the Holy Roman Empire, the 
ethnic nation became the focus of the Nation-State (minzoku kokka). According to the 
article, it was this idea of nation that emerged, in opposition to the dominance of 
Napoleonic France, to provide ‘a cultural basis in history for a political 
consciousness’. In Japan however, the development of a nation-based political 
consciousness had been stunted by the autocratic Japanese state in the latter part of 
the Meiji period.96 
In the following month, August 1957, Abe Kozō also pointed out the 
confusion of the Japanese concepts of kokumin and minzoku. He saw this confusion 
not only as a linguistic conundrum; for him, it was actually inherent in Japanese 
nationalism. As Kinoshita Hanji argued, the retarded development of a healthy 
political national consciousness (kokumin) had a historical explanation. It stemmed 
from a deformity in the modernisation and development of Japanese nationalism in 
the Bakumatsu period just before the Meiji Restoration. In Japan, ethnic national 
consciousness (minzoku ishiki) was brought about by the lower strata of the warrior 
class, rather than by the bourgeoisie, as it was in Europe. This gave a conservative 
tinge to the development of national consciousness in Japan. Abe saw that in Europe, 
as well as in the new nationalist movements in Asia and Africa, nationalism and 
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social revolution were strongly linked, yet the 19th century Japanese warrior class had 
not linked nationalism with any reform of the feudal system. For Abe, nationalism in 
Japan was from its very beginnings linked to the desire of the leaders of the early 
Meiji period for autocratic power. 97 Seen from this viewpoint, nationalism in Japan 
had come from the top down. The Japanese people had been unable to emerge as a 
counterbalance to the power of the state. Nationalism in Japan easily took on the duty 
of justifying Japanese Imperialism. ‘Unlike in France and Britain, nationalism in 
Japan helped suppress movements for democracy, liberalism or worker’s rights.’98  
For Abe and Kinoshita, the ethnic nation (minzoku) was the basis for the 
development of a political national consciousness in Japan. Yet it was because of the 
particular historical conditions within which Japanese nationalism had developed in 
the Meiji period that an active political consciousness had failed to attach to Japanese 
nationalism. This historical deformity needed to be rectified. In the early 1950s, it was 
in this context that Occupation policies aimed at ridding Japan of militarism and 
promoting peace and democracy helped fuel ideas of nation in opposition to the state. 
During the same period, national liberation movements were fighting for 
independence from their colonial rulers throughout Africa and Asia. In Japan, Marxist 
thinkers pressed the case for social and political revolution through a ‘national 
awakening.’ This would free the cultural nation from the deleterious effects of 
external manipulation and internal coercion.99 At the same time, moderate and liberal 
intellectuals saw the nation standing in opposition to the state by allying itself to ideas 
of liberal democracy and peace. The debates and discussions of intellectuals, 
journalists and commentators reflected the divisions of the Cold War. 
Many intellectuals took the early Meiji period to be the best guide for the 
future direction of Japanese ideas of nation. With wartime and prewar ideas 
discredited, some intellectuals set a democratic idea of nation in opposition to the 
negative and ultimately disastrous prewar state-centred nationalism (kokkashugi). Just 
as Kinoshita and Abe traced the deformity in Japan’s nationalism back to the 
restoration, the more democratic idea of nation was traced back to the ‘opening’ of the 
country in the Meiji period. Through postwar thinkers such as Maruyama Masao, the 
ideas of Fukuzawa Yukichi and Meiji period ‘enlightenment’ were put forward as a 
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model for Japan’s future national identity. Ienaga Saburo has pointed out that 
Fukuzawa himself could be seen to support a state-centred style of nationalism. 
Nevertheless, at the beginning of the Occupation he came to be seen as ‘the father of 
Japanese democracy.’100 In his apparent quest to establish a democratic nationalism in 
Japan, Fukuzawa was ‘a thinker who was focused on demolishing the “feudal 
consciousness” imbued in the Japanese people and on rooting a “European civic 
culture” on Japanese soil…’101 As Maruyama Masao put it, the task of the intellectual 
in the postwar period was to complete the democratic revolution and bring about a 
new normative consciousness.102 
This domestic and state-centred concern with shaping ideas of nation in light 
of defeat, occupation and the disintegration of empire was sharpened by the 
international situation. As Sebastian Conrad has noted, Japan’s history needed to be 
integrated into universal historical processes that would allow the country’s 
peculiarities to be viewed as the result of backwardness rather than ‘as the point of 
departure for visions of an alternative geopolitical hegemony.’103 At the same time, 
the democracy established by the Occupation was in a ‘state of flux and openness’ 
throughout the 1950s and 1960s as the process of establishing a Cold War global 
order played out.104 For the Historical Science Society, after defeat ‘it was high time 
to look at Japanese history from the standpoint of democracy and world history.’105 
The Occupation goal of eradicating what it saw as the negative Emperor-centred 
nationalism of the pre-war and wartime elites tied in to a broader discourse 
concerning the nature of nationalism and the ends to which ideas of nation could be 
put.  
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Many of the intellectuals writing in the general interest journals were hoping 
to overcome their own associations with the wartime state. The spectre of an ethnic 
minzoku nationalism that during the wartime had excluded others and was used to 
justify reaction, intolerance and the oppression of other nations remained strong.106 
Yet the end of the Occupation in 1952 came at a time of strong movements for 
independence from colonial rulers in Asia and Africa, and for many intellectuals, 
Japan needed to follow the example of those countries and throw off United States 
domination. The bi-polar division of the international arena in the early 1950s meant 
that the threat of Soviet hegemony was just as powerful as US neo-imperialism. Far 
from being anti-nationalists, in the 1950s the very ambiguity of the idea of 
nationalism proved its usefulness for the Japanese in coming to terms with the war 
and the ambiguity of the deepening Cold War standoff. The nature of the international 
situation reinforced the ambiguity of ideas of nation and nationalism as intellectuals, 
journalists and commentators sought to tie ethnic nationalism to democracy and social 
revolution. They also attempted to connect that nationalism to a peaceful 
internationalism and the reconstruction of the Japanese economy.  
The Cold War nation 
Following the collapse of the Japanese Empire in 1945, anti-colonial nationalist 
movements in Asia continued their push for political independence from European 
colonial rulers. The influence of the Japanese in Southeast Asia during the early 
1940s had helped to break the mystique as well as the institutions of Western 
colonialism. But while the struggle for national independence in those countries was 
fuelled by the belief that independence would bring some protection from the vagaries 
of international power politics, in many respects the post-war period was even more 
hostile and dangerous than it had been in the early 1940s.107 The ideological standoff 
of the Cold War quickly narrowed the options for newly independent states. The 
promotion and encouragement of economic development may have been presented in 
the language of cooperation and construction, but schemes such as the Colombo plan 
were also an attack on the problems created by the link between poverty and 
nationalism, and ‘though it is not stressed by its sponsors-to combat Communist 
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influence…’108 economic independence was not a necessary concomitant of political 
independence. In this context, discussion over ideas of nation in Japan was also an 
attempt to deal with Japan’s subordinate international role.  
The early period of the Occupation was idealist in its goals and plans for 
postwar Japan. But by the middle of 1947 the economic recovery of the country had 
become a major concern for the United States. The development of a containment 
strategy against communism in Northeast Asia as well as domestic political 
considerations meant that Washington began to push for the economic stabilisation of 
Japan.109 In early 1948, US Army Secretary Kenneth Royall pointed to changes in the 
international situation as the cause for a re-examination of policy toward Japan. The 
policy of economic decentralisation needed to be reconsidered, as did the purges 
carried out against those involved with the wartime regime or ultra-nationalist groups. 
There were calls within the Occupation policy for Japanese rearmament, the de-
purging of right-wing leaders and new purges of the left. This shift helped to clarify 
Japan’s importance to the United States within the context of the international Cold 
War.110 By the late 1940s, state department Policy Planning Chief George F. Kennan 
believed that American security in Asia required the rejection of commitments to 
China, control of offshore Pacific islands and ‘harnessing the economic potential of a 
truly friendly Japan.’111 In 1948, Kennan convinced congress to introduce the 
Economic Relief in Occupied Areas (EROA) plan for one year.  
This plan provided loans to the Japanese government to be used in the 
reconstruction of the country’s economy. As Takamae Eiji points out, the goal of this 
funding was to develop export-oriented industries and more generally ‘to stimulate 
the economic revival of the Far East.’112 At the same time, because of the fear that 
Japan’s desperate need for raw materials and markets could provide communist 
powers with a means to bring Japan under their influence generous access to US 
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markets was seen as essential.113 In January 1950, the Yomiuri newspaper emphasised 
that the US hoped to return Japan to the position of a strong country. The paper 
pointed out that US Secretary of State Dean Acheson had made clear the importance 
of Japan for US Cold War strategy. The US needed to rebuild Japan ‘as the main 
defence against communism in Asia.’ For this it would be necessary to support 
Japan’s trade in the international economy and provide aid to bring stability to the 
Japanese domestic economy.114 Nevertheless, by the early 1950s, plans for the 
economic rehabilitation of Japan into the non-communist economic bloc were proving 
contentious. Britain was concerned about Japanese competition for the markets of its 
former colonial possessions and within the US there were worries over competition 
for US manufacturing because of a perception of ‘lax labour standards’ and a low 
wage economy.115 The issue of a peace treaty with Japan became pressing and calls 
for its quick conclusion grew even before the outbreak of war on the Korean 
peninsula in the summer of 1950.  
Ultimately, the conclusion of the San Francisco treaty, as many in the United 
States acknowledged, integrated Japan into the non-communist bloc and created a 
permanent structure of US control.116 In the midst of the Korean War, the treaty 
firmly set Japan on the side of the ‘Free World’. In the written media, the ambiguity 
and instability of the international situation came to the fore. The people were 
presented with a stark choice between ‘Free World’ democracy and Soviet 
communism. On January 1st 1952, the Yomiuri Shimbun reported an interview given 
by John Foster-Dulles, the author of the San-Francisco Treaty, to the American 
television channel CBS. Discussing the situation in Korea, Dulles pointed out that 
while the heavy land battles had ended, the political problems of the peninsula had not 
been solved. According to Dulles, it was thanks to the bravery of the US forces and 
the help of allied countries that the invading armies had been stopped. Nevertheless, 
the country was politically divided and the Korean people faced a dangerous outlook 
for the New Year. The Japanese people had given their all to side with the ‘Free 
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World and its destiny’ despite the fact that they had been offered ‘the bait of cheap 
resources from the Soviet Union.’ Dulles believed that the Japanese people 
understood that efforts to bring Japan over to the side of the Soviet Union would 
continue, but he was confident that the Japanese would be able to resist.117 On the 
same front page was a New Year message from the Soviet leader Josef Stalin. His 
message was designed to send the goodwill of the people of the Soviet Union to the 
‘good people of Japan under foreign occupation.’ The article conveyed a ‘wish for the 
freedom and fortune of the Japanese people (kokumin)’, as well as ‘success in their 
fight to become an independent country.’118 Both Stalin’s and Dulles’ comments 
clearly emphasised the importance of Japan and the Japanese within the dynamics of 
the Cold War. Whereas Dulles presented the image of a free people choosing to join 
the free world, Stalin made clear the political and economic subordination of Japan to 
the United States. The newspaper’s front-page juxtaposition of the two messages was 
a powerful symbol of the precariousness of Japan’s position as the Occupation came 
to an end.119  
The importance of this ideological battle for the coming year was further 
underlined by an editorial on the same front page entitled ‘The outlook for Peace 
through Power.’ Europe had made progress economically, politically, and militarily 
towards a more stable and unified continent. The European Coal and Steel 
Community came into existence in 1951, but according to the article, 1952 would be a 
decisive year for the security of Europe. It was a presidential election year in the 
United States, but also the most important year for a decisive plan for peace in 
Europe. The editorial stressed that the US advisory role in the region could not be 
shirked and neither could its military assistance. For some time the United States had 
been encouraging European countries to rebuild their military infrastructure. The 
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) had been established in 1949 in part to 
ease the path to German rearmament. But the Yomiuri Shimbun criticised the fact that 
by the early 1950s a belief that peace could be maintained through the projection of 
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military power seemed to be giving way, for practical reasons, to a focus on culture 
and ideology. The editorial emphasised that the policy of peace through power needed 
to continue, but with the end of the Marshall Plan, funding for re-armament was a big 
problem for European countries.120 In this context there was a split between the US 
and Europe over the issue of rearmament. For European countries such as France or 
Italy it was the economic cost of rearmament that was the problem.121 The instability 
of the French currency and the British pound demonstrated the political danger of 
pushing rearmament. Worker unrest in Italy and France had made this danger all too 
clear. The Yomiuri argued that while international peace may have rested on military 
power, the Soviet Union’s influence also extended through persuasion. Dialogue was 
as important as military might. With the early end of the Marshall Plan and worries 
over the feasibility of continuing a policy of peace through power, this was something 
Europe, the US, and Japan needed to take into consideration.122  
By the early 1950s, calls for fully-fledged rearmament in Japan were met by a 
push from the Japanese left for unaligned neutrality. Yet according to the Asahi 
Shimbun, public opinion surveys indicated that the Japanese public preferred 
neutrality in the guise of uninvolvement. Despite this, the Japanese government’s 
defence budget had reached eighteen billion yen by 1952, and appeared to the 
Japanese people and many members of the parliamentary opposition to point to 
nothing less than rearmament. The National Police Reserve, set up in 1950, had 
originally numbered 75,000 men but by October 1952 the number had increased to 
110,000.123 The government repeatedly claimed the money was for essential self-
defence. ‘In any case, it was not an adequate amount for rearmament, which would 
require vast sums to be spent on naval and land forces’. Still, the Asahi claimed that 
the repeated denials were ‘difficult for the people to swallow.’ Remarks made by the 
Japanese Justice Minister that ‘for war it is necessary to have a military force suitable 
for warfare…’ worried the newspaper. The minister pointed out that Japan’s police 
force, set up in 1950 and limited to 75,000 men, was far from suitable for war and 
was only there to ensure political security. The government and even members of the 
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opposition denied any accusations that the rise in spending on the police could be 
classed as rearmament. Yet by 1952 it was becoming increasingly clear that the denial 
of rearmament was simply down to a strong awareness that the Japanese people were 
unlikely to support any change in article nine of the postwar constitution, rather than 
an accurate description of government actions.124  
The Asahi editorial called for the government to come clean about the nature 
of the considerable increase in funds for the National Police Reserve. At the same 
time it emphasised the need for the Diet, the government, and the opposition parties, 
to decide if this increase in spending amounted to rearmament or not. If it did, then 
the Japanese people should be asked to make a decision in favour or against. A 
general election, according to the newspaper, would then allow the ‘actions of the 
government and the people’s everyday lives to be in agreement with the constitution’. 
The discussion of rearmament and the perilous nature of the Cold War world linked 
the economic decisions of the government to the everyday livelihood (kokumin 
seikatsu) of the Japanese people.125 Government spending on rearmament at a time 
when most Japanese people were still struggling to find nutritious food and adequate 
shelter was an example of how out of step government policy was with the people’s 
everyday experience. Yet it was also evidence of the direct impact the Cold War had 
on ideas of nation in Japan. The debate over food and nutrition was one element of 
this, and will be discussed in the following chapter. Ultimately, the split in the 
international environment of the Cold War helped give shape to a split in ideas of 
nation in Japan as the Occupation came to an end.  
The Divided Nation 
In an article in Chūō Kōron in April1952, Inoki Masamichi claimed that by the early 
1950s the ideological division of the international arena had sparked a reorganisation 
within both nationalism and internationalism. The article was entitled The Direction 
of Japanese Nationalism and carried the sub-heading ‘Nationalism and International 
solidarity’. It made clear the painful dilemma faced by Japan and the wider world. 
According to Inoki, the usual belief that when ethnic nationalism was quiet, 
international solidarity could emerge and when internationalism was weak, 
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nationalism would suddenly rise up, no longer held true in Japan. The two concepts 
no longer balanced each other out. Japanese nationalism had been split along the lines 
of the ideological division between the United States and the Soviet Union. ‘In front 
of our eyes, two types of ethnic nationalism have become indivisible from two types 
of internationalism’.126 In Japan an anti-Soviet, anti-communist nationalism combined 
with an anti-Soviet, anti-communist internationalism was opposed by an anti-
American, anti-imperialist nationalism, which was itself combined with anti-
American, anti-imperialist internationalism. Domestic nationalism mirrored the 
ideological split which was fuelling the Cold War.  
Given this situation, Inoki questioned the most suitable direction for Japanese 
nationalism. He wondered whether Japan should continue to side with the United 
Sates or switch its support to the communist bloc. The split was dangerous for the 
internal stability of the country. Inoki believed that in the immediate postwar world 
nationalism had seemed to offer the prospect of combining with internationalism to 
form a perfect system. Unfortunately defeat, and the sense of inferiority it brought to 
the Japanese through the occupation of the country by the United States, had all but 
eradicated Japanese nationalism. For Inoki, a utopian sense of internationalism was all 
that was left of a nationalism that had continued since the Meiji period. Immediately 
after the war, the possibility existed of channelling this utopianism through the new 
constitution, offering the chance of a utopian, internationalist commitment to peace. 
However, the international events of the late 1940s had thrust Japan into a greatly 
altered and strategically important position within international power politics. The 
outbreak of the Korean War, which at its beginning had seemed merely a local 
problem, ‘turned Japan into a base for the anti-soviet, anti-communist camp’.127 Japan 
itself had no choice over which camp it became part of. Occupation by the United 
States and involvement on the side of the allies in the Korean War had already 
decided this.  
It was at this point, according to Inoki, that the Japanese people’s nationalistic 
trend (minzokushugiteki kiren) quickly reorganised itself into the division between the 
opposed camps of anti-soviet, anti-communist nationalism, or anti-American, anti-
imperialist nationalism. The domestic and the international were linked. It was not 
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only the international community that had been divided; Japanese nationalism itself 
had been split. As the culmination of the power of ultra-nationalism, the Second 
World War had clearly demonstrated that when internationalism combines with the 
worst kind of expansionist nationalism it could destroy itself. The split did not just 
pose the danger of a third world war, but within Japan, in view of the country’s recent 
history, it presented a real danger of internal unrest.128  
After a period of anti-nationalist democratic sentiment following defeat, Inoki 
saw three aspects to the nationalistic trend that was developing in Japan. Firstly, the 
social disorder immediately following the surrender, especially riots by Chinese and 
Korean residents in Japan, was hard for the Japanese people to understand. The 
second aspect was a growing disillusionment with the Occupation. Although greeted 
at first as liberating angels, there had been a gradual sense of discontent that had 
begun to manifest itself as anti-American sentiment. Communists, supporters of the 
emperor system, and patriots who saw the collapse of virtue and the destruction of the 
people’s spirit as being due to the Occupation, were all united in the view that the 
occupation must end. Added to these internal conditions, the anti-Japanese 
propaganda of Soviet Russia had increased the anti-Soviet mood of the people. 
Ultimately, the liberal democratic emancipation promised by the Americans had not 
been grasped by Japan. In Inoki’s view, if the power of social liberal democracy had 
caught the nationalistic mood of ‘our people’s ethnic nationalism’ (kokumin no 
minzokushugi), that nationalism would have escaped from its division into anti-soviet, 
anti-communist or anti-America, anti-imperialist camps. Unfortunately, the Japanese 
people had become either ultra-conservative or ultra-left wing socialists. Ultra-
conservatism pushed in the direction of an anti-soviet, anti-communist nationalism. 
The right wing nature of Japanese farmers, who ‘with their pedlars, hawkers and 
hoodlums form the guerrilla army of anti-soviet, anti-communist nationalism’, was a 
result of the Russian anti-Japanese stance. For Inoki, ‘bourgeois window-dressing 
which sought to escape from Asia by presenting Japan as a Western country’ as well 
as a quiet patriotism which since the Meiji restoration had harboured the conscious 
fear of Japan becoming a colony of the West, only added to this ultra-conservatism. 
129 
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Japanese people in their sixties still harboured memories of the wars against 
China and Russia, and this fed a patriotism not shared by younger Japanese. Inoki saw 
it as a problem that young university students had no recollection of the international 
political situation or of the situation within Japan which had led to the war and the 
defeat of 1945. Calls for national independence, and the anti-colonialism of the 
communist slogans, had a hold on the young as they turned against America. But 
those young people failed to realise that the pre-war strength of Japan itself was built 
on imperialism and foreign labour, as well as colonialism. For Inoki, the tragedy of 
Japanese nationalism in 1952 lay in this division between the generations. Their ideas 
of patriotism each had a different focus and added to the division over the Cold War 
struggle. The only solution was to check the hardening of the opposition between the 
two nationalisms, as Japan was again faced with the choice of whether to fight against 
imperialism on the side of proletarian internationalism, or as the big brother of Asia 
under the British/American slogan of ‘freedom for people of all countries’. Inoki 
rejected both choices, and while he admitted that ‘some may say it is too late’, and 
that in failing to decide either way Japan would be crushed by one giant or another, he 
maintained it was up to the intelligentsia to make a choice, or run the risk of unrest 
within Japan and war abroad.130  
The ideological divide of the Cold War posed a serious dilemma for 
intellectuals, journalists and commentators discussing ideas of nation in Japan as the 
Occupation came to an end. Far from putting forward a clear cut idea of the nation, 
ethnic nationalism was itself divided and put into service by differing political 
considerations. This situation was exacerbated by the emergence of anti-colonial 
nationalisms in Asia and Africa. Tokyo University president Yanaihara Tadao, 
writing at the beginning of 1952, claimed that Japan had already experienced such 
nationalism in the Meiji period. At that time the country was threatened with losing its 
independence as the powerful western imperial countries sought more colonies in 
Asia. In Yanaihara’s opinion, this threat had created a group consciousness of a 
shared national destiny in the Meiji period and brought people together to maintain 
national independence against foreign invasion.131 The development of domestic 
capitalism in the Meiji period had brought about the economic basis for the 
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establishment of a nation-state (minzoku kokka). As far as Yanaihara was concerned, 
by the time Japan had begun to embark on the path of modernisation, the country was 
already a nation-state. The development of a shared consciousness during the Meiji 
period meant that after defeat in 1945, pure ethnic nationalism (tanjun minzokushugi) 
could not totally disappear within Japan.132 It was also no surprise that ethnic national 
movements were now gaining ground in Asia. Japanese imperialism had collapsed in 
1945, but only after freeing those countries from the threat of western colonialism, 
allowing them to press for the creation of their own nation-state. 
In an article in the Yomiuri Shimbun, also published in January 1952, 
Yanaihara warned that because Japan had passed through that stage of development 
of national consciousness now being experienced by countries in Africa and Asia 
much earlier (Japan was ‘the first to establish minzokushugi and at the same time is 
responsible for leading Asia into the mess of today’) the important question was 
‘would “the spectre of ethnic nationalism” floating over the mess of Asia bring 
happiness and prosperity or more misery?’133 Through its actions as an imperial 
power in East Asia, Japan had lit the fuse of ethnic nationalism and, like Inoki, 
Yanaihara maintained that the division of the international arena along ideological 
lines had created two types of ethnic nationalism. The first, ‘pure ethnic nationalism’ 
had been brought about by Japan’s actions in Asia as an imperial power, by focusing 
attention on opposing the colonialism of the West and by denying the populations 
control over their own state. The second, ‘red ethnic nationalism’ was spread by the 
Soviet Union. Yanaihara warned of the warlike character of this type of nationalism, 
which would pose a real danger should it spread. After the war it was this type of 
ethnic nationalism that had been the first to develop in Japan, and had pushed calls for 
Japanese national independence. Japan no longer led Asia, and in the Yomiuri article 
Yanaihara appeared pessimistic about the direction of Asian nationalism. He claimed 
that if it was allowed to spread, the Soviet Union’s conception of ethnic nationalism 
could lead to war, the danger of which ‘follows the ethnic nationalist movements of 
today.’134  
In the early 1950s, the international setting within which politicians, 
journalists, intellectuals and commentators discussed and debated ideas of nation in 
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Japan was fundamentally ambiguous and unstable. For the United States, the 
communist victory in China and the outbreak of war in Korea in June 1950 altered 
perceptions of the communist threat in East Asia. As Nagai Yonosuke has put it, these 
events paved the way for the ‘globalisation and militarisation of containment’.135 
Japanese intellectuals tried to link ideas of nation to peace and democracy, 
subjectivity and universalism. This attempt to re-make the nation was a reflection of 
the international Cold War, the desire to exorcise the wartime state, and the reforms 
of the Occupation. As intellectuals looked to mould a future Japanese nationalism 
around the goals of peace and democracy, the difficulty in pinning down both the 
historical basis and the nature of the Japanese nation was unavoidably shaped by the 
objective historical circumstances within which the Occupation came to an end.  
For Japan in the early 1950s, ideas of nation were complicated by the fact that 
nationalism and internationalism were often seen as indistinguishable. In this context, 
at the end of the Occupation in the early 1950s many politicians, journalists, 
commentators and intellectuals saw ideas of nation as a major focal point for 
subjective and collective identification. The 1957 Asahi article gave a brief 
explanation of the problems of defining the concept of nationalism as those problems 
were discussed at a conference held in Kyoto in 1953. In line with the dominant 
Marxist debates of the time, the participants were mainly interested in the problem of 
the ‘nationalism of the everyday life of the masses’, or ‘proletarian nationalism’. One 
side of the debate defined this type of nationalism as pursuing the interests of the 
ethnic nation (minzoku) of one’s own country, whilst respecting the interests of people 
of other nations. But it was pointed out that if such a definition were to be considered 
correct, then nationalism and internationalism would have to be seen as 
indistinguishable. On this point all the participants at the conference agreed.136 
Ambiguity and the apparently inseparable nature of nationalism and internationalism 
neatly encapsulated Japan’s position in the Cold War world of the early and mid-
1950s. This was played out in debate and discussion in the popular media over issues 
much more closely related to the everyday lives of the Japanese people, an important 
aspect overlooked by the abstract debates of intellectuals. 
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Chapter 2 
Feeding an Autonomous Nation 
 
‘In the past, science has conferred on those peoples who availed themselves of the 
newer knowledge of infectious diseases, better health and a greater average length of 
life. In the future, it promises to those races who will take advantage of the newer 
knowledge of nutrition, a larger stature, greater vigor, increased longevity, and a 
higher level of cultural attainment. To a measurable degree, man is now master of his 
own destiny, where once he was subject only to the grim hand of Fate.’ 
Dr James S. Maclester.1 
 
 
As Theodore Bestor has pointed out in relation to the consumption of seafood in 
Japan, changes in eating habits are not only related to alterations in production, supply 
or distribution as a result of changes in technology. Often wider changes in the 
everyday lives of ordinary people, changes with little direct relationship to food 
culture or culinary habits, can affect ideas of regional and national cuisine.2 The 
production, consumption and circulation of food — as well as the political, economic, 
cultural and social aspects of these — can illuminate the broader context in which 
people live out their everyday lives.3 In Japan, as in the West, it was the experience of 
imperial expansion and war that brought food, its production, distribution and 
consumption largely under the control of the state and helped to popularise national 
notions with regard to the everyday activity of eating. These changes were 
accompanied by an increasingly scientific view of food and its place in domestic and 
international politics.  
Often a type of cuisine or particular foodstuff marks a symbolic boundary 
between the collective self and the other. In the case of Japan, rice is usually seen to 
                                                
1 Quoted in Frank G. Boudreau, ‘Nutrition in War and Peace’, The Millbank Memorial Fund 
Quarterly, Vol. 25, No. 3, (July 1947), pp. 231-246. 
2 Theodore C. Bestor, Tsukiji: The Fish Market at the Center of the World (Berkeley: University 
of California Press), 2004, pp. 126-176. 
3 Eric C. Rath and Stephanie Assmann Eds., Japanese Foodways Past & Present (Chicago: 
University of Illinois Press, 2010), pp. 1-15. 
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perform this task.4 Within Meiji period notions of civilisation and enlightenment, 
eating beef and adopting many of the major foods of the West were seen as a means 
of attaining a greater vigour, stature, and a higher level of cultural attainment for the 
Japanese nation. But ideas of a national cuisine, like ideas of nation, are always a 
modern construct. In early Meiji Japan, the process was very much a top down effort 
led by the state. It was also highly focused on the elite and their own self-perception 
as embodiments of the new ideal of a civilised lifestyle.5 Yet, as the example of Meiji 
Japan clearly shows, national cuisine is also inextricably linked to the historical 
dynamics of any given period. Many of the elements which come to be seen as 
making up any nation’s food culture can usually be tied to the past of a particular 
region, class or group within that nation. But most of the factors that drive change in a 
nation’s diet are universal forces.6 For this reason, it is also important to understand 
the development of a particular national cuisine within the context of the economic 
and social conditions of any given period.7  
Much emphasis has been placed on the postwar Occupation efforts to establish 
the school lunch programme in Japan, and for many it was this programme which 
changed the eating habits of the Japanese people, mainly the younger generation born 
during or after the war.8 Yet as this chapter will demonstrate, the end of the 
Occupation inspired debates and discussions in magazines such as Fujin Kōron, Fujin 
Gaho, Fujin no Tomo and the major newspapers demonstrating the desire of many 
Japanese to move away from the association of diet with the discredited prewar and 
                                                
4 Emiko Ohnuki-Tierney, Rice as Self: Japanese Identities Through Time, (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1993), p. 3. 
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Century East Asia (Farnham: Ashgate, 2013); Shinmura Hiroshi, Shoku to Nigen Keisei: Kyōiku 
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wartime militarism of the Japanese state. The misery of the immediate postwar food 
shortages also served to integrate and interrogate democratic ideas of national strength 
and vitality, and at the same time, commentators began to question the cultural basis 
of certain types of food, in particular the central place of rice in the Japanese diet.  
While the prewar militarisation of nutrition saw the nation’s diet as one 
element of national and military mobilisation — the militarisation of nutrition, as 
Katrzyna Cwiertka has termed it9 — in the postwar period the sustenance provided by 
the national diet, as well as the nature of that diet, became tied to a vision of an 
autonomous country. The Occupation emphasis on democracy and demilitarisation, 
which formed the basis of the political and social structure of the postwar Japanese 
state, strongly influenced postwar ideas of food, diet and nutrition. The ideas of nation 
put forward in the debates in the popular media imagined a nation of free individuals 
working towards the strengthening of the nation in the international arena. This link 
between economic and everyday cultural concerns was facilitated by the fact that 
throughout the late 1940s and early 1950s, the international debate over the role of 
nutrition and dietetics became ever more closely tied to a discourse of modernisation 
and helped foster strong ties between economic and ideological goals. 
This chapter examines how the debates and discussions of politicians, 
commentators and journalists in the popular media at a particular moment in postwar 
Japan broadened ideas of nation in discussion of food and nutrition along lines 
dictated by the deepening tension in the international arena and the particular postwar 
circumstances of the country. The end of colonial imports of rice and other important 
foodstuffs necessitated different ways of thinking about diet for the Japanese people. 
With the colonies lost, domestic agricultural production still below prewar levels and 
the Cold War standoff becoming increasingly more serious, Japan was heavily reliant 
on food imports, mainly from the USA.10 In the popular media politicians, journalists 
and commentators made the connection between food as the philosophical and 
physical sustenance of the nation, and linked it explicitly to the country’s domestic 
conditions and international standing. The ideas that informed this link, however, 
developed out of the policies and concerns of the Allied Occupation and US plans for 
Cold War East Asia. As much as the new school programme imposed by the 
                                                
9 Cwiertka, Modern Japanese Cuisine. 
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Occupation authorities sought to ‘raise social awareness and cultivate a sense of 
individual responsibility’11 as a means of instilling democratic habits in the Japanese 
people, the debate over diet and nutrition tapped in to similar ideas. 
Reforms clearly linked the nutritional value of the food consumed by the 
Japanese to the vitality of the nation. Crawford Sams, head of the Occupation’s 
Health and Welfare Section, led the fight to bring an improved diet to the Japanese 
people. The introduction into the Japanese diet of more animal protein was seen as 
one element of the Occupation’s emphasis on democratisation. The provision of 
school lunches was not just a practical response to the dire problems of malnutrition 
amongst Japanese children, it was also intended to elicit the trust and respect of the 
Japanese people for Occupation reforms. Powdered skimmed milk achieved a 
nutritional purpose, yet it was also a ‘powerful weapon in the Cold War, 
recommending the US as a natural ally of Japan’.12  
Ensuring an adequate and nutritionally beneficial diet was considered an 
important element of the foundations of economic reconstruction in the immediate 
postwar world. In Japan, this brought ideas of nation and economic reconstruction 
together in the discourse over food and culture. As Michael Schneider has shown, 
during the 1920s and 1930s the place of rice in the Japanese diet initiated a debate 
over cultural rule in Korea, which ultimately helped to address the more openly 
economic motives of policies in that colony.13 As the Allied Occupation came to an 
end in 1952 politicians, commentators, journalists and intellectuals directly linked 
ideas of individual and national independence through the national problems of food, 
nutrition and the availability of rice to wider economic concerns. As with the 
intellectual debate over Cultural Rule, examination of these discussions shows that 
they reflected the specific economic and political context of the time. Yet they were 
also a means of disavowing that context in favour of cultural explanations, or 
conversely challenging cultural explanations in light of the domestic conditions of 
Japan in the early 1950s. Japanese politicians and commentators sought to imagine a 
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strong and independent nation reflected in the nutritional value of its diet and the 
improvement of its standards of living, but Japan’s lowly economic position in the 
international arena was also seen as preventing any improvements to the Japanese 
diet. 
The first section of this chapter will outline the historical development of the 
discourse on nutrition and diet and its connection to postwar reconstruction. The 
second section will set out the postwar context within which the debate over food and 
nutrition developed in the popular media. Economic necessity in the early 1950s was 
particularly relevant in continuing the wartime move away from consumption of rice 
as the foremost staple food, and this led to the questioning of the apparently cultural 
(traditional) over-reliance on white rice in the diet of the Japanese people 
(shokuseikatsu). These factors lead into the third section, which shows how the debate 
over relaxing government controls over rice emphasised Cold War ideals of free 
market capitalism. The debate used rice as a means to connect the Japanese people as 
a free people (dokuritsu kokumin) to wider concerns over Japan’s economic 
development in the Cold War. Finally the chapter will examine how discussion of 
nutrition and diet in the popular media came to reflect the economic and strategic 
realities of the early 1950s. Politicians, journalists and commentators evinced ideas of 
a strong and healthy nation through discussion of the health and physique of the 
Japanese people, and such debates often disavowed the economic basis for the low 
stature of both the country and its people through the seemingly passive and impartial 
science of nutrition. 
 
Food and Power 
In Britain, the industrial revolution and the growth of city slums had made the poverty 
of the diet consumed by the vast majority of factory workers directly visible. Yet 
when the Quaker philanthropist Seebohm Rowntree reported at the beginning of the 
20th Century that most adults and children in York existed on not much more than 
white bread with tea, he was met by an apathetic response. Rowntree’s first report 
was published in 1899, yet it was not until over a decade later, as the First World War 
began in Europe, that the claim by the head of the British Army Medical Service that 
no less than 40% of volunteers had to be rejected on medical grounds sparked the 
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government into action.14 The First World War in Europe and the beginning of 
imperialist expansion in Japan saw an emerging focus on the necessity of feeding and 
maintaining a military capable of fighting. The poverty of the industrial revolution 
was glaringly evident, spurring discussions regarding social policy in nineteenth-
century Britain and Japan.15 Like Rowntree in Britain, Kagawa Toyohiko raised the 
problem of an inadequate diet in his attempts to outline the experience of modern 
mass poverty in Taishō Japan.16 Yet it was through attempts at improving the 
appalling physical condition of the military conscript that diet and food became an 
essential part of the government’s wider social modernisation programme in both 
countries.  
In Japan, the Imperial Government Institution for Nutrition was set up in 1920 
in response to the rice riots of 1918. Throughout the following decade nutritional 
advice came to feature regularly in cookery books and women’s magazines and 
gradually became increasingly dominant in the printed media. It was also an 
important element in the push to improve lifestyles in prewar Japan, with middle-class 
women’s groups taking the knowledge into rural areas.17 The Military Diet Research 
Committee, set up in 1921, carried out research into the nutritional values of fish and 
meat, and played a large role in helping to create dishes with a high-calorie and high-
protein content. Ultimately, this research helped create cheap and nutritious meals for 
serving conscripts.18 At the same time, this practical application of nutritional advice 
to national goals led to ‘an array of measures that resulted in the proliferation of the 
military model of efficient nourishment among the civilian population’.19 Throughout 
the 1930s and 1940s, nutritional knowledge was rapidly transformed from a scientific 
domain of specialists into practical advice for the people. While the military played a 
role in placing rice at the centre of the Japanese diet, by offering the prospect of rice 
three times a day to attract recruits from rural areas,20 this was also true for factory 
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owners seeking to employ rural women by peddling luxuries which were not available 
in agricultural villages.21 
In Japan, for Kataryzna Cwiertka, unlike ‘the ideological aspects of wartime 
life, which were persistently erased by the occupying forces after 1945, the 
knowledge and skills of a healthy diet disseminated in wartime were perpetuated 
undisturbed despite the fall of the regime’.22 Yet this view disregards the ideological 
aspects of the science of nutrition itself, and the ways in which the development of the 
science in the 1920s, 1930s and postwar was linked to economic concerns and the 
wider international situation.23 It was the late nineteenth century discovery of the 
calorific value of the consumption of different types of food that allowed the 
emergence of a statistical and more scientific approach to the topic. At the same time, 
in postwar Japan discussion of nutrition and national diet were perpetuated to serve 
different ends. The wartime Japanese state looked to nutritionists to create a ‘national 
food’ (kokuminshoku), which would show Japan as a strong imperial power on the 
international stage, and distinguish the home islands from the empire.24 The centrality 
of rice to the diet was a reflection of the power over and control of rice-producing 
areas in East and South-East Asia. Postwar, new ideas and new ways of thinking 
about Japanese national cuisine were no less tied to a dominant ideological discourse, 
which reflected the altered balance of power in the region and its changing economic 
priorities. This discourse operated within the language of the Cold War, and in the 
context of the United States’ plans for Japan in the region as the Occupation came to 
an end. Where the prewar bureaucrats had seen diet as an important weapon for 
gaining support on the home front, the Occupation authorities, as Christopher Aldous 
and Akihito Suzuki have shown, saw tackling the problems of Japanese nutrition as 
intrinsic to the success of their policies of democratisation and demilitarisation.25 The 
science could be harnessed for both ideological and economic ends.  
Wilbur Atman’s 1896 experiments with a calorimeter — a machine designed 
to measure the combustive efficiency of explosives and engines — helped render the 
consumption of food into hard figures. The statistical results produced by locking 
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students in the machine and measuring the movement of heat, matter and air as they 
consumed various food types and performed different physical and mental exertions 
had political ramifications. The discovery of ‘how far a man ought to ride a bicycle on 
one egg’ helped to produce tables that assigned calorie counts to specific foods and 
tasks. But, as Nick Cullather points out, ‘the calorie has never been a neutral, 
objective measure of the contents of a dinner plate. From the first its purpose was to 
render food, and the eating habits of populations, politically legible.’26 In the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, states came to use food as a political 
instrument of control over their own populations and, importantly, to match diet with 
agricultural production. 
The new science allowed comparisons between classes and between nations. 
By losing its subjective, cultural character, food could play a part in ‘an evolving 
developmental discourse that registered the requirements and aspirations of nations 
largely in numerical terms’. It could become ‘a material instrument of statecraft’.27 
For the United States in the 1920s and 30s, what emerged was the belief that food 
consumption could be comparable between nations and time periods, and that the 
state had a duty to ensure a balance in the supply of food and the dietary needs of the 
nation.28 Scientific rationality could be subordinated to economic realities, and 
ideological goals could be harnessed to the rationalisation of everyday life. By the 
1930s, the task of improving diet and emphasising nutrition was linked to the 
production and supply of foodstuffs on an international scale. In Japan this was 
manifested by the development of the idea of Kokuminshoku as Korean rice provided 
the means for more and more Japanese people to place rice at the centre of their 
everyday diet. Wider economic goals thus became entwined with the science of 
nutrition and the provision and utilisation of surplus agricultural production.  
In the 1930s, in response to the rise of political extremism and economic 
stagnation in the world economy, the League of Nations launched the World Food 
Movement and related the supply of food and good nutrition to much wider economic 
benefits. As Frank Boudreau explained in the late 1940s, the movement was 
‘designed to release the economic jam by emphasizing that adequate diets were 
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essential to human health, and that in supplying the raw materials for such diets, 
agriculture throughout the world would rise from its depression and in rising carry 
with it the industries needed to supply farm machinery, fertilizers, housing, roads, 
marketing equipment, and other essentials for agricultural rehabilitation’.29 With the 
end of the war in 1945, Atwater’s calorimeter could translate ‘the vernacular customs 
of food into the numerical language of empire’.30 The Recommended Dietary 
Allowance (RDA) developed for the United States armed forces and civilians during 
the war soon became an international reference system for dietary standards and was 
used for calculating food relief for the overseas population.31 With the arrival of 
American-led Occupation forces in Japan, the perpetuation of the knowledge and 
skills of a healthy diet would be tied to the economic and ideological goals of the 
developing Cold War. Just as in wartime the development of nutrition and dietetics 
had been tied to the economic concerns of Empire,32 after 1945 the development of a 
national cuisine in Japan would be dictated by the economic priorities of United 
States plans and strategic aims for the revival and reintegration of the country.  
The postwar international food order developed as part of the larger economic 
and political arrangements of the postwar period within which ideas of nation in Japan 
were discussed and debated. As the postwar order took shape and the Cold War 
deepened, US grain surpluses became a resource in international relations. In this 
context, efforts to find customers for the large surpluses of American grain became 
entwined with attempts to solve complex political and military problems abroad.33 
One way to secure the allegiance of strategically important countries ‘was to provide 
economic assistance, including, and especially, food aid. The rationale of prominent 
political leaders was that countries receiving US aid were more likely to be US allies’. 
Food for war and food for peace became the order of the day.34 The GARIOA 
(Government and Relief in Occupied Areas) programme provided $400 million in 
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annual assistance to Japan to buy foodstuffs, clothing, medical supplies, fertilizer and 
petroleum.35 In Japan between 1945 and 1952, 60% of economic aid received from 
GARIOA and EROA (Economic Rehabilitation in Occupied Areas) came in the form 
of wheat and rice imports to feed the Japanese people.36  
By the end of the occupation in 1952, fear of communism and fear of hunger, 
poverty and despair in Japan led the chief negotiator of the San Francisco Peace 
Treaty, John Foster Dulles, to emphasise the fact that if ‘world trade becomes so 
divided into restraining compartments that raw materials do not flow, that you have 
widespread unemployment and undernourishment in Japan, the Japanese will go 
communist.’37 United States food aid to Japan grew and was extended on the basis of 
such fears, which also echoed the worries of Crawford Sams during the Occupation as 
he tried to come to terms with the perceived necessity of changing the Japanese diet. 
Indeed, Sams explicitly linked US domestic farm surpluses to the aims of Cold War 
policy because in his opinion it had become the responsibility of the US ‘whether we 
like it or not to assume a position of world leadership. So long as our own great 
country is a farm surplus producing country…we should consider as long-term 
foreign aid for peoples of underdeveloped nations that we are trying to keep on our 
side those programs for our mutual benefit.’38 The impact on ideas of nation in Japan 
can be seen in the contours of the discussion and debate around national diet as the 
Occupation came to an end. Trade with China was boycotted by the US and its allies, 
Korea was still at war and Taiwan was in no position to offer food for export. The 
former colonial masters found their food supply intimately connected to the shifting 
Cold War concerns of the United States.  
In this context, while the wartime diet emphasised the centrality of rice to 
Japanese national cuisine and introduced new dishes, the chronic shortage of rice in 
the postwar period led not only to its diminishing quantitative importance and the 
gradually increasing consumption of bread and noodles, but also to a preponderance 
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of meat and fish side-dishes.39 As Shinmura Hiroshi has argued, the political, social 
and economic effects of Japan’s position ‘under the umbrella of American food 
supplies’ were evident in debates and discussions over the nature of postwar school 
meals. Although the assumption that school meals could effect a transformation in the 
morals and patriotic feelings of Japanese children was clearly one facet of the prewar 
and wartime ideas of kokuminshoku,40 the difference in the early 1950s was in the 
types of food available. If the diet of the Japanese people changed as a result of the 
growth of empire, the postwar shift reflected the cheap supply of American wheat and 
flour and the developing Cold War.  
During the Occupation, as Michael Schaller has noted, American food aid to 
Japan, which took care of surplus production in the US, actually prevented Japan’s 
participation in the market for Southeast Asian food produce, particularly rice.41 By 
the late 1940s, the importance of Japan for surplus US wheat production was 
becoming clear. As early as 1947, Oregon wheat producers had lobbied for an 
independent commission which would allow growers to pool their resources to carry 
out assessments of the situation in Japan ‘for the purposes of education, promotion 
and research’.42 In the prewar period, global US exports of wheat and flour amounted 
to a mere six million bushels annually, yet by 1948-1949, as Cold War concerns 
deepened, the amount stood at 104 million bushels. The conclusion of the 
international wheat agreement in 1949 served to price the United States out of much 
of the market for wheat. Yet Japan remained outside the agreement and, as the Far 
East Grain Mission report of 1950 pointed out, was supplied with wheat ‘largely on 
the basis of funds appropriated by the United States’.43 The United States Grain 
Advisory Committee, operating under the Research and Marketing Act, sent the Far 
East Grain Mission to study market potential for US wheat in the region. In its report, 
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the mission was clear about the potential Japan and other countries of the region 
presented to the US market. The mission concluded that the ‘wheat requirements of 
Japan and India alone could provide satisfactory outlets for the entire surplus wheat of 
the Pacific Northwest’.44  
At the same time, the International Wheat Agreement also kept the price of 
rice higher than that of wheat in the market more generally.45 Japan gradually became 
an important importer of grains other than rice. So much so that by the end of the 
1950s the country accounted for 5% of the world total for grain imports and 8% for 
wheat.46 As one US congressman put in 1964, ‘the American sponsorship of Japanese 
schools meals had made Japanese children like milk and bread and made Japan the 
largest customer for American agricultural products’.47 But the results were more than 
simply economic. The science of dietetics and nutrition transformed the ways in 
which commentators discussed the issue of food. The early stages of US wheat 
promotion in Japan began with a ‘soft sell’ phase ‘where market development projects 
were mainly directed toward educating consumers to improve their nutrition and 
general health through increased consumption of wheat products’.48 The science of 
dietetics may have presented itself as neutral and passive, but in the popular media as 
the Occupation came to an end it nevertheless reinforced the discourse put forward by 
the Occupation authorities regarding the inadequacies and inefficiencies of the 
Japanese diet. This worked to ensure that Cold War economic realities were reflected 
in ideas of nation and national cuisine.  
That this was a cultural concern was not lost on commentators, journalists or 
politicians. The consumption of different grains had a massive impact on the Japanese 
diet as wheat based dishes gradually became more common.49 The debate in the 
media at the end of the Occupation helped lay the discursive groundwork for much of 
this shift. The idea that the Japanese people needed to vary their diet more in order to 
become physically stronger was connected to the economic necessity of rebuilding the 
country. It would be necessary to work together to improve the diet and lifestyle of 
the nation, whilst in the context of the Cold War, encouraging a belief in and desire 
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for individual autonomy. A social approach to the apparently neutral science of 
nutrition offered a means to integrate the everyday cultural aspects of the Japanese 
diet into the very real Cold War concerns of the early 1950s and the economic 
development of the Free World. The intensity of the debate in the popular media 
reflected both the domestic experience of the immediate postwar and the instability of 
the international situation. 
Feeding the Nation 
During the early years of the US led Occupation that followed the Japanese surrender 
in 1945, shortages and problems in the collection and distribution of staple foods 
ensured that, in the words of one historian, the Supreme Command for Allied Powers’ 
(SCAP) ‘economic policy for Japan was its food policy’. Food took up approximately 
70% of a family’s budget, and factories found it hard to maintain their workforces as 
workers took time off due to physical weakness, or simply to sell goods on the black 
market.50 More than 15% of civil servants took time off to search for food and the 
metropolitan police in Tokyo even went as far as providing staff with ‘food holidays’ 
on a monthly basis.51 After the surrender in the summer of 1945, the price of rice and 
other foodstuffs had soared as the dissolution of Japan’s empire meant importing was 
no longer a cheap and easy option. In the 1930s, 31% of Japan’s rice came from the 
colonies and much of the domestic food and industrial production had been destroyed 
in the war. On top of this, the 1945 harvest was the worst since 1910 and only 40% of 
the expected yield was taken. Just feeding those lucky enough to have survived the 
war was a huge task, and hunger and scarcity defined everyday life.52  
Up to the mid-1930s the percentage of rice in the Japanese diet had been 
around 70%.53 But by 1945, the supply of rice had reached near starvation levels at 
80kg per capita per year, and barley and potatoes had become a common, though 
increasingly rare staple food.54 As SCAP reported to former US President and 
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Chairman of the Famine Emergency Committee Herbert Hoover in a summary of the 
situation in 1946, the magnitude of the food deficit in Japan was ‘unprecedented in 
Japanese history’. SCAP predicted that without food imports the urban population of 
Japan would be reduced to an average consumption level below 700 calories per 
day.55 Indeed by May 1946 people living in Tokyo received only 775 calories from 
the official ration, and Hoover’s own conclusions in May 1946 predicted conditions 
‘much like those at Buchenwald and Belsen concentration camps if imports were not 
forthcoming’.56 Famine also threatened the stability of occupied West Germany as the 
people there were surviving on 1,200 calories a day and US Army officials warned 
that without additional food they would lose ‘the great struggle…to prevent 
[Germany] going communistic’.57 Harbouring the same fears for Japan, Occupation 
policy focused on rebuilding agriculture and concentrating the collection and 
distribution of food, but for the most part SCAP’s efforts in the first two years were 
attempts to prevent mass starvation. As John Dower points out, until 1949 the 
majority of Japanese were preoccupied with obtaining the bare necessities for daily 
subsistence.58 
The provision of a subsistence food supply adequate enough to keep mass 
starvation at bay fitted well in the early years of the Occupation with the policy of 
democratisation and demilitarisation. There was little desire to help the former enemy, 
and the Occupation authorities treated food shortages as a matter of low priority. This 
policy changed drastically by mid-1947, however, and American food imports 
became the most basic component of US attempts to reindustrialise the Japanese and 
West German economies.59 In the aftermath of 1945, food shortages were a 
worldwide phenomenon not restricted to Japan, but by 1949, spurred by the 
surprisingly rapid recovery of European agriculture, world food production had at last 
moved into surplus. As a consequence, the amount of food Japan could import 
increased. This allowed the government to begin to relax food controls. Potatoes, 
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sweet potatoes and wheat were all de-rationed in September of 1949. Prime Minister 
of the time Yoshida Shigeru claimed this policy marked the end of the postwar food 
crisis and connected it to the government aim of promoting economic recovery 
through free competition. As Takemae Eiji points out, by 1949 the nutritional value of 
food rations finally reached the level necessary to sustain a healthy life.60 Yet for the 
most part the cities remained worse off than the countryside. 
Economist Yoshikawa Hiroshi has portrayed 1950 as the end of postwar 
disruption and the beginning of the high growth period. In 1950, before the beginning 
of the export boom created by the start of hostilities on the Korean peninsula, around 
50% of the population lived and worked in agricultural industries in farming villages. 
By the last years of the Occupation, most households in these farming areas were 
‘living a traditional lifestyle in a society which was 50% self-sufficient’. 61 Japanese 
cities were by no means self-sufficient for food requirements though, and the thriving 
black markets made this clear to anybody who walked around them. By 1949, these 
markets were mainly selling durable goods rather than food, but homelessness and 
poverty were still major problems. Although most food rationing ended in the early 
1950s, ‘the black market for currency, imported and luxury goods, and even rice, 
continued on a much smaller scale into the 1960s’.62  
On a national level in 1950, food accounted for around one third of Japan’s 
imports. The following year this had declined to one quarter. By the end of the 
Occupation in 1952, domestic rice production had returned to prewar levels. 
However, it had failed to keep pace with population growth, and without the colonies 
the amount of imported rice was less than half the average of the 1930s.63 Despite the 
increase in production in the early 1950s and the availability of imported rice in the 
1930s, white rice had for a long time been considered a luxury item and, in an era of 
wartime shortages, eating brown rice was stressed as the antidote to many health 
                                                
60 Takemae, The Allied Occupation, p. 79. 
61Yoshikawa Hiroshi, Kōdo Seichō: Nihon o Kaeta 6000Nichi, (Tokyo: Yomiuri Shimbunsha, 
1997), pp. 29-33.  
62 Owen Griffiths, ‘Need, Greed and protest in Japan’s Black Market, 1938-1949.’ Journal of 
Social History, Vol 35. No. 4 (Summer 2002), pp. 849-850. Griffiths claims that in October 1945 
there had been as many as 45,000 open air stalls employing some 80,000 people in Tokyo alone. 
63 Jerome B. Cohen, Economic Problems of Free Japan, (Princeton: Princeton University, 1952), 
pp. 8-18. See table 7 for the figures. 
68 
 
problems.64 Indeed by the end of 1939, the government banned the consumption of 
polished white rice and the people were urged to use unpolished rice and mix it with 
other grains.65 As John Dower has noted, as early as 1946, with rice rations 
disappearing ‘it was announced that the “era of flour” has arrived’, and bread-making 
became essential to survival.66 The postwar food crisis and the rationing of staple 
foods in wartime gave impetus to the debate over nutrition and the national diet.  
Food control measures during the US-led Occupation were mostly an 
extension of wartime policies established by the Japanese government. From the 
middle of 1937, staple foods gradually came under greater government control.67 The 
1938 National General Mobilisation Law gave the Japanese state unprecedented 
power over people and resources, and by 1942 the central government had taken 
comprehensive control over the collection and distribution of staple foodstuffs.68 In 
the same year food rationing, which had been established in the six largest Japanese 
cities in April 1941, was extended across the nation.69 From the end of 1945, the 
collection of quotas was the ‘area of most direct and intensive occupation 
participation’; preventing the hoarding of rice and its infiltration onto the black 
market was a priority for the authorities.70 The problems of the distribution and 
supply of rice remained precarious until the early 1950s. Still, by the beginning of 
1952 the Japanese government was hoping to remove restrictions on the sale of rice 
under the banner of free market economics, and this issue became closely tied with 
ideas of nation as the Occupation ended.  
Despite government efforts to increase the output of domestic rice and other 
staple foods through a five year plan announced in 1952,71 the proclamation of the 
end of ‘a deep attachment to rice’ in the subtitle of a New Year interview with 
politician Ikeda Hayato in the Asahi Shimbun hinted at the difficulties involved. The 
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article gave out a call to action to provide cheaper rice but also to find alternative 
sources of nutrition for the population. Acknowledging that the end of the Japanese 
Empire meant that it was no longer possible to import large amounts of rice, the Asahi 
article also recognised that there was ‘a limit to self-sufficiency’.72 Addressing 
questions of food and nutrition by invoking the diet of the nation allowed politicians, 
journalists and commentators to tie concerns over the quality of the national diet and 
memories of postwar and wartime scarcity to the wider national goal of independence 
and the economic reconstruction that independence required. This implicitly 
harnessed the wartime idea of national diet to the Cold War Free World ideology 
within which Japan would emerge as a Free Country.  
A Free People (Dokuritsu Kokumin) 
The postwar vision for the Free World saw the free flow of goods and commerce as 
essential. The Bretton Woods system and institutions such as the IMF (International 
Monetary Fund) and the World Bank aimed to lubricate this exchange. In the 
immediate postwar period, the Marshall Plan, GARIO and EROA were designed to 
ensure that those countries which had suffered the ravages of war would have the 
means to rebuild their economies within an economic system, integrating prewar 
spheres of influence structured around the United States and free market democratic 
ideals. As Charles S. Maier has pointed out, the aim was to create a ‘sphere of trade 
and exchange that posed no barrier to United States economic doctrines or ambition’. 
Through its policy making, Washington took on commitments between 1945 and the 
late 1960s, which aided the establishment of a wide-reaching zone of trade, payments 
and investments conducive to liberal capitalism.73 Japan played a crucial role in this 
system, and in 1952 economic concerns over implementing a free market in the 
supply and provision of rice for the Japanese people became linked by politicians, 
journalists and commentators to questions of national culture through the debate over 
its nutritional value. 
The political and ideological goal of re-introducing the free market to the 
supply of food was one of the stated aims of the United States Mutual Security Act of 
1951. In return for aid, section 516 stated that the act would ‘eliminate the barriers to, 
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and provide the incentives for, a steadily increased participation of free private 
enterprise in developing the resources of foreign countries…’74 In this context the 
issue of food, particularly rice as a staple food in Japan, was related in the popular 
media to a sense of personal responsibility and freedom of choice by politicians, 
journalists and commentators. With the official end of the Occupation in May 1952, 
this was mirrored and made explicitly national by the image of a free Japan. While 
some may have lamented the gradual decline in the status of rice in the diet of the 
Japanese people, it had to give way in the early 1950s to the domestic necessity of 
finding nutritious and affordable food and the international requirement to build a 
strong, autonomous Free World economy. 
In 1954, two years after the end of the occupation, Agriculture and Fisheries 
minister Akagi Munenori bemoaned the decline in rice consumption and blamed it on 
the ship-loads of American food coming to Japan to ‘stamp out revolution’.75 From 
1948 to just after the end of the Occupation in 1953, the average Japanese consumed 
just over 1,900 calories per day. Compared to the mid-1930s, per capita consumption 
of rice had declined so that between 1951 and 1955 calories from rice made up around 
half of the daily diet of the Japanese. In contrast, the amount of wheat in the diet had 
almost doubled compared to the 1930s.76 Yet the gradual shift from rice as a staple 
food had begun in the wartime era and was being actively encouraged by the media in 
1952. This shift was also strongly influenced by the international situation at the time. 
On January 6th 1952, an editorial appeared in the Yomiuri newspaper decrying the fact 
that the financial conditions of the country and the ever shifting international situation 
had ‘pulled food prices left and right’ over the past year. According to the newspaper, 
the quality and quantity of imported rice had been less than adequate. Worse still, the 
amount of rice the government would be able to import could soon be limited by what 
the newspaper referred to as ‘the crisis in East Asia’.77 The newspaper raised the 
spectre of rice decreasing from 55% of the people’s diet to 50% over the year, due to 
what it called ‘blunders’ by the government. The unstable international situation was 
an important factor in the food choices of the Japanese people in the early 1950s, but 
it served to reinforce the emphasis on Japan’s place in the Free World. 
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The August 1952 edition of the magazine Fujin no Tomo carried a Problem of 
the Month article entitled ‘Has the Food Problem Been Solved?’ According to 
Kawano Shigeto, a Tokyo University Professor specialising in agricultural 
development, there was still a food problem for Japanese housewives but it was no 
longer about the absolute shortage of food. Kawano explicitly linked Japan’s position 
in the international economy to the place of rice in the diet of the Japanese people. 
The main complaint of Japanese housewives had changed from one of ‘there is an 
absolute shortage so I cannot buy it’ to ‘it’s available but I cannot buy it because it’s 
too expensive’.78 The increasing price of rice and the more common availability of 
wheat were intimately tied to the international situation. Kawano noted that even 
before the war a gap in consumption patterns for grains had been evident between the 
rural areas and the big cities. In Kawano’s opinion, in the agricultural villages before 
the wartime restrictions on foodstuffs there had been a gradual improvement in diet as 
people moved from sweet potatoes to rice as a staple food. At the same time, in urban 
areas there was a greater consumption of more expensive yet more nutritious bread.79 
After the war everything changed. It was understandable that the defeat had 
brought about a decline in consumption, but the poor state of the economy should 
have decreased the demand for more expensive bread. Because rice was cheaper, the 
demand for it should have increased. It was here that Kawano acknowledged the 
international environment as having a huge impact. With rice imports lost from 
Japan’s former colonial possessions, Taiwan and Korea, rice was becoming more 
expensive and so the demand for it was falling, just as demand for cheaper staples 
such as wheat increased. According to Kawano, the decline in the overall level of 
consumption in Japan and the decreasing availability of rice made it a much more 
precious commodity.80 Now, the government’s plan to abolish controls over rice 
meant that the rice price, given the international situation, would be inherently 
unstable on the market. Although he did not explicitly mention the dominance of 
wheat in the food imported from the United States, Kawano did at least note that until 
1950, financial support from the US was overwhelmingly responsible for funding 
                                                
78 ‘Shokuryō Mondai wa Kaiketsu Shita ka’, Fujin no tomo, August 1952, p. 21. 
79 Ibid.  
80 Ibid. As noted, rice imports were around half of pre-war levels although domestic production 
was back to the levels of the 1930s. See Cohen, Economic Problems of Free Japan, p. 15 and table 
seven for consumption figures.  
72 
 
Japan’s food imports. He urged readers to bear in mind that if the international 
situation got any worse there could be a problem with Japanese exports. This would 
lead to a decline in the country’s ability to pay for its food imports again and, should 
that happen, there could be a ‘return to the hunger and starvation of the immediate 
postwar period’.81  
The stability that appeared to have returned to the world stage was only 
temporary. Kawano correctly concluded that the problem ran much deeper than 
simply the abolition of controls over rice and the prices of staple foodstuffs. If the 
food situation appeared stable in 1952, it was down to Japan’s procurement policies. 
If imports from foreign countries were stopped, Kawano claimed there would be 
enough food stockpiled for a year and then the starvation and hunger of the immediate 
postwar period would return. For him, that was the ‘real power of and the reality 
behind’ the so-called stability of the food situation in Japan. In such a context, being 
self-sufficient was the best form of national defence, and Kawano even equated it 
with the issue of rearmament. The relaxation of controls on wheat meant an easing of 
the problem and some stability, but this was ‘based on nothing but a fleeting stability 
in the international environment within which our country finds itself,’ and ‘it goes 
beyond the simple question of the control over or the price of rice’.82 
In this context, as the Occupation came to an end with rice becoming more 
expensive, it was the perceived traditional over-dependency on rice as a staple food 
that concerned many. In the January 1952 edition of the housewives’ magazine Fujin 
Kōron, politician Ikeda Hayato attempted to disavow the wider economic and 
strategic causes of the decline in rice consumption. Ikeda had been Finance Minister 
in 1950 under Yoshida Shigeru, and would become Prime Minister in 1960 
advocating the income-doubling plan. While working in the Finance Ministry for 
about a month in late 1952, Ikeda made a series of comments regarding the economic 
difficulties faced by small business and the poor. Particularly notable was his 
assertion that ‘in the transition from an inflationary to a stabilised economy, it cannot 
be helped if some businessmen…go bankrupt and are forced to commit suicide’.83 He 
was eventually forced to resign in December 1952. Significantly, Fujin Kōron 
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introduced Ikeda as a former finance minister, although his most important role at the 
time had been in negotiating the San Francisco Peace Treaty and the concomitant 
Mutual Security Agreement with its emphasis on free markets. This became the US-
Japan Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement in 1954, which further deepened 
economic links between the two countries and caused Akagi Munenori to bemoan the 
ubiquity of US wheat.  
In the magazine interview, Ikeda argued that the government was doing its 
best to ease any shortages of rice by increasing imports to keep the price down. But he 
acknowledged that the cost and availability of rice, particularly in the cities, continued 
to be a major problem. The implementation of free market policies was essential to 
tackling shortages. Ikeda saw this as the best method of overcoming the problems of 
consumption, distribution and most importantly quality. It would also take care of the 
existence of the black market. He assured his interviewer, journalist Hiramura Taiko, 
that government controls over the distribution of rice would definitely be eased over 
the coming year and explicitly linked the issue to the end of the Occupation. In 
Ikeda’s view, there was a need for an autonomous Japanese people. Japan would need 
to take responsibility on the world stage as a free country (dokuritsu koku) and, in the 
same way, the Japanese people needed to establish a free national lifestyle (dokuritsu 
kokumin seikatsu). But Hiramura was concerned that the end of government controls 
over rice would not improve quality or availability. She was concerned that relaxing 
economic controls over the market in rice could result in an even more uneven 
distribution of food.  
As noted above, the cities were dependent on the countryside for their food 
provisions and under a free market for rice; Hiramura was concerned that those in the 
countryside would be able to get hold of more rice than the people in the cities. In the 
immediate aftermath of the defeat, people from urban areas had regularly travelled to 
the countryside to barter and exchange goods for food. Both Ikeda and Hiramura 
agreed that this inequality in food distribution was something that needed to be 
avoided. Ikeda, however, did not see the policy of de-rationing as the problem. He 
pointed to the quite significant inequalities that already existed under the controlled 
system. While in Tokyo only fifteen days’ worth of rice was given out each month, in 
more rural Niigata the amount was 25 days’ worth. On the black market this resulted 
in a price differential of eighty yen. Somebody was pocketing the profit. Ikeda was 
adamant that, ‘in the situation where we are about to become a free people (dokuritsu 
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kokumin) I do not want this inequality as a precondition (zentei toshite) of our 
independence’. He emphasised the fact that the ‘present law is criminalising most of 
the Japanese people’. After all, ‘is there anyone in the cities who has not sold rice on 
the black market?’84 For Hiramura, that sounded like surrender to disorder — 
‘because there is some disorder now, let’s make everything disordered!’ She found it 
timely to remind the politicians that those at the bottom of society could not even 
afford to buy their rationed amount of rice. So even though the government had raised 
the amount of rice it had procured, and according to Ikeda would easily be able to 
solve any problems of distribution, many people would be unable to afford to eat it 
anyway. For Hiramura, it was hard to see how the release of controls over rice would 
help. 
Nevertheless, Ikeda was convinced that free market economics was the best 
way forward and that the problem could be solved by better procurement and 
improved distribution. In his opinion, if the government were able to provide enough 
imported rice the price would not increase too much. If it did increase, the 
government would do all it could to make it cheaper. As Laura Hein has shown, 
leading economists pushed ideas of democracy through individual economic 
responsibility, seeing ‘household economics as one of the important ways in which 
democracy and peace could be safeguarded’.85 The most important thing for Ikeda 
was to promote individual choice. If the price of rice increased and wheat became 
cheaper, he believed people could ‘think and economise for themselves’, and decide 
what was best to eat.86 Food was what the people required, and promotion of the free 
market would provide this, but at the same time, the promotion of individual 
responsibility was essential.  
To strengthen his argument for the workings of the free market, Ikeda attacked 
those who had criticised the de-rationing of fish and vegetables. He pointed out that 
the result of the relaxation of controls over those foods had been ‘an improvement in 
their quality and quantity through the free market’. In much the same way, Ikeda 
claimed, the de-rationing of rice would push farmers to produce better quality, more 
nutritious rice, and simple market economics would mean that ‘if good rice is 
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expensive and bad rice is cheap it is economical behaviour for farmers to produce 
more good rice’. Hiramura wasn’t too convinced though, and the exchange continued: 
 
Hiramura: That maybe the case for the producers but, as for the 
consumers, given the present impoverished conditions, rich people will 
be able to afford to eat domestically produced rice, while the poor will 
have to take foreign imported rice along with wheat, roots and shoots. 
 
Ikeda: That is natural. I think that is the basis of economics. If politics 
ignores that it will not be good politics. 
 
Hiramura: If that happens through a natural laissez-faire policy is it 
not the job of politics to put a stop to it?87 
 
For Ikeda and the government, the hope was that with improved distribution the free 
market would promote the quality and availability of rice.  
Yet, despite this professed belief in the rationality of the people in the face of 
a free market, there was an irrational cultural attachment to rice, which Ikeda believed 
the people needed to overcome. The Japanese people were too reliant on rice in their 
diet, and this was a big problem. In response to Hiramura’s concerns over equality 
and the free market, he admitted that for him the biggest challenge was to change the 
pattern of the Japanese diet. Rice was essential, but Ikeda stressed the importance of 
side dishes. Using the analogy of rail travel, he admitted that if people only ate rice 
free market reforms would lead to the rich travelling first class while the poor would 
be stuck in third class. It was his intention as a politician to see to it that everybody 
was able to travel in first class, and providing foods other than rice was an important 
step towards this goal. Moreover, Ikeda explicitly linked a change in the eating habits 
of the Japanese people to the improvement of the national economy. All the efforts of 
the government and the people had to be focused on the international stage to increase 
and develop the country’s exports: 
 
Our priority is to make this country an independent trading nation. To 
this end, whether we like it or not, I predict we need to change the 
pattern of our eating lifestyle (diet). Through this, Japanese people will 
be gradually released from a reliance on rice, bringing bread into the 
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diet, and in this way, at the same time as increasing the number of 
calories consumed, we will improve the physique of the people.88 
 
Mention of the physique of the Japanese people was an indication of a broader 
discourse within the newspapers and magazines, but these comments also pointed to 
deeper problems facing the country. While soba noodles, bread and butter and the 
sweet potato offered the means to survive relatively cheaply, the availability and 
accessibility of food gradually became profoundly linked to the economic position of 
postwar Japan, both domestically and internationally. The government felt that food 
issues could be solved through the introduction of a free market, accompanied by a 
change in the eating habits of the Japanese people. But Ikeda also broadened this out 
and related it directly to the future economic development of an autonomous country. 
The people needed to become independent, responsible for themselves and their 
household budgets, just as Japan needed to take its place on the international stage. 
The need for a change in the eating habits of the Japanese people was not simply a 
political response to temporary problems with the availability of rice, or the need to 
combat black market racketeering. It was closely linked to the idea of a ‘free Japan’ 
and linked the wartime discussions of national cuisine directly to the Cold War 
concerns of the Japanese state. At the same time, food and good diet were put forward 
as the key to economic growth by providing a strong workforce. By necessity this 
challenged the idea of rice as a central aspect of Japanese culture and ideas of nation. 
The science of nutrition and the convenience of international comparisons reinforced 
the importance of a healthy diet to the image of Japan as a free country and the need 
for the rational individual to decide what was best within the economic constraints of 
their own everyday life.  
Nutrition (Kokumin Eiyō) 
In 1952, Japanese cinemagoers flocked to see Bitter Rice, a 1949 Italian film starring 
Silvana Mangano. The film, which was nominated for an Academy Award for best 
story in 1950, follows workers in the rice fields of the Po Valley in the North of Italy 
after the war. Two small-time thieves, Francesca and Walter, befriend Silvana, a 
peasant rice worker. Francesca persuades Silvana to find her work in the rice fields, 
which with the help of the other workers she does. Silvana eventually falls in love 
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with the crook Walter, who persuades her to help him steal rice from the storehouses 
during the festival following the end of the growing season. After helping Walter, 
Silvana is overcome with guilt, and a deep sense of her betrayal of the other women 
workers. This guilt leads her to take her own life as recompense. The film closes with 
the women who work in the fields taking the rice they have received and one by one 
covering her body, before walking away from the rice fields and returning to their 
home towns. 
The film was a great success in Europe and made a star of the lead actress 
Silvana Mangano, who brought more than just her acting ability to brighten the lives 
of audiences of the time. On its release in Japan in 1952, it also caught the popular 
imagination. According to a review of the film in the Asahi Shimbun, the 
‘overpowering fleshiness’ of the actress in the eponymous role of Silvana (Silvana 
Mangano) could be taken in two ways. While she ‘sparkles with feminine beauty’ she 
was also a daydreamer, who nevertheless ‘bursting with flesh’ ‘efficiently goes about 
the demanding work of the rice fields’.89 According to the review, the film could be 
appreciated in Japan on a deeper level than simply entertainment. Being set in a ‘rice 
producing area’ the film, which in the words of the reviewer ‘does not turn away from 
[addressing] the times,’ would be easily understood by Japanese people. 
Critic Hazumi Tsuneo, in the magazine Fujin Gahō, also claimed it would 
appeal to anybody who watched it.90 On one level the film’s reviews and the images 
of its leading lady — usually standing knee deep in a rice paddy wearing a tight 
sweater, tight shorts and torn tights — spoke to ideas of the ancient centrality of rice 
in the diet and culture of the Japanese. The reviews provide a clear example of what 
Emiko Ohnuki-Tierney sees as rice being a ‘dominant metaphor’ for the Japanese. For 
the reviewers, the film reinforced the role of rice as the symbolic link to land (rice 
paddies) and self, community and polity through consumption and ritual.91 In a period 
of scarcity and insecurity, both domestic and international, Bitter Rice was presented 
as a reflection of deeply held Japanese values. Silvana was a role model, easily 
understood by the Japanese and readily identifiable through hard work, strength, and 
traditional communal values — exactly the values required of the people as the Allied 
Occupation came to an end. On a different level though, the film and the reviews in 
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the newspapers and housewives’ magazines also helped to reinforce debate and 
discussion in the media over food and ideas of nation at a time when the place of rice 
in the Japanese diet was being questioned and contested.  
 
(Fig. 1.) The ‘fabulously fleshy’ Silvana (centre) at work in the rice fields.  
 
The reviews did not dwell on many aspects of the film. The dingy and 
Americanised Walter and Francesca are the criminals, the women in the rice fields are 
overworked and ill-treated but simply happy to have work, a mass brawl breaks out 
between the legal and illegal women workers, and Silvana’s attraction to the violent 
Walter ends in death for both of them. Given the relatively harsh conditions, which 
remained a reality for many Japanese in early 1952, it is hard to imagine that many 
cinemagoers saw the film as a positive portrayal of agricultural work. In the final 
scene the women workers do not flee with their rice to return to their local towns and 
villages. They leave the rice and the rice fields behind them, and in one sense Silvana 
becomes a symbolic sacrifice to the central grip the commodity held over their lives. 
The film offers a powerful critique of American culture and capitalist exploitation. 
But the Asahi review appeared next to an article proclaiming the establishment of the 
joint US-Japanese Association for the Promotion of Japanese Health, and Silvana was 
not only an efficient worker in the rice fields providing sustenance for the community 
in times of scarcity, she was also physically attractive, healthy and robust — ‘bursting 
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with flesh’ or ‘fabulously fleshy’ as the Asahi explained. This was the role model the 
film presented to the Japanese viewers. 
As the food supply became more problematic in wartime Japan, discussions of 
the nutritional value of different kinds of food and how to ‘scientifically’ improve the 
level of nutrition in the diet of the people had become increasingly evident in the 
media. By 1939, the government banned the consumption of white rice and urged the 
mixing of unpolished rice with other grains. Moreover, within the first few months of 
the US-led Occupation, SCAP had ordered research into the nutritional value of the 
diet of the people of Japan.92 In March 1949, the Yomiuri newspaper carried an 
advertisement for a new publication entitled An Introduction to National Nutrition. 
The short advert explained how the new tome looked at the future of the national diet 
from many sides — climate, economics, tradition and customs — yet the advert 
promised a more scientific examination of the link between physique and diet.93 With 
the end of the occupation approaching and the pressing need to imagine a Free Japan, 
the stature and lifestyle of the people was an important focus for the housewives’ 
magazines and the major newspapers. Comparison with other countries became 
important and reinforced Ikeda’s call for a change in the Japanese diet, with a move 
away from the overdependence on rice. As Harada Nobuo has pointed out, through 
the passing in 1952 of the Law for the Improvement of Nutrition, which led to 
national surveys to raise awareness of the importance of nutrition and to improve the 
physique of the Japanese people, nutritional education in postwar Japan became 
modelled on the western pattern.94 Yet the implementation of this push to improve the 
diet of the Japanese people was by no means solely the work of the Japanese 
government. 
As noted above, by the beginning of 1952, the amount of food available was 
far less of a problem than the quality of the food consumed by the people. There was 
no longer a threat of mass starvation and, as Ikeda insisted in Fujin Kōron, the 
government hoped to push ahead with the de-rationing of rice. But the nutritional 
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content of the food the people consumed remained a focus for the popular media. 
Hiramura Taiko had pointed out to Ikeda that even if the rationing of rice ended, 
many people in the cities could still not afford to buy their allocated amount of rice. 
Nor was it necessarily the case that white rice was the best staple food from a 
nutritional point of view. Within the discussion and debate over the national diet in 
1952 most of the emphasis was on the need to move away from rice as a staple food. 
In an article entitled ‘The rationalisation of eating with vitamins at the centre: the new 
style of cooking dietetics’, Inagaki Naganori, a professor of agriculture from 
Ochanomizu University, reiterated that since the end of the war the Japanese diet had 
improved in terms of the amount of food consumed, yet the same could not be said for 
the quality of that diet. People were consuming enough calories for an active lifestyle, 
but calorific content was not the only important factor for a healthy lifestyle.95  
Inagaki argued that people should not yearn for a prewar diet of white rice and 
white sugar. Such a desire ignored the fact that during the wartime the government 
had ordered the mixing of rice, and white rice was not eaten for much of the period. 
Inagaki also warned of the risk of diseases such as beri-beri and pointed out that it 
was not good to return to such a diet. For sociologist Shimazu Chitose, writing in the 
July edition of Fujin Gahō, as for Ikeda and other commentators, the preponderance 
of rice in the diet was part of the problem. Shimazu pointed out that, in 1952, a 
Japanese adult living in the city consumed only 1974 calories. Of this, almost 80% of 
their daily intake of calories came from cereals. According to Shimazu, the 1359 
calories attributed to rice was an unusually high figure, and contributed to a startling 
lack of protein, calcium, vitamin B1 and B2 as well as vitamin C.96 Despite the fact 
that the food supply was relatively stable compared to the early postwar period, many 
important nutritional aspects were still missing from the Japanese diet. This 
nutritional paucity was having a direct effect on the people because of a lack of 
variety.  
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The article appeared in a special section dedicated to daily lifestyles and 
particularly diet. Shimazu connected the effects of a poor diet on the physique of the 
Japanese people to wider economic conditions. The article presented a typical 
Japanese family and outlined the best means of economising the household finances 
in order to maximise the quality of the diet. Rice was the cheapest option in terms of 
its calorific content, and while bread was becoming more readily available, the cost of 
butter, margarine and ham made it an expensive choice in the quest for a nutritious 
meal. The poor physique of the people was, as far as Shimazu was concerned, clearly 
a result of the low level of earnings of the people. ‘With Japanese workers’ earnings 
being one tenth of American workers’, their food lifestyle (shoku seikatsu) both from 
the point of view of calories and nutrition, is weak. A weak dinner table makes a 
weak body’.97 Problems of diet had a wider connection to national goals. If Japan 
were to regain international prestige and standing on the world stage, it was important 
for the population’s diet to provide the people with the vigour, stature and cultural 
vitality that would reflect that. Yet the country’s economic problems were at the root 
of the bad diet. 
Writing in the same edition of Fujin Gahō as Shimazu, economist Ōkawa 
Kazushi asserted the effects of the problems of poor nutrition on culture. He argued 
that a lack of dairy products was bad for the development of an active, intellectual 
culture and pointed to the figures for milk consumption in one year: in the US 192kg, 
the U.K 142kg, Italy 35kg, but, in Japan, ‘only a depressing 1.5kg’.98 Figures for the 
amount of meat consumed and the variation in the Japanese diet also clearly showed 
that the standard of living of the Japanese people was not so rosy. Ōkawa claimed that 
the amount of meat eaten in one year was 89kg in the United States, 65kg in the 
United Kingdom, 22kg in Italy; 7kg in India, and while Japan’s 42kg was not so bad 
as a percentage of all calories consumed it only made up 23% of the diet. In the US on 
the other hand, excluding cereals or potatoes, meat made up 68% of the calories 
consumed. Ōkawa went even further in linking low levels of nutrition to low levels of 
culture. Recalling a phrase from the old days — ‘good manners begin with a full 
stomach’ — he linked modern good manners to levels of culture and the nutritional 
quality of the diet. Ōkawa believed that without being able to support oneself and 
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raise children, no culture could begin. Survival and therefore nutrition were essential 
to enjoy life.99 
Ōkawa’s fears echoed those of a joint Japanese-American body set up to 
investigate such problems. In March 1952, an article in the Asahi Shimbun reported 
on the setting up of the Association for the Promotion of Japanese Health. On March 
16th around sixty people gathered in Tokyo to discuss the nutritional make-up of the 
Japanese diet. According to the Asahi, this ‘international’ group of researchers and 
specialists in diet and nutrition had been brought together in Tokyo to tackle the 
problems with the nutritional content of the Japanese diet. The association was two 
years in the planning and was a cooperative venture between Japan and the United 
States. With the association at the centre of a 1 million yen per month budget, it was 
hoped that researchers would find ways of putting into practice ideas to improve the 
nutritional value of the food available to the Japanese people. The aim was to discover 
‘how to cheaply and efficiently supply many households with nutritious, balanced 
food products’. Arimoto Kunitarō, an expert in Japanese dietetics who had been 
appointed director of the Nutrition Division in the Ministry of Health and Welfare in 
November 1946,100 outlined his view of the problems affecting the Japanese diet. He 
pointed out that although household expenditure on food had increased, the average 
calorie intake of Japanese was only 1960 calories per day. The low level of calorific 
intake when compared to other countries did not look good against the 3000 calories 
per day consumed by people in the United Kingdom, Canada, New Zealand and the 
United States. It was worse still given that people in Italy, the Soviet Union and 
Pakistan could boast 2500 calories per day. While the intake of calories had increased 
year on year, it was the nutritional vacuity of these calories that concerned Arimoto 
and the newly established association.101  
The overreliance on rice and the unscientific custom of mixing it with 
whatever was at hand was the main cause of the nutritional deficiencies according to 
Arimoto. Professor S.L. Denning from the University of California pointed out that 
while the European and American diets relied on grains and sweet potato for one third 
to one half of food intake, in Japan the fraction was closer to four fifths. The health 
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and welfare ministry had already spent time and money on finding new ways of 
adding nutrients to rice. According to the newspaper, the overdependence on poor 
quality rice was one of the association’s major concerns.102 The Association for the 
Promotion of Japanese Health followed on from efforts by the Ministry of Health and 
Welfare, along with researchers into nutrition, who had recently put into action a plan 
to come up with ways of providing more healthy fare. The association was aware of 
the link between levels of income and the poor nutritional content of the Japanese 
diet. Yet, as the Asahi article pointed out, although ideas of bringing more fish and 
meat into the diet had already been put forward it was becoming hard to ignore 
problems with the low content of fat, calcium and other important vitamins and 
minerals making up a Japanese diet still mainly based on vegetables. Doubling of the 
intake of animal protein had been suggested, as had the idea of using fish to increase 
the intake of animal fat, an issue that had also concerned the Occupation authorities in 
the late 1940s.103 
The Asahi Shimbun concluded however, that ‘the reliance on rice in Japanese 
food production and the custom of making do with what is at hand’ (leading to the 
mixing of rice with roots and shoots) was the main reason for the poor state of the 
nation’s diet. The article claimed that four fifths of food production in Japan was 
given over to vegetables. This resulted in a bias in the diet of the people, the results of 
which had become evident in their physique.104 According to the article, a new and 
more nutritious variety of white rice was being developed, which would be low in 
cost and contain more vitamins than the usual mix of rice, roots and shoots. It could 
be cooked in the same way as normal rice, was apparently better tasting and good for 
digestion. Once brought into production, this rice would enable Japanese households 
to increase their intake of those vitamins and minerals missing from their everyday 
diet without unduly increasing expenditure. Fiscal prudence and good nutrition were 
important for Japan as the end of the occupation approached. As far as the new rice 
was concerned, ‘[f]or a country such as ours which … exists on rice, this [the 
development of the new rice] is good news’.105  
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The low nutritional content of the Japanese diet and the physique of the people 
were linked, and for most commentators it was a backward looking Japanese culture 
that prevented progress. As it welcomed attempts to develop new varieties of more 
nutritious rice, the Association for the Promotion of Japanese Health nevertheless 
criticised the unscientific custom of mixing rice with other foods such as wheat or 
shoots to give the feeling of a full stomach. This was one of the causes of the bad 
Japanese diet and if it continued it would soon become a serious problem for ‘the 
health and physique of the people’.106 The Asahi articles, Shimazu’s discussion of the 
poor nutritional value of the Japanese diet, Ōkawa’s comparisons and Ikeda’s 
statement about substituting bread for rice as a means of improving the diet of the 
Japanese people all addressed issues of economic growth. At the same time, they 
spoke to ideas of nation, culture and what constituted Japanese food. The dependence 
on rice in the national diet was explained by the relative cheapness, in monetary 
terms, of the calories taken from it. 
This was particularly relevant when compared to the consumption of bread 
and butter. Yet all the commentators spoke of the necessity of increasing the earnings 
of the people to allow them to afford bread and other dishes. Shimazu believed that if 
bread were cheaper or more accessible, ‘it would probably easily replace rice’. She 
believed that ‘Japanese people’s deep attachment to rice can be seen as coming 
simply from the need for calories’. Rice supplied calories more cheaply than bread 
because the foods needed to make bread taste better — butter, ham or cheese — were 
still expensive.107 Likewise Hiramura Taiko, in her interview with Ikeda in Fujin 
Kōron, did not see any deep cultural attachment to rice. Hiramura conceded Ikeda’s 
point about changing Japanese lifestyle patterns, but she insisted that dependence on 
rice was not a problem of traditional culture. It stemmed from the fact that the 
Japanese people’s living standards were so low.108 
Emphasis on the daily foodways (Shoku Seikatsu) of the people was part of a 
wider movement, which further stressed the need to integrate Japanese lifestyles into 
an economic discourse that focussed on the need for personal autonomy in the pursuit 
of economic growth. A desire to move beyond the militaristic associations of wartime 
in the presentation of national diet and national lifestyle stressed the freedom of the 
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individual within the framework of Japan as a free nation. This was a reflection of a 
dominant Free World ideology, which saw national, cultural and individual autonomy 
within a Free World capitalist block as the best defence against the threat of 
communism. So whether looking for more nutritious home-grown rice varieties or 
seeking to vary the Japanese diet, the proclamation of ‘the end of a deep attachment to 
rice’ in the subtitle of a New Year interview with Ikeda Hayato in the Asahi 
newspaper was followed by a call to action from the Japanese government and the 
establishment of the Association for the Promotion of Japanese Health.  
There was a need not only to provide cheaper rice but also to find alternative 
sources of nutrition for the population. In 1952, the worst of the postwar food crisis 
was well behind Japan. The government hoped to push on with economic reforms to 
create a free market in rice, and the diet of the people was considered an important 
element in the foundations of economic reconstruction. By taking responsibility for 
their own nutritional needs, the Japanese people could help in the rebuilding of the 
country. Throughout the late 1940s and early 1950s, the international debate on the 
role of nutrition and dietetics became increasingly tied to a discourse of 
modernisation and strongly linked economic goals to ideological goals. The 
overwhelming economic superiority of the United States by the late 1940s meant that 
those ideological goals reflected the Cold War aim of opening overseas markets to 
American goods, and the abundance of cheap wheat and wheat flour helped drive the 
debate over the place of rice in the Japanese diet. The availability of cheap rice form 
the colonies during the imperial 1920s and 1930s had made the idea of rice as a staple 
food part of the national identity of the Japanese people, as more and more people 
were able to eat rice. The harsh realities of wartime when those imports were 
becoming scarce helped challenge that idea.  
The postwar period saw the discussion and debate over the Japanese diet move 
to accommodate the new and different economic realities of the Cold War. 
Throughout the early 1950s, the possibility of staple foods other than rice filled the 
discourse on diet and nutrition. Ideas for increasing the number of side dishes 
accompanying rice, thus reducing reliance on it for nutritional requirements, also 
became the focus of many housewife magazines during the early and mid-1950s. The 
prevalence of discussion on nutrition in the Japanese newspapers and magazines 
focused attention on the everyday lives of the Japanese people. What they ate and 
how they budgeted for family meals was one aspect of the rationalisation of everyday 
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life, which linked pre- and postwar ideas of nation. The discussions also reveal the 
tension between the economic necessity of moving away from a preponderance of 
rice in the diet, or at least the ideal of rice as the staple food of the Japanese, to one 
that incorporated more varied dishes and replaced rice with wheat-based foods. These 
discussions were a reflection of the economic and political context within which the 
United States led Occupation was coming to an end and a means of disavowing that 
context in favour of cultural explanations for Japan’s position within it.  
The apparently dispassionate, modern, scientific outlook of nutrition and 
dietetics served to rationalise the economic basis for shifting ideas of nation and 
national cuisine. 1952 provided an historical moment when the idea of the cultural 
centrality of rice to the Japanese diet (and thus to ideas of nation) was being 
challenged discursively, politically and economically. As the Japanese economy 
improved, the mid-1950s brought the beginning of high-speed economic growth and 
stable and cheap imports of rice from Thailand and South East Asia more generally. 
With increasing wealth, rice could again return to the Japanese table as the traditional 
staple food, albeit one which in reality continued to decline in importance. As the 
economic situation improved, national, individual and gradually cultural autonomy 
became even more connected to the realm of everyday life. The contradictions of 
Japan’s Cold War position became more apparent.
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Chapter 3 
 
Defending the Nation 
‘(At work) everybody has become interested in the ANPO problem. Before we mostly 
talked about clothes and make-up now it’s all about June 15th and Kishi. Everybody 
hates Kishi.’ 
Ōkawa Michiko (Department store worker).1 
 
 
Cold War Alliance 
At the end of 1951, the Mutual Security Treaty and the San Francisco Peace Treaty 
solved a problem the US authorities had been pondering for some time: the Truman 
administration was divided between those wanting to continue the Occupation in 
order to keep the military bases and those who feared an increase in anti-American 
sentiment the longer the Occupation lasted.2 Nevertheless, once signed, the treaties 
appeared largely one-sided. The Security Treaty did not outline a commitment on the 
part of the United States to defend Japan against any external threat, but the US did 
reserve the right to put down large-scale internal riots and disturbances caused by 
external influence or agitation. Moreover, the additional extra-territoriality for US 
military personnel agreed in February 1952 clearly evoked the unequal Meiji period 
treaties.3 Possibly because the most contentious aspects of the security treaty were not 
made public until February 1952, the details did not arouse national opposition. 
Indeed, opinion polls found most Japanese supported the Security Treaty in 1952.4 
In this context, the emergence of a united opposition and the coming together 
at the national level of local anti-base movements in 1960 to protest the treaty’s 
renewal suggest a change in the perceived nature of the relationship between the two 
countries during the 1950s. On one level, the international situation made the treaty 
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appear increasingly unnecessary, but economically ANPO raised important issues that 
were reflected in debate and discussion in the popular media. By the time the treaty 
came up for renewal in 1960, the concerns were not simply issues of state and 
international power politics. Images of the United States and Japan were far more 
complex and ambiguous within the everyday lives of the Japanese. Of course, the 
Cold War power politics of the early 1950s still fed much of the discourse concerning 
the nature of the Peace Treaty and the Security Treaty. In the rhetoric of many 
members of the opposition movements, the trope of US imperialism remained 
important. Certainly, the events known as the ‘ANPO Struggle’ provided an outlet for 
the worries of liberal intellectuals regarding the domestic re-emergence of a powerful 
state headed by a former class A war criminal. Many intellectuals and protesters 
sought to protect the US-imposed postwar constitution. Nevertheless, the 
fundamentally political issue driving ANPO, that of the relationship between the US 
and Japan, was already in the process of being depoliticised by the advent of 
consumer-driven and consumption-focused economics. As Yoshimi Shunya has 
argued, through the 1950s, as the presence of US forces in Japan diminished, the 
concept of America changed from one of overbearing patriarchal military power to a 
benign consumer paradise.5 Even as the protesters filled the streets around the Diet 
building, the popular media increasingly portrayed consumer America as a model that 
could be emulated. 
This was an apparently depoliticised vision of America. But it was in part the 
shift in the mid-1950s from production-centred economics to a consumption-focused 
plan for economic growth which made the ANPO Treaty all the more necessary, 
because of the promises of market liberalisation it brought with it. In the growing 
popular media, consumption was only occasionally connected to the US-Japan 
alliance. Yet thanks to the growth of the mass media, consumer culture already 
formed the backdrop to the lives of many Japanese by 1960. The appointment of 
Ikeda Hayato as Prime Minister in the summer of 1960 and the announcement of the 
‘income-doubling plan’ provide a convenient historical moment from which to chart 
the Japanese people’s movement away from overt political action in favour of the 
good life and a more individual, everyday connection to the political. But as this 
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chapter shows, from the late 1950s the public celebration of consumerism in the 
growing popular media juxtaposed the political America of the Security Treaty to 
America as a lifestyle choice. This was particularly appealing to the large numbers of 
young people moving to the city in search of work. Moreover, consumerism and 
nation were already linked through the media debate and discussion. In their rejection 
of politics after the failure of the ANPO protests, the Japanese people found an idea of 
nation ever more closely linked to the ideals of a consumer society; something that 
had gradually developed over the late 1950s as a political response to the Cold War.  
Domestically since the early 1950s there had been a growth of nearly 200% in 
the sectors that employed low-waged women workers. Many of them were young, 
single and living away from home, and this created social concerns as well as a new 
and increasingly prosperous market for consumer goods.6 Connected to this was the 
growth of mass weekly and monthly magazines concerned with entertainment and 
leisure over the course of the 1950s which transformed the aspirations and horizons of 
these young Japanese people.7 In the 1950s and 60s, such magazines also dealt with 
political topics, juxtaposing consumer lifestyles with the concerns of the Cold War. 
For the huge numbers of young people leaving the countryside to work and live in the 
cities, the vision of consumer life offered an escape from the overcrowded and still 
poor living conditions in which they found themselves.8 Diversion through mass 
entertainment offered an escape from the realities of everyday life whilst shifting the 
boundaries of consumer-oriented ideas of nation. Nevertheless, this transformation of 
daily life in the popular media reflected the political and economic concerns of the 
late 1950s and early 1960s.  
From the last days of the Pacific War, social and economic factors fuelled 
American concerns about the spread of communism in Japan and East Asia. In that 
context, during the 1950s, the ideology of production-centred economics, which 
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helped to fuel growth after the Korean War, spurred the ideology of consumption. 
This further connected the economic goals of the Japanese state to the ways of living 
of the Japanese people. Through the debates and discussions in the mass media it also 
offered a way for young Japanese to identify with the US and Japan. By July 1960, 
with Kishi gone and the new Prime Minister espousing income doubling and the 
separation of politics from economics, the Mainichi Graph was reporting on the boom 
in boat ownership in Japan and newspapers and magazines touted the benefits of extra 
leisure time. Yet throughout the 1950s, wages improved for many workers and this 
brought stability to the lives of many Japanese. The increasing availability and 
visibility of household appliances, particularly in advertising targeted at housewives, 
gradually softened the image of the violent America of the Occupation.9 Economic 
stability and the promotion of a mass consumer society based on the consumption 
levels of American lifestyles also helped to direct anger at the renewal of the Security 
Treaty towards the Kishi cabinet and its anti-democratic, forced ratification in place 
of any vehement anti-Americanism.10  
This chapter outlines the ways in which the goal of a consumer lifestyle was 
juxtaposed in the popular media with anger and protest at the political system. Rather 
than seeing the failure of the ‘ANPO struggle’ as the beginning of the focus on 
consumption and the separation by the state of politics and economics, this chapter 
examines how discussion of the idea of the consumer as king in the popular media 
reflected broader changes in ideas of nation. The first section notes how Japanese 
economic thinking reflected Cold War ideology throughout the 1950s, and 
championed consumer society as the best defence against communism as well as the 
best means of achieving national economic development. In this context, some 
commentators in the popular media touted the importance of the Security Treaty to 
the economy. The second section shows how the idea of a consumer culture offered 
an image of a future Japan. But in 1960, the postwar national ideals of peace and 
democracy were often carried in magazines, which existed because of, and were 
driven by, the promotion of consumer society. The tensions in the relationship 
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between economic growth since the mid-1950s under the nuclear umbrella of 
American protection, and the postwar idea of the democratic, peaceful nation were 
clearly evident.  
Finally, the chapter will examine the ways in which coverage of the apparent 
thaw in the Cold War marked by the Soviet leader’s visit to the US in late 1959 
seemed to make the Security Treaty redundant. In this context, the national ideal of 
peace was being undermined by the actions of the Japanese state. Yet the popular 
media did not take an overtly anti-US stance and, through the actions of the Kishi 
government, the ANPO issue soon became tied to the protection of postwar 
democracy. The treaty symbolised a subordinate client-state relationship between 
Japan and its former occupier, a relationship in which the ideals of peace and 
democracy were threatened in the eyes of many intellectuals by US self-interest and 
the authoritarian nature of the Japanese state. The presence of US bases on Japanese 
soil and their extra-territoriality reinforced this view. At the same time, the economic 
and international context of the late 1950s worked against the Japanese and US 
governments’ claims that the treaty was necessary for Japan’s security. The apparent 
détente in the Cold War after Khrushchev’s visit to the US underlined the rapidly 
changing nature of the international situation. Ultimately, the increasing prospects 
brought by economic growth allowed debate and discussion in the popular media to 
emphasise ideas of nation which appeared to relate more concretely to the everyday 
lives of the people. Throughout the late 1950s, the nation of Peace and Democracy 
could gradually become the nation of Peace and Prosperity. In this way, the public 
celebration of consumerism in the popular media helped deflect attention from the 
political to the realm of everyday lived experience.  
Consuming the Cold War 
Back in the 1920s and 1930s, the process of rationalisation in industrial production 
brought calls for the modernisation of material life. At the same time, economic 
recovery and a growth in the strength of the popular media reinforced calls for 
increased consumer demand to help with economic growth. The aim was to build a 
strong national people’s economy. As Andrew Gordon has argued, the promotion of 
middle-class lifestyles and consumption as an essential element of economic 
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development had transwar origins.11 As with the debate over diet and nutrition, 1930s 
discourse linked middle-class consumption to the increasing rationalisation and 
militarisation of everyday life in the context of imperial expansion and war. As 
Yoshimi Shunya has noted, the promotion of better standards of living through the 
increasing use of household appliances (Seikatsu Kaizen Undō) was one of the most 
significant movements of the 1910s and 1920s. The acquisition of these appliances 
was taken as a means for achieving rationalisation in household activities. As the Life 
Improvement Union stressed, ‘by removing all waste from the home, taking away all 
ornaments, introducing more rationalisation, we must promote efficiency in the 
activity of the nation, and contribute to the growth of the national fortune.’12 Images 
of an American lifestyle that was centred on consumption stimulated people’s desires 
in the immediate postwar period as it had in the 1920s and 1930s, yet the consistent 
image of electric appliances in the home, evident in the late 1950s, did not appear 
before the war. Moreover, the new and more effective image of domestic electric 
appliances that appeared from the mid-1950s ‘was not positioned as an extension of 
the life improvement movement in the prewar period’.13 
The prewar and wartime discourse on consumption had an important place 
from the immediate postwar period until the mid-1950s, but this gradually gave way 
to new ideas and discourses shaped by the more immediate concerns of economic 
growth and Cold War politics. In the late 1940s and early 1950s, the dominance of the 
black market turned domestic consumption into a political issue. Consumption was 
about balancing the identities of consumer, producer, citizen (shimin), and national 
(kokumin).14 As was made clear in the media discussion of diet and nutrition outlined 
in the previous chapter, the acts of buying and consuming goods were inseparable 
from the blunt necessities of staying alive. In this context, during the Occupation, 
housewives’ groups were prominent in their protests for improved rationing and 
against the ever-increasing prices of daily necessities.15 In the early 1950s, 
consumption continued to be an essential aspect of family life. Gradually, through 
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advertising and the popular media, it became a necessary part of the role of the 
Japanese housewife.16 Through the trope of food and nutrition, articles in magazines 
such as Fujin Kōron, Fujin Gahō or Fujin no Tomo made the connection between the 
home, the difficult domestic social and economic situation facing the country and the 
wider international environment. Indeed, such magazines continued to carry articles 
discussing the rising cost of living and the economic situation. But in the 1950s, the 
debate over consumption gradually came to reflect the Cold War, the question of 
democracy, peace and Japan’s importance in the promotion of free world values. By 
the late 1950s, the consumer was emerging in the popular media as the dominant 
aspirational identity for housewives and for young single Japanese with disposable 
income. Popular magazines presented a lifestyle which opened up new possibilities to 
a new generation of Japanese. This made clear a shift in the boundaries of, and 
between, consumerism and ideas of nation. By 1960, increasing affluence and a 
burgeoning popular media began to merge consumerism with ideas of nation, and 
Cold War concerns helped to bring about this change.  
The Korean War made plain the precariousness of Japan’s food supply, yet it 
also provided a critical boost to the economy and helped to cement Japan’s position as 
the pivot of America’s defence strategy in Asia. The textile, construction, chemical, 
metal, communications and automotive industries benefited enormously from war 
procurements. As Michael Schaller puts it, Japan became ‘one huge supply depot’ 
serving US aims on the Korean peninsula.17 The war took on the role of ‘Japan’s 
Marshall Plan’ and at the same time established the boundaries of containment in 
Northeast Asia.18 In the opinion of the Japanese Prime Minister of the time, Yoshida 
Shigeru, the war completely transformed the Occupation’s approach to Japan and the 
situation in the Far East, and spurred the growth of Japanese production over the next 
decade.19 Nevertheless, Japanese politicians and economists along with US Cold War 
strategists needed to find ways of perpetuating economic growth after the wartime 
boom. The boost provided by the Korean War had required increased raw materials, 
equipment and consumer goods to keep pace with the country’s expanding industry 
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and consumption demands. But for numerous reasons, the focus on heavy industry 
proved problematic by the mid-1950s when the surge in demand dropped off. ‘A 
program was needed which would systematically attack the basic problem of low 
productivity and high costs throughout Japanese industry’.20 With less need for 
armaments and heavy industrial goods, new methods of production, along with ways 
and means of stimulating domestic demand, were becoming necessary.  
These were identified and developed under the guidance of the Japan 
Productivity Centre, established with American assistance in 1955. The first such 
group had been set up in Britain in 1948 with the assistance of Marshall Aid.21 The 
economic theory behind the JPC was closely tied to American Cold War ideology. Its 
original aim was to increase labour and management productivity, a goal that would 
bring about the expansion of markets, help to increase employment and raise wages as 
well as standards of living.22 The ideas behind the program began to circulate in Japan 
towards the end of the Occupation in the late 1940s. Taylorist ideas of rationalisation, 
developed and expanded in the 1920s and 1930s in Japan, were put to work to 
enhance productive efficiency and transcend class conflicts that could arise from 
scarcity. In the impoverished conditions of early Cold War Europe, the United States 
promoted the purportedly apolitical solution of productivity to combat communism by 
shifting the focus of the dialectic from class versus class to one of waste and 
abundance. The productivity movement eventually came to be seen as a way of 
defeating Communism whilst promoting the American way of life. The Ministry of 
Trade and Industry had proposed a Japan Productivity Centre as early as 1951, but in 
1953 US officials offered to promote the program in Japan. In the same year, the 
Dōyūkai Director Gōshi Kōhei, later to become the third chairman of the JPC, visited 
Europe and confessed to being very impressed by the ideological success of the 
programme.23  
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Increased efficiency in the production of goods and services as well as 
improved technology and methods of organisation and operation would strengthen the 
Japanese economy and raise the living standards of the Japanese people.24 Promoting 
the belief that the goal of rapid growth in gross national product was tied to 
improvements in productivity, the United States had by the time of the JPC’s 
inauguration already welcomed tours by some 16,000 European managers, 
technicians and labour leaders paid for by the Foreign Operations Administration. US 
aid had also financed a large series of reports on American productivity in Japan and 
Europe, and the efforts came to incorporate CIA personnel in the US embassy in 
Tokyo as well as front organisations such as the Asia Foundation.25 The three guiding 
principles of the JPC were: expansion of employment, cooperation between labour 
and management, and fair distribution of the fruits of productivity. The ‘fruits of 
productivity should be distributed fairly among labour, management, and consumers 
in line with the state of national economy.’26 By the late 1950s, the consumer needed 
to be seen to be receiving those fruits, whilst simultaneously becoming vital to the 
continuation of growth in productivity. This dual role was perpetuated through the 
celebration of consumption in the popular media.  
Between 1956 and 1966, the JPC sent more than six hundred inspection 
groups to the United States, in which more than six thousand people took part. The 
groups were made up of small business representatives, academics, labour leaders, 
technical specialists and business leaders who studied various aspects of American 
manufacturing methods. Whilst these groups did study and import industrial technical 
skills and know-how to Japan, in the late 1950s marketing techniques were by far the 
most important productivity tool the technical group personnel brought back. 
Japanese managers came to see marketing as an essential technology, ‘offering a 
solution to a problem that had plagued Japan throughout its modern history: how to 
find domestic outlets for the nation’s growing industrial capacity’.27 Throughout the 
late 1950s and early 1960s, the strength and wealth of the mass market came to be 
seen as best fuelled by the spending power of the consumer. This consumption would 
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create a virtuous circle spurring production, which would in turn fuel people’s desire 
to consume more. As the agro-economist Tobata Seiichi put it: ‘the masses are 
appearing on the economic stage, they are the agents of effective demand’.28 
In this context, the ‘bright life’ emerged in the 1950s as an ideological symbol, 
which sought to imply ‘the housewife-centred family and the dominance of the 
middle class’.29 At the end of the Occupation, the liberalisation of markets in 
foodstuffs had been tied to ideas of democracy and individual agency in the popular 
media. By the late 1950s, companies such as Matsushita were promoting their 
electronic appliances as the ‘housewives’ partner’ and linking the arrival of these 
goods in the home to democratisation — in some instances even going so far as to 
link the promotion of these goods to article 25 of the Japanese constitution: ‘The 
people of Japan have the right to enjoy a healthy and cultural life’.30 This clearly 
reflected the deliberate shift in the wider economic discourse from a production-led 
economy to the promotion of consumption as the ultimate driving force of economic 
growth. Yet an examination of the popular magazines of the late 1950s and early 
1960s shows that it was not only the Japanese housewife or her husband who was the 
target of this ideology. Magazines pressed the benefits of consumption onto young, 
single people and promoted leisure activities that relied on the promotion of the belief 
in abundance and consumption as waste.   
The expansion of the mass media throughout the 1950s played a central role in 
linking these ideas with Japanese social attitudes.31 As Hasegawa Kenji has pointed 
out, the late 1950s was a time when ‘the spread of popular weekly magazines and 
compact paperback books, the launching of electric household appliances, and the 
feverish spread of hula-hoops and Dakkochan dolls signalled the arrival of a 
“consumption revolution”’.32 Importantly by 1960, as Yoshimi Shunya has shown, the 
consumer revolution had helped to produce two images of the United States: one was 
the powerful, patriarchal America of the Occupation, the military bases and the 
protests against them. The other America was a lifestyle choice for housewives or a 
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fashion choice for young Japanese.33 This was partly due to the decreasing American 
presence in the everyday life of the Japanese people. After the Occupation ended, the 
number of US military personnel in the country fell from 260,000 in 1952 to 46,000 
by 1960.34 At the same time, the electrification of the home and the advertising 
strategies of companies seeking to improve the housewives’ lot reinforced the 
America of consumption.35 But the debate and discussion in the popular media, 
particularly in magazines aimed at young people, went further than merely assisting 
the Japanese housewife. For the Japanese people, consumption was now presented as 
an individual choice rather than the necessity of the 1940s and early 1950s. Moreover, 
the early 1950s ideas of nation based around the tropes of peace and democracy were 
juxtaposed by the Security Treaty crisis with ideas that emphasised Japan as a 
growing economic power with unique cultural traits.  
Soft Money in the Silver Sixties 
‘The Consumer is King’, proclaimed the Mainichi Graph at the beginning of January 
1960. The accompanying photographs presented a very different Japan from the 
country of food shortages and rationing that symbolised the end of the Occupation in 
1952. One photograph (Figure 2) showed deliverymen hauling a new piano through 
the window of an apartment in a new and ultra-modern ‘danchi’ building complex. 
‘Even the neighbours have bought one’, proclaimed the caption. The focus on 
consumption as an economic goal and an end in itself was evident in the article. 
‘Pianos costing as much as ¥200,000 are being brought to the danchi everyday…the 
symbol of high class for the danchi-zoku is no longer the TV…because of the 
psychological process of the increasing competitiveness of everyday life the danchi 
are the place of powerful mass consumption’. Yet ‘powerful mass consumption’ was 
not only evident in the purchasing habits of the Japanese middle classes. Travel and 
tourism, if at this stage purely domestic, also epitomised the transformation of 
everyday life. Between 1957 and 1960 the number of hotels increased by over 10% 
and the number of guests by more than 30%. As evidence of the growing leisure 
industry, an accompanying photograph (Figure 3) showed lines of hotel owners 
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holding placards and banners displaying the name of their hotels as they waited for 
customers in front of Atami train station.36 
 
 (Figure 2.) ‘Even the neighbours have got one!’ Mainichi Graph January 3-10 1960. 
 
 
(Figure 3.) Lines of hotel owners outside Atami train station, Mainichi Graph January 3-10 1960. 
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As noted above, the improving standard of living of the Japanese people from 
the mid-1950s was tied to the promotion of consumer lifestyles as an essential 
component of a successful capitalist society. The construction of the Danchi was one 
element of this. In 1954, Hatoyama Ichirō had become Prime Minister, proclaiming 
the goal of solving Japan’s housing crisis within ten years. To this end, the Japan 
Housing Corporation was established the following year. This state-sponsored 
housing agency was given the task of building large-scale apartment complexes 
(danchi) for middle class urban families. The aim was to improve living conditions in 
the cities following the large influx of workers during the boom created by the Korean 
War. But as the photo-spread in the Mainichi Graph made clear, the creation of the 
danchi did more than simply provide better housing. For those middle class Japanese 
lucky enough to be chosen in the ballot, these newly built apartment complexes 
symbolised a style of everyday urbanity that became a prototype of middle class life 
in postwar Japan.37 It was this overtly middle class existence that was celebrated in 
the article.  
The promotion of a consumer lifestyle as a means of perpetuating economic 
growth and prosperity was intimately tied to the ideological divisions of the Cold 
War. In the United States, as early as 1947, the promotion of consumption to help 
boost the economy and provide for the well-being of the whole nation was clearly 
evident in magazines such as Life. In 1947, an article entitled ‘The Price Problem’ 
argued that ‘the individual family’s efforts to rise in the class ranks through 
consumption helped boost the economy and provide for the well-being of the nation 
as a whole’, while other articles equated homeownership with democracy, security, 
and civic virtue.38 This vision of material life was actively promoted abroad. As 
Lizabeth Cohen has noted, during the Cold War the idea that American consumer 
goods would be able to ‘win the hearts and minds of the people in the so-called 
developing world’ was combined with the understanding that the expansion of US 
consumables into those markets would also help American manufacturers.39 Through 
the Marshall Plan, the importance of household consumption in securing peace and 
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democracy was promoted in Europe. In 1952 for example, the Mutual Security 
Agency deliberately shifted the focus of the annual German Industrial Exhibition 
from heavy industry and consumer goods to focus the US display ‘exclusively on 
private consumption’. As the State Department saw it, the display’s content was to be 
developed ‘in terms of arguments for a high-production, high-wage, low-unit cost, 
low profit-margin, high consumption system’ with emphasis on the ‘fortunate 
outcome of American economic philosophy when combined with European skills and 
resources’.40 By the late 1950s, this fortunate outcome was the flipside of the mass 
protests against the renewal of the Security Treaty for Japan.  
As Andrew Gordon has noted, observers of Japanese economic growth in the 
1950s drew on ‘the precocious appreciation of prewar commentators’, seeing 
consumer demand as one engine of a national economy ‘connecting manufacturers, 
lenders and consumers in a virtuous cycle of growth’.41 This thinking was clearly 
driving the policies of the JPC but at the same time, in the late 1950s, this cycle of 
growth became a national goal and the popular media made explicit its connection to 
America and the prosperity of the Free (capitalist) World. As Laura Nietzel has put it, 
whether pre- or post war, ‘materiality was always associated with mentality’. 
Throughout the 1950s, the Danchi became symbolic of the democratised family, in 
particular through the promotion of privacy in the provision of separate sleeping 
spaces. This connected seamlessly with the liberation of women from housework 
through the electrification of the kitchen.42 Economic planners and theorists looked to 
redeem some ideas from the past in their quest for postwar economic recovery,43 but 
the promise of increased consumption had become deeply embedded in ideas of 
democracy and individual freedom.  
The Mainichi Graph article gave a ‘banzai to consumption’. Echoing the goals 
of the JPC, the magazine stated: ‘mass leisure is becoming an element which 
capitalist countries, particularly America, can no longer do without to continue 
increasing prosperity’. In Japan at the beginning of 1960, a change in mentality was 
still necessary. The article explained how people were celebrating the announcement 
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of the ‘earnings-doubling plan’, but cautioned that this did not imply the doubling of 
monthly income, but rather ‘it is the doubling of total GNP’. The article pointed out 
that even if the necessary increase in production, the required capital and the increase 
in imports came about, monthly income would not double. To achieve the doubling of 
income it would be necessary for Japanese people to ‘use things freely’. Waste was 
essential to a consumer society. Yet even with the development of a wasteful lifestyle 
it was not sufficient to buy only the things which were necessary. ‘To develop a 
prosperity which has no limits there has to be a demand which has no limits’. The 
problem was creating a market for this mass leisure. As the magazine noted, the 
symbol of the new middle classes in America was ownership of a boat and swimming 
pool. In Japan in 1960 it was the piano and the second-hand car. In order to bring 
about a transformation of consumer culture in Japan money needed freeing up. ‘At the 
moment people consume within their monthly budget. In America, in order for a 
salaryman to buy a boat, the bank lends him the money’. Yet things were gradually 
improving in this respect. ‘In Japan rent comes automatically out of the bank account, 
the monthly salary is paid by check…. Money is distributed without you even having 
to touch cash’. The ease with which money could come and go from the bank 
accounts of the middle classes was helping to casualise consumption. For the 
Mainichi this was the key to a consumer lifestyle. ‘The consumer lifestyle has 
changed from the era of hard money to the era of soft money. That will continue to 
make consumption a casual thing’.44  
The following pages held out the promise of things to come. Under the 
headline ‘Lifestyle Progressivism: America — ¥14 trillion on pastimes,’ the article 
explained how the technological revolution meant that ‘the nature of work itself is 
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changing, “free time” is continually increasing’. Yet again, as with purchasing 
consumer goods, waste was important. The article introduced Japanese readers to the 
different ways in which the American people ‘wasted’ this vast amount of money and 
time. A photo-spread showed people painting by a lake in Aspen, canoeing in 
Northern Minnesota, a family enjoying time in the garden and a family camping in 
Kentucky. The article asked ‘What about our Japan?....now waste is a virtue, we 
exclaim with an indifferent smile, yet if this lifestyle becomes a reality by 1970, it 
will certainly be the Silver 60s which will have played the role in bringing it about’.45 
The image in the popular media of an America symbolising free consumption and 
leisure time was attractive because it held out the prospect of future prosperity for 
Japan, promising individual choice and freedom on a broader level.  
Nevertheless, the reactions provoked by this fascination with American 
culture and lifestyle were not all positive. The same edition of the Mainichi Graph 
featured an article looking at the passion of young Japanese for sex, drugs and rock 
and roll. Living for the day, taking drugs, sporting shocking clothes and using 
‘interesting’ language, they spent their time on the city streets taking their cue from 
the American Beat Generation.46 But while the Mainichi tantalised its more mature 
readers with the virtues and dangers of a consumer-oriented youth culture, Shūkan 
Heibon portrayed a world which was opening up for young Japanese. There was an 
‘Oriental Boom’ in the United States. The magazine told its readers ‘America is 
Looking for Young Japanese Women’. It was said that a ‘weekly wage of ¥36,000 is 
not a dream’ in America.47 
According to producer Matsuda Kyoko, the next two or three years would 
offer the perfect chance for any Japanese hoping to make it big. There is a Japan 
boom all over America but all eyes in Hollywood in particular are looking to Japan’. 
Matsuda was not only working as a producer at NBC, she was also the daughter of the 
then Education secretary, Matsuda Takecho, and was thus in a rather more privileged 
position than the majority of the magazine’s readers. Nevertheless, Matsuda offered 
the example of Nobu Azumi, a former fashion model in Japan who had moved to 
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America after marrying a GI. Making contacts in America, she had quickly become a 
film star, and was rumoured ‘according to newspapers and magazines over there’ to 
be on the verge of becoming the number one Asian star in America. ‘If that happened 
it would be amazing: 4 or 5,000 dollars a week’. To an ordinary Japanese woman this 
was an unbelievable amount, but as Matsuda saw it ‘there are Japanese women who 
have those possibilities’.48 Articles discussing life in the US were frequently 
published in Shūkan Heibon in the late 1950s and early 1960s. For the vast majority 
of the magazines’ readership the prospect of moving to America was non-existent. 
Nevertheless, the imagined life the magazine offered helped to soften the image of the 
US as the Security Treaty came up for renewal.  
In June 1960, the same magazine carried a special section entitled ‘How to 
live alone for women’. The article showcased the new found freedom (jiyu) of young 
women, for the most part in their early twenties, who 
had moved to Tokyo to work. The article stressed 
that despite feelings of loneliness in the big cities 
there was a sense of freedom in apartment living, 
and the number of women moving to apartment 
buildings was increasing. Many of the women 
interviewed were living with siblings or older 
women in their 30s, but they all described the sense 
of safety and freedom that could be found in the 
numerous new apartment blocks springing up 
around the city, many of which were reserved for 
women only. As ‘Yoko-san’, a 27 year old designer, 
left her Hillman Imp in the car park and took the 
elevator to the seventh floor, opened the door to her 
apartment, washed her face, changed clothes, then 
crashed out on the sofa she explained ‘when I come 
back here it’s quiet so I feel at ease. This apartment 
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matches the tempo of our lifestyle…’ 49 The lifestyle changes that were gradually 
emerging as a result of consumption-driven economic growth presented new ways of 
understanding personal freedom and America. The bright life was about more than 
just electric appliances. In the late 1950s, for young, single Japanese moving to the 
cities to find work, freedom and individual subjectivity gradually became tied to 
consumer society. The media juxtaposed this changing everyday experience with the 
battle for peace and democracy that was being played out on the streets of Tokyo in 
1960. 
A Crisis of Indifference 
At one o’clock in the afternoon on the 16th of January 1960, the Japanese Prime 
Minister Kishi Nobusuke and his entourage fled at least seven hundred protesting 
students from Zengakuren to fly to Washington to renew the US Japan Security 
Treaty.50 Almost a week later, the crowd that gathered to celebrate the return of the 
party were, according to one account, mainly right-wing thugs playing military 
marches and waving the Hinomaru. Clearly the departure and arrival of the Prime 
Minister’s party was nothing if not ‘a strange contrast’.51 Yet this ‘strange contrast’ of 
violent left wing students and a revival of right wing nationalism clashed on the 
streets of Tokyo and in the pages of the popular press in the early summer of 1960 in 
the context of treaty renewal.52 The huge protests over the renewal of the security 
treaty united people in their condemnation of the Kishi government but, in the context 
of high-speed economic growth, the close relationship between the two countries 
created a paradox in debate and discussion of ideas of nation in Japan.  
On the evening of May 19th the Diet debated ratification of the treaty. 
Students, workers, and ordinary citizens surrounded the Diet compound in Tokyo 
giving voice to their protest against the revision of the treaty. Around 15-20,000 
demonstrators had gathered outside the Diet compound by the early evening. Inside 
the Diet, the socialist members worked to stall the ratification while Prime Minister 
Kishi hoped to extend the Diet session beyond its 26th May end date. As the time 
allotted for the treaty’s ratification was almost up, socialist Diet members staged a sit-
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down protest outside the speaker’s office in an attempt to prevent him from reaching 
the rostrum in the chamber to begin the debate. Seeing no other option, at 11pm the 
Speaker ordered the police to enter the Diet building and forcibly remove them. The 
session was extended beyond midnight and the treaty was ratified in the early hours of 
the morning in the absence of the socialist members of the Diet.53 Newspaper 
editorials quickly proclaimed the events a crisis for parliamentary democracy.54  
By the morning of the 20th, the demonstrations increased as people came on to 
the streets to protest against the perceived threat to liberal democracy and Japan’s 
independence as a nation-state.55 The mainstream newspapers were unanimous in 
their condemnation of the Kishi government. For the Asahi, it was ‘inexcusably 
undemocratic’. The Yomiuri saw it as a ‘tyranny of the majority’ and, though most of 
the press placed at least some of the blame for the events with the Japan Socialist 
Party, all the major newspapers agreed that the events of May 19th were ‘tantamount 
to digging a grave of parliamentarianism in Japanese politics’.56 In the year leading up 
to the renewal, the mainstream newspapers had printed more than two hundred 
editorials addressing the topic. For most of the rest of May and June the media 
supported the actions of the protesters including the illegal general strike held on the 
4th June. Yet, on June 7th United States Ambassador Douglas MacArthur II held a 
meeting with the editors of the major newspapers to seek their cooperation in 
diffusing any anti-Americanism and promoting the visit of President Eisenhower that 
was scheduled for June 19th. Kishi did the same on June 7th, 8th and 9th.57 Whether 
these meetings had a concrete effect on the media or not, from this point on the press 
began to become critical of the JSP and mass protests, in particular the violence of the 
student groups clashing with riot police. 
Only a few months earlier, according to a September 1959 Yomiuri Shimbun 
survey, only 14% of respondents had been ‘very interested in the current treaty 
revision problem’. 43% claimed to be ‘not interested’. At the same time, almost half 
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(46%) believed the Japan-US Security Treaty was necessary, and a survey by the 
Prime Minister’s Office published in October 1959 found 53% of people ‘in favour of 
Japan’s general cooperation with the US in the future’. As George Packard has 
pointed out, the fact that the polls showed little interest in the issue supports the 
conclusion that the events of May and June 1960 owed less to the treaty problem itself 
than to Kishi’s handling of it.58 For many of the protestors it was Japan’s postwar 
democracy which needed saving in light of the forced ratification. Even before 
Kishi’s actions, the issue of postwar democracy was a concern. The fact that 
negotiations were taking place had been kept secret until the end of 1959, and on 
January 12th 1960 an opinion piece in the Asahi Shimbun asserted that ‘for ten years’ 
the Japanese people had been worrying about the ANPO problem. The core of the 
problem lay in the fact that ‘this bill, which decides the direction of Japan for the next 
ten years, will be pushed through without gaining the satisfaction of the people’.59 
While not anti-treaty, the comment made clear the concerns for the role of democracy 
in the process of ratification.  
Nevertheless, the idea that the Japanese people were for the most part 
indifferent to the treaty appeared to be backed up by opinion polls in the press before 
the events of May 1960. The headline in the Mainichi Graph in January described the 
violence at Haneda airport as Kishi left for Washington as ‘the storm in the midst of 
indifference’.60 The problem for those who were concerned with the process was not 
only the domestic repercussions of ‘signing the treaty without a wide-ranging 
democratic debate among the people’. The international situation was also greatly 
worrying the Japanese people. Relations between Japan and China were a pressing 
problem which needed to be dealt with. The Asahi pointed out that even within the 
ruling party there were ‘many views on the future of China-Japan relations’. The 
treaty would compel Japan to stand alongside the United States in the international 
arena, a situation that would make the restoration of good relations with China much 
harder. The newspaper urged the government to keep ‘as much of a free hand as 
possible in dealing with this problem,’61 but the article also stressed the fact that over 
the ten years of the previous treaty there had been rapid changes in military 
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technology and its prevalence. In the late 1950s, the Soviet Union had made large 
advances in missile technology, developing and testing an intercontinental ballistic 
missile. The renewed treaty was dangerous, according to the Asahi, because it had the 
character of a mutual defence treaty between the United States and Japan. There was a 
great fear among the Japanese of being dragged into a war, given the constantly 
changing international situation.  
As the renewal was becoming an issue in the Japanese media, the international 
situation was certainly ambiguous. Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev visited the United 
States in the autumn of 1959, and this seeming thaw in relations between the two 
great powers in the Cold War, the so-called ‘spirit of camp David’, appeared to make 
the Security Treaty redundant. For the Japanese Prime Minister, talk of a thaw was a 
communist conspiracy and the ‘spirit of camp David’ a ‘term devised by communist 
propagandists for their own purposes’.62 But for the popular media, it was an 
important issue in the debate and discussion over Japan’s international position and 
the need for the renewal of the treaty. The domestic protests against the treaty took 
place against the background of growing Japanese economic influence in Asia and 
competition over exports with the United States.63 Commentators and journalists in 
the popular media discussed the international ambiguity of the Cold War, making 
clear popular anxiety over the prospects for both war and peace. At the same time, 
they promoted a vision of a consumer society grounded in Free World ideology and 
reflecting American lifestyles. This discussion served to gradually frame ideas of 
nation around the domestic and leisure activities of a growing middle-class, and 
offered to the young urban workers an aspirational image which reinforced Japan’s 
position in the Cold War as much as the renewal of the Security Treaty made it a 
political and strategic reality.  
Importantly, both the United States and Japanese governments promoted the 
economic cooperation the renewed treaty would bring. Indeed, it must be noted that 
one of the signatories of the 1960 treaty was Adachi Tadashi, who was at the time the 
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chairman of the Japan Productivity Center.64 On the Japanese side, there was a belief 
that the treaty would encourage international competition and raise living standards. 
Writing in Chūō Kōron, economist Ono Yoshihiko saw the issue of the economic 
liberalisation of trade and currency as one of the most pressing issues affecting Japan, 
on a par with the renewal of the treaty. As he saw it, the rapid development of 
Japanese capitalism after the war had taken place in the midst of profound changes in 
the international situation — changes which were ‘on a world historical scale’.65 As a 
result of these changes, the entire political and economic life of the Japanese people 
would be affected by reform of the treaty and the liberalisation of trade that would 
come with it. Since 1945, the overall figure for Japan’s exports and imports with the 
United States has increased by 30%. Between 1957 and 1959 exports to the US had 
increased by almost 10%.66 As the Mainichi Graph reported in the same month: ‘The 
Japanese industrial world, which has achieved remarkable progress by adopting 
foreign techniques, is now taking a big stride forward into the field of international 
competition with the coming of trade liberalization. Having made foreign technology 
its own, the thing to watch is how Japan will perform on the international stage’.67 
The debate over ANPO, then, was about more than simply the future international 
security of Japan and its position in the international arena. Indeed, it was a problem 
which would ‘decide for a long time the future destiny of the Japanese people’,68 
through its effects on the future direction of the Japanese economy.  
The Cold War and the ANPO Problem 
The January Asahi Shimbun article stressed the ambiguity of the Cold War. It made 
clear to readers that when thinking about future threats it was ‘important to bear in 
mind that the idea that Japan-US relations as defined in ANPO could ease the worries 
militarily and finally overcome them’, could ‘all be undone by a change in the present 
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situation’.69 For many commentators the Japanese government’s renewal of the treaty 
showed a dangerous willingness to accept US protection without regard to the 
ideological baggage associated with it. These worries were only exacerbated in the 
lead-up to the treaty’s ratification by signs of a change in the relationship between the 
Free World and the Soviet sphere. By the late 1950s, some commentators in the mass 
media believed they had detected a thaw in East/West relations on the world stage, 
and this was interpreted by many as the end of the ideological battle to divide the 
world between Soviet and American spheres of influence. At the very least it 
appeared to signal a willingness to coexist peacefully.  
The Russian leader Nikita Khrushchev and the US President Dwight D. 
Eisenhower had met at Camp David for three days from the 25th September 1959. 
Eisenhower had stated his intention to reciprocate with a visit to Moscow in the 
spring of 1960. The Asahi Graph of October 11th 1959 carried coverage of the 
Russian leader’s visit under the headline ‘One step at a time, one step at a time’. 
Underneath, was a photograph of Khrushchev and Eisenhower shaking hands with the 
question ‘is this the end of the Cold War or the beginning of a movement towards the 
end?’70 The magazine carried reports alongside photographs of the Soviet leader and 
his wife enjoying dinner with Hollywood stars, visiting farms and markets, and also 
mentioned his son and daughter who were accompanying him on the eight-day visit to 
the Soviet Union’s ideological enemy. There were ‘hot debates, defiant remarks on 
peaceful competition, repeated peace talks and relaxed moments as a tourist in Los 
Angeles, San Francisco, Des Moines and Pittsburgh’. All this during a trip which 
‘enlivened the news world’.71 According to the communiqué released following the 
three-day Camp David summit, both sides had expressed the desire to work together 
to solve ‘all important international problems’ and stressed the belief that these 
solutions should be peaceful ones. From the perspective of the Japanese popular 
media, the Cold War appeared to be thawing.  
There had been much talk of arms reductions during the Camp David summit. 
These ideas were debated in a roundtable discussion article published in Shūkan 
Heibon in March 1960. Fujiwara Hirotatsu, a professor at Meiji University, discussed 
the history of arms reduction and the latest proposals with two young people, 
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restaurant worker Shinosaki Takako, and unemployed Daigenji Shunsuke. Fujiwara 
explained that the suggestions put forward by the Soviet Union for reducing standing 
armies, followed by the reduction of arms production and consumption and even the 
banning within four years of the use of scientific rockets and nuclear research for 
military ends were wide-ranging but hard for the West to accept. Secrecy was 
endemic in the Soviet system and it was therefore hard to verify the seriousness of the 
East’s efforts to carry out any reduction. The West for its part had come up with 
suggestions centred on the establishment of an independent international body to 
verify any reductions on both sides. According to Fujiwara, these suggestions had 
been dismissed by the Russian media as signs that the West was not serious about 
reducing arms.72 Unemployed Daigenji Shunsuke saw their point. He expressed 
concern that the Japanese government was buying jets and strengthening their Self-
Defence Forces at a time when the Cold War seemed to be thawing. But ultimately, 
for Fujiwara, the problem was not the weapons themselves but the level of distrust in 
the different camps. The hope was that this distrust could be overcome. 
The Soviet leader and the American president had met to discuss world peace 
just as the Japanese government was preparing to ratify the renewal of the ANPO 
treaty. According to Nakamura Shōgo, the former head of the Asahi Shimbun’s 
American office, the great success of the visit, ‘made one think that the idea of 
peaceful coexistence had further inspired and penetrated into the minds of the 
American public’.73 Pressing ahead with the renewal of the treaty, then, appeared to 
some to be a submission to the strategic interests of the United States at a time when 
the ideological divisions of the Cold War seemed to be softening. When the signing 
ceremony for the renewal of ANPO came around, this contradiction was reinforced. 
On February 7th, the Mainichi Graph carried photos of the signing ceremony for the 
renewed treaty along with photographs of Kishi in Washington. The headline 
proclaimed ‘In the middle of the thaw the cold wave’, with the sub-heading ‘the day 
Japan was coldest’.74 The article carried photos and commentary on the 
demonstrations against the treaty by university students in Tokyo and claimed that 
since the return of the signatories to Haneda airport there had been no banzai or 
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celebration of the treaty. The Japanese government appeared to be going against the 
grain in the international environment to renew a military agreement with the United 
States that appeared to be unnecessary. At the time, when the conditions of the 
Treaty’s renewal became known to the public, the disconnection between the apparent 
thaw in the Cold War and a wider awareness of the prospects for rapid changes in the 
future only facilitated the growing opposition.  
A monthly current affairs column in the housewife magazine Fujin Kōron 
played on this ambiguity and the volatility within the international arena. The article 
pointed out that the year 1960 had the potential to turn out to be a historical one, but 
at the same time there was also a good chance that it might not. The article reminded 
readers that 1960 was only fifteen years after the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki, eight years after the H bomb tests, three years after the appearance of the 
ICBM, not to mention two years since the landing of a rocket on the moon.75 As 
Fujiwara Hirotatsu pointed out in Shūkan Heibon, the Soviet Union had developed an 
ICBM in 1957. Clearly, before 1960, the West had underestimated what the Soviet 
Union could do. Consequently, even with the apparent thaw and Khrushchev’s visit to 
the US, ‘the military power of the Soviet Union gradually became unusually 
threatening to the Western side’.76 According to the Fujin Kōron article, by 1960 it 
was clear that the human race would be wiped out in the event of another war. It was 
equally clear that although there existed no other option but to live in peace, ‘human 
feelings do not move in a logical way’.77 Despite the apparent thaw, fear and distrust 
remained. The international situation was volatile, but this did not necessarily mean 
ANPO was essential for Japan’s defence. 
Shūkan Heibon carried a discussion piece in January 1960 in which twenty-
two year old beautician Tanada Etsuko pointed out that things had changed a lot since 
the signing of the first ANPO treaty in 1952, and that these changes brought into 
question the reliance of Japan on the United States and vice versa. ‘We can put a 
rocket on the moon, and we live in an era when we can take pictures of the dark side 
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of the moon. In an era when a missile can fly at the touch of a button the United 
States cannot guarantee its own security by making Japan a bullet proof vest!’ Takagi 
Takeo of the Yomiuri Shimbun agreed, pointing out that if there were to be a war 
between Taiwan and China and the US became involved, there was a grave danger of 
Japan coming under retaliatory attack in the form of the bombing of Japan’s US 
military bases. Takagi mentioned the fact that the treaty as it stood had no limits. The 
next reform would not be due for another ten years, but in such a ‘speedy era’ ten 
years was far too long. For Takagi it was ‘impossible to think that the international 
situation will not have changed in ten years’.78 Japan would do better to keep its 
options open. 
The concept of mutual protection contained in the new treaty influenced the 
vehemence of opposition to it. It also provided some grounds for the belief that there 
was a price Japan would pay for its alliance with the US. Yamashita Hajime, a 
professor at the University of Tokyo, pointed to the ambiguity in political discussions 
of the treaty. The thorny but central issue of the definition of the concept ‘Far East’ 
was ambiguous. The government’s explanation had changed two or three times in the 
Diet discussions.79 Yamashita also brought up the idea of prior consultation, the right 
of Japan to refuse to help the US military as well as the problem of nuclear arms, 
saying: ‘We don’t know at the moment if there are nuclear weapons in Japan’.80 None 
of the most important issues surrounding the treaty were solved. At a time of an 
apparent thaw in the Cold War, the renewal of the treaty was raising more doubts and 
worries for the people than it was solving.  
Whatever the definition of the term East Asia, for many people the danger lay 
in Japan having to be drawn in to a war undertaken by the US military in the ‘Far 
East’. Given the continual stress on the ambiguity in the international arena this was 
not an idle worry for most Japanese. For opponents of the treaty, by signing and thus 
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becoming much more closely involved politically with the United States strategy in 
Asia, Japan could not embark on improving relations with China or the Soviet Union. 
Yet, as Fujin Kōron pointed out, one of the few positive features of the new ANPO 
treaty was that it expressed a ‘new economic cooperation between Japan and the 
United States’.81 In the popular magazines of the late 1950s and early 1960s, Free 
World ideology, as under the Marshall Plan in Europe, came to represent a de-
politicised America redefining Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s ‘Four Freedoms’ by 
‘transforming freedom from want into freedom to want’.82 Consumption was the key 
to economic development, and improving living standards and the ‘new economic 
cooperation’ between the two countries was key to this. It also tied Japan to US 
military strategy in East Asia on the side of the Free World in the Cold War. In this 
context, it is important to note Susan Reid’s assertion that in the Soviet Union 
‘consumption and living standards more generally came to the forefront of party 
rhetoric and state policy during the 1950s, under the conditions of “peaceful 
competition” that marked a new, somewhat more relaxed phase of the Cold War’.83 In 
Japan, the media discussed and debated the power politics of the renewal of the 
Security Treaty whilst discourse and debate in the same magazines continued to tie 
ideas of nation to consumption. Ideas of nation based on ‘peace and democracy’ 
became transformed into ideas of ‘peace and prosperity’. 
This separation of the political America of the Security Treaty crisis and the 
America of consumer lifestyles was made clear in the magazine Shūkan Heibon at the 
end of June 1960. In its regular ‘News Square’ section, the magazine published a 
special round table debate that brought out the ambiguous nature of the crisis for 
many young people. Hosted by critic Ōya Sōichi, the debate brought together 
Teramoto Keichi, a ‘Western singer’ and postgraduate student at Aoyama University, 
27; actress Hara Chisako; ‘TV talent’ Canadian Lee Smith, 18; Chūō University 
student Fujimoto Kaiya, 20 and department store worker Ogawa Michiko, 20. The 
introduction to the article asked the question ‘When will Kishi quit? Even among 
people with no interest in politics, in place of ‘good morning’ or ‘good evening’ this 
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(question) has become the extraordinary conversation point’.84 The anger and hatred 
directed towards Kishi was powerful among the young people chosen to take part in 
the debate. Yet for the most part the tone was apologetic when the subject turned to 
Japan’s relationship with the United States. The article allowed readers to sense a gap 
between the Japanese people and Japanese politics and, at the same time, provided 
them with a means of considering the American view of events. 
The debate went on to consider the visit to Japan on June 10th by US president 
Eisenhower’s press secretary James Haggerty, who had arrived at Haneda airport to 
prepare for a planned visit by the president. Around fifteen thousand demonstrators 
surrounded the car carrying Haggerty and Ambassador MacArthur, and they were 
finally rescued by a US military helicopter and taken to the US embassy.85 
Eisenhower’s visit to Japan, planned for the middle of June, was cancelled. The 
Canadian Lee Smith claimed to be as ‘an individual a neutral’, but she thought the 
demonstrations opposing the treaty were strange, in particular the desire to cancel 
Ike’s visit. Although she was Canadian, Smith allowed the readers to imagine the 
kinds of questions the American public would be asking. She turned their attention to 
Kishi and the US president. ‘I understand that everybody hates Kishi… but why were 
there placards proclaiming “Don’t Come Ike” and “I hate Ike”? I don’t think there is 
any connection between Kishi and Ike’. Hara replied, ‘It’s not that we hate Ike!’ Ōya 
Soichi agreed. ‘That’s right. It’s probably hard for foreigners to understand the 
feelings of the Japanese people right now. I think even MacArthur in the embassy 
does not understand the feeling at the moment’.86 The debate brought to the fore the 
ambiguous nature of the relationship between Japan and the United States. Fujimoto 
stressed that the protests were not ‘anti-America or totally against Eisenhower’s visit’. 
Teramoto Keichi hoped Eisenhower would understand that ‘the Haggerty incident 
does not mean we hate Haggerty or America’. Kishi and his anti-democratic actions 
had been the main target of the protests of June.  
The presence of the Lee Smith at the round table debate allowed the reader to 
see the broader international perspective on the Security Treaty crisis. The reader 
could imagine Japan’s relationship with the international community (the Free World) 
as having been jeopardised by the protests. Importantly, the explanations were in 
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large part directed at her. Her foreignness allowed the article to bring out the unique 
aspects of Japanese culture that had apparently been evident in the protests. If the 
feelings of the Japanese people were hard for foreigners to understand, Ōya looked to 
tradition for an explanation. He noted, laughing, that ‘the Japanese people have a long 
tradition of hating Prime Ministers and people in power’.87 Later he pointed out that 
‘traditionally in Japan protesters make the police their enemy’.88 In the photograph 
accompanying the article, rather than being directly involved in the debate, Lee was 
separated from the other participants by virtue of being seated away from the others to 
Ōya Soichi’s right (Figure 5). From the outset, she stressed that her father worked in 
the Canadian embassy and therefore she was unable to offer political opinions. 
Nevertheless, in posing questions about the protests to the other participants Lee 
continually detached Kishi from the Treaty itself, thereby allowing readers to do the 
same.  
 
Smith: I understand that Kishi is hated, but why hate ANPO? Doesn’t it 
protect the Japanese people? 
Okawa: I think ANPO probably has some good points but the bad points 
are worse. 
Fujimoto: Until now ANPO has been forced on us by America but in 
revising it the Japanese people should be able to give their 
opinions. That’s the problem. 
Ōya: But up to now Japan had no freedom to cancel the treaty. In the 
next ten years if we want to cut off the treaty we can do. But, if 
we cancel the treaty on one side, it will mean cutting off relations 
with America. That is the problem. 
Hara: It’s not about saying ‘We like America’ or ‘We like the Soviet 
Union’ I think the hope of the Japanese people lies in their saying 
‘we want to live in peace’. 
Teramoto: At any rate, people are resigned to wanting something to 
happen soon. Honestly, when I go to the ‘Young Japan’ meetings 
and they are all moaning about the anti-America 
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demonstrations…as someone who sings American music 
(western songs) I feel like giving up! (laughs). 
Ōya: Teramoto-san and Hara-san your job is the business of peace. 
Without peace Shūkan Heibon will not sell. For that reason (let’s 
hope) that the end comes and peace returns.89 
 
 
  (Figure 5.) The News Square round table with Canadian Lee Smith next to critic Ōya 
Soichi 
 
Smith’s presence and Ōya Soichi’s role as commentator allowed the reader to 
sense that the anger on the streets of Tokyo was ambiguous. It was not necessarily 
anti-American, but the renewal of the Security Treaty was being imposed on the 
Japanese people without their consent. The ambiguity created room for the reader to 
begin to view the relationship with the US on Japanese terms, although it recognised 
an element of subservience and, as with the wider media debates and discussions, 
underlined the necessity of the treaty for the economic development of Japan. Yet, by 
                                                
89 Ibid. p. 29. 
117 
 
separating Kishi from the treaty and reinforcing the image of a benign America it 
added to the increasing de-politicisation in the portrayal of consumer society. In the 
media, the protests over the renewal of the Security Treaty in 1960 brought out the 
ambiguity of the Cold War and the domestic transformations currently under way in 
Japan. The media presented an image of America which offered lifestyle choices for 
the increasingly prosperous Japanese people. The ideology of production, which 
helped to fuel economic growth after the Korean War, spurred the ideology of 
consumption, offering a way for Japanese to identify with the US. and consider their 
country’s position in the world through the lens of an emerging consumer culture. In 
many ways, this worked to disavow the subordinate relationship between the two 
countries.  
If at the beginning of 1960 Americans looked to own a boat and travel in their 
free time, by July 1960, with Kishi gone and the new Prime Minister espousing 
income doubling and the separation of politics from economics, the Mainichi Graph 
was reporting on the boom in boat ownership in Japan (Figure 6). ‘Yachting and 
motor-boating have become popular among the Japanese people recently. Groups of 
four or five that own a yacht or a motorboat, repair the craft by themselves’. Going 
(Figure 6.) The boom in leisure at sea, Mainichi Graph July 3rd 1960. 
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out on a boat, ‘though it may sound like an exaggeration, allows you to perceive the 
happiness of human freedom’.90 Hosting the Olympic Games would increase the 
emphasis on mass leisure for the Japanese people and cement the link between 
consumer and national ideas within the Cold War ideological trope of freedom and 
happiness. At the same time, criticisms of domestic consumption patterns would 
emerge to re-inscribe the overtly political opposition to the United States seen in the 
ANPO protests onto ideas of nation based around consumption and individual choice.
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Chapter 4 
Japan during the Tokyo Olympics 
 
‘Understood in its totality, the spectacle is both the outcome and the goal of the 
dominant mode of production…the spectacle epitomizes the prevailing model of 
social life’. 
Guy Debord1 
 
The Tokyo Olympics, held in October 1964, were the first to be held in Asia. Indeed 
they were the first to be held in any non-white, non-western country. They were also 
the first to be telecast internationally, live and in colour, the first to use computer 
technology to record the results of the sporting events, and the first time a fibre glass 
pole was used in the Pole Vault competition.2 Inasmuch as the Olympics have long 
been considered a Western event, their hosting by non-western cities has mostly been 
interpreted in terms of the attainment by the host of certain social and economic 
conditions, usually marking the Games as a rite of passage for the host country in the 
eyes of the international audience and the domestic public. But the Games in Tokyo in 
1964, no less than those in Beijing and Seoul more recently, tell as much about the 
changing international political environment as they do about the social and economic 
development of the host country.  
In many ways, the overarching imperative to make the Tokyo Olympiad a 
success was driven by the desire to flaunt the fact that, in the words of the Japanese 
government’s 1956 white paper, the ‘postwar is over’.3 Novelist and cultural critic 
Yasuoka Shōtarō claimed that the Tokyo Games brought a certain amount of peace to 
the hearts of the Japanese after the worries of the immediate postwar period, and critic 
Etō Jun watched an opening ceremony that ‘showed a Japan which could at last take 
its place in the world’, and similar claims could no doubt be made for South Korea in 
                                                
1 Guy Debord, The Society of the Spectacle, (New York: Zone Books, 1995), p. 13. 
2 http://www.olympic.org/tokyo-1964-summer-olympics. Last accessed on 17/12/12.  
3 Sekiguchi Eri, ‘Tokyo Orinpiku to Nihon Banpaku Hakurankai’, in Oikawa Ed. Tokyo 
Orinpikku, pp. 1-38; Yoshikuni Igarashi, Bodies of Memory: Narratives of War in Postwar 
Japanese Culture, 1945-1970, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), pp. 143-163; 
Christian Tagsold, ‘Modernity, space and national representation at the Tokyo Olympics 1964’, 
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1988 and China twenty years later.4 Nevertheless, the hosting of the Olympiad in East 
Asia has done more than demonstrate a growing worldwide homogeneity. The Games 
have in many cases emphasised distinctive Asian histories, priorities and identities to 
a greater extent than what William Tsutsui has called ‘a unitary global modernity’.5  
The 1964 Tokyo Olympics as a spectacle and media event sought to combine 
the idea of a unique Asian identity with a thoroughly modern, economically advanced 
democratic society. In doing so, it demonstrated how the recurring question of 
‘universality and cultural integrity’6 was confronted by Japan within the context of 
Cold War rivalries and rapid economic growth. For the domestic audience, as well as 
for ‘advanced countries’ the Games presented Japan as more than ready to play its 
role in the global modernity of the 1960s. Peace-loving and democratic, the Japan on 
display in 1964 had thoroughly abandoned the militaristic and feudal tendencies of 
the 1930s and 1940s and could now be completely reintegrated into international 
society.7 Less than twenty years after the end of the war, the Games also projected an 
image of a rebuilt, modern country centred on Tokyo, a capital city which offered up 
an example of modernization to be emulated by other countries in Asia. Within the 
popular media this idea of a Japan that had successfully followed the path of 
modernisation laid down by the Free World, and had apparently caught up with the 
West was one which nevertheless retained its Asian identity and retained its cultural 
uniqueness. 
The Tokyo Olympics affirmed Japan’s existence in the world, and confirmed 
for the Japanese people their identity within a world of nations. There were vast, 
widely celebrated transformations which aimed to turn Tokyo into a modern, 
cosmopolitan city. 97.25% of the budget for the Games was spent on urban expansion 
and the improvement of infrastructure.8 As the popular photographic magazine Asahi 
Graph recalled a few weeks after the closing ceremony: ‘The children of Tokyo had 
(the fact of) their existence among the many countries of the world burned into their 
                                                
4 Ueyama Kazuo, 'Tokyo Orinpiku to Shibuya, Toyko', in Oikawa Ed. Tokyo Orinpikku, pp. 39-
74; William Tsutsui ‘Introduction’, in Tsutsui and Baskett Eds. The East Asian Olympiads, pp. 1-
22. 
5 Tsutsui, ‘Introduction’, in Tsutsui and Baskett, Eds. The East Asian Olympiads, p. 15.  
6 Stefan Tanaka, Japan’s Orient: Rendering Pasts into History, 1993, p. 68. 
7 Noriko Aso, ‘Sumptuous Repast: The 1964 Tokyo Olympics Arts Festival’, Positions 10:1, 
Spring 2002, p. 8. 
8 Tsutsui, ‘Introduction’, in Tsutsui and Baskett, Eds. The East Asian Olympiads p. 14. 
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eyes, and the visitors experienced first-hand the heart and energy of the Japanese 
people (Nihonjin). It was a truly precious month’.  
Regarding the Tokyo Olympiad, Christian Tagsold has argued that, ‘symbolic 
politics and the burden of history called for image management not simply in order to 
enhance marketing opportunities but to reconstruct national identities’.9 Yet this 
chapter shows how the emergence of Japan within the context of almost a decade of 
high-speed economic growth firmly embedded the reconstruction of Japanese national 
identity within the marketing opportunities presented by a vibrant, youth-led 
consumer society. This was the continuation of a process outlined in the previous 
chapters through which ideas of nation became connected in the popular media with 
an everyday life based around consumption. As an event, the Tokyo Olympics was all 
about consumption, and when ‘Tokyo turned out to be the most cosmopolitan city in 
the world during the 15 day Olympic Games…’ it was in those spaces of consumption 
that the nation came to be seen as a reality. The Asahi Graph continued: ‘Tokyoites 
saw men and women from all the continents in the world at shopping centres, 
entertainment places and parks’.10 As Nakamura Masanori has noted, the 1960s was a 
period when ‘high school students’ and University students’ new ways of living and 
feeling brought about a change in the scenery of the imagination’.11 The extent to 
which this changing scenery was about consumption was literally made concrete by 
the alterations in the actual scenery of Japan itself as the Games approached. 
This chapter will outline how the popular media in Japan in the lead up to the 
1964 Olympics exposed the tension between the emphasis on a distinctive cultural 
identity and the universal global modernity of the Cold War Free World. As outlined 
in the previous chapters, the role of consumption in the everyday lives of the Japanese 
people changed over the course of the 1950s and helped to depoliticise the image of 
America and Japan in the popular media. In the context of the Olympics, the question 
of Japan’s national identity emerged in the popular press as a debate over the nature 
and desirability of consumer society, a debate which informed ideas of nation 
throughout the period of high speed economic growth and clarified Japan’s place in 
the global order of so-called free world capitalism. At the same time, the distancing of 
                                                
9 Christian Tagsold, ‘Modernity, space and national representation at the Tokyo Olympics 1964’, 
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everyday life from Cold War politics continued. As Shunya Yoshimi has shown, by 
the early 1960s Japanese companies had begun to assert a certain amount of national 
pride in their advertising of new consumer goods.12  
Asserting the quality and performance of home-produced consumer goods in 
media advertising helped produce an image of Japan as an example for other Asian 
countries to follow. Japan epitomised ‘global modernity’ not only through the 
transformation of its infrastructure; the very nature of its national identity was 
transformed into an article of consumption. This could be separated from the 
symbolic politics of the Games to allow an apparently depoliticised idea of nation to 
emerge, a shift that affected the way both Asia and the West figured domestically in 
the formation of ideas of nation. However, it also reflected fears over the increasing 
visibility of the working class men and women who consumed and populated these 
new spaces of consumption. Criticism of these new lifestyles took aim at Japan’s 
aping of American consumerism and this allowed for reflection on ideas of Japan and 
Japanese-ness. The country’s re-emergence onto the world stage as a bridge between 
East and West was not simply related to the numerous feats of civil engineering 
carried out to make the games a reality, it was also about the presentation of a 
Japanese lifestyle firmly embedded, ideologically if not economically, in 
consumption.  
This chapter will firstly outline the Cold War context of Japan’s relationship 
with Free Asia and the way in which this was reflected in discussion and debate over 
Japan’s international image in the run-up to the hosting of the Tokyo Olympics. The 
second section will show how the transformation of the city for the Games allowed 
the consumption of a modern lifestyle to come to the fore in debate and discussion 
over ideas of nation. This lifestyle was becoming more literally Japanese as building 
and construction projects gathered pace and consumption tied together the national 
and international. The chapter’s final section will look at the way the hosting of the 
Olympic Games brought division and disagreement over the positive and negative 
features of consumption, which played out in the juxtaposition of the threats and the 
opportunities the transformations posed to Japan’s young women.  
 
Japan as a Role Model 
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After 1945, as the Japanese Empire was disbanded and international power politics 
divided along Free World versus Communist Bloc lines, the strategic imperatives of 
the United States and its allies shifted. The immediate postwar emphasis of the 
Occupation authorities on stripping Japan of military and economic power and 
punishing the country’s wartime leaders ceded to the necessity of finding a way to 
bring the country back into the postwar world, particularly in Asia. Unaware of the 
strength of nationalist feeling in the colonies of Southeast Asia and lacking an overall 
post-war plan for the region, the European and American colonial powers feared that 
instability could provide fertile ground for pro-communist movements. The longer the 
transfer of sovereignty took, the weaker the anti-communist nationalists and the 
colonial powers would become. By 1949, U.S Policy Planning Staff Paper 51 
emphasised the importance of Southeast Asia in the battle against communism in Asia 
and the importance of relations between Japan and Southeast Asia for the economic 
revival of both regions.13  
Japan’s advance into the region throughout the 1950s ‘proceeded with the tacit 
acceptance of the United States’ which worried that the vacuum created by the retreat 
of the colonial powers would be filled by communist influence. ‘Japan’s return to 
Southeast Asia overlapped with decolonisation and the Cold War, and Japan’s return 
to Asia was thus closely linked to the transformation of the order in this region’.14 
From the mid-1950s, historian and diplomat Edwin Reischauer had pressed the need 
for the downplaying of the American model in advancing the cause for democracy in 
Asia because, ‘to the extent that we identify democracy exclusively with the United 
States, we are actually undermining our cause in Asia, for then we make democracy 
seem hopelessly unobtainable’.15 Reischauer did not offer up Japan as a role model to 
take the place of the United States, but by early 1960 the United States National 
Security Council had made clear its desire to ‘use Japan as an example to the less 
developed countries of the feasibility of achieving rapid economic progress within a 
framework of free institutions’.16 How Japan was understood in the region became a 
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14 Taizo Miyagi, ‘Post-War Japan and Asianism’, Asia-Pacific Review, Vol. 13, No. 2, 2006. 
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pressing issue that increased in parallel to its growing economic power — but Japan 
was still not accepted as a part of the developed world of the West. 
During and after the Bandung Conference of 1955, many in Japan saw an 
opportunity for the country to position itself as neither Eastern nor Western, but 
instead to use its original civilisation as the ideal bridge between the Cold War 
powers.17 During the late 1950s, Japan’s increasing economic role in Southeast Asia 
provided the ideal means to strengthen this position. After the signing of the San 
Francisco Peace Treaty in 1952, the issue of war reparations to countries in Southeast 
Asia became combined with the Japanese government’s desire for economic 
development in the region. Japanese leaders sought to promote economic cooperation 
and build up markets for the rapidly growing Japanese economy. The region offered 
Japan the cheap raw materials and markets necessary to build up capital reserves and 
begin to bridge the ‘dollar gap’. In the late 1950s, Japanese Prime Minister Kishi 
Nobusuke visited 15 countries in Asia including India, Pakistan, Taiwan, Thailand, 
Indonesia and Singapore, underlining the importance of the region for Japanese 
economic development.  
Throughout the 1950s, Japan’s war reparations, paid in the form of services 
and capital goods, were successfully designed to ‘facilitate integration with Southeast 
Asia’ whilst easing the path for Japanese influence in the region.18 All reparations 
were made through the provision of services and products, spurring production in 
Japan and providing ready-made export markets for Japanese firms. The pay-off was 
clear in economic terms. Japan’s trade with Asia increased more than 300% in the ten 
years between 1957 and 1967. The policy also helped to sow the seeds of a conscious 
independent identity for Japan and its international relations, which was further 
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bolstered by the policies pursued by the Kishi government.19 During the same period, 
the Japanese domestic economy grew at a rapid rate, and by 1964, according to a 
government white paper, the standard of living in Japan was equal to that of countries 
in Western Europe. The policies pursued at Bandung, and then through the Kishi 
administration, had by the mid-1960s gradually elevated Japan to the economic 
position in which it could take over the burden of leading the development of the 
region from the United States.20 Nevertheless, by 1964, as Ronald Dore pointed out, 
Japanese attempts to claim a place alongside the developed world whilst at the same 
time siding with the interests of its poorer Asian neighbours had put Japan into a 
position that was becoming increasingly difficult.21 How Japan was understood in the 
region became a pressing issue as its economic power increased. 
In July 1964, three months before the start of the Tokyo Olympics Fujin 
Kōron carried an article based on a round table discussion, which focused on the way 
people in other Asian countries viewed Japan. The article was accompanied by a 
picture of Prime Minister Ikeda Hayato on a visit to Southeast Asia, and sought to 
examine the way ordinary people in Asia understood Japan’s diplomatic policies in 
the region and how that affected their views on the country itself. After recent UN 
trade negotiations in Geneva one newspaper reported that within Asia Japan was seen 
as an ‘advanced country’, while from the viewpoint of ‘advanced countries’ Japan 
was Asian. This report gave the impression that both sides — Asia and the advanced 
countries — had marginalised Japan. The Fujin Kōron round table strove to 
understand why despite the best efforts of Japan’s diplomats to present Japan as ‘one 
country in Asia’, (one of the three principles of Japanese foreign policy announced by 
the Kishi cabinet), Japan was still not accepted by countries in Asia as ‘a member of 
Asia’.22 
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At a time when the United States was seeking Japan’s support for operations 
in South Vietnam, and talks between South Korea and Japan had been put on hold due 
to violent student protests against the resumption of bilateral relations, Terasawa 
Hajime urged the need to think about how Asian people saw Japan. The legacy of 
Japanese colonialism and the present Cold War battle between the free world and 
communism loomed large in the discussion. As the sub-heading of the Fujin Kōron 
article put it: ‘twenty years after war how do Asian people caught up in the 
ideological battle between East and West see and think about a Japan which has 
recovered so surprisingly?’ By understanding the views of ordinary Asian people it 
would be possible to understand the stance Japan should take in international 
relations. As the article saw it, knowing how ordinary people in other Asian countries 
saw the effects of Japan’s diplomacy would make it possible to get to the core of how 
Japan should act in Asia.23 The perception of a low opinion of Japan among many of 
the people in Asian countries was a worry for all the participants in the round table 
debate.  
Maruyama Shizuo, an editorial writer for the Asahi Shimbun who as a war 
correspondent covered Japanese campaigns in Burma, discussed Indonesia, where 
during the wartime he had sensed a lot of hope and expectation among the people 
towards Japan.24 Unfortunately, those hopes were dashed by the actions of the 
Japanese military in Southeast Asia. As Maruyama saw it, despite their initial 
goodwill the Indonesian people were left understandably disappointed. With the end 
of the war and the dismantling of the Japanese Empire ‘whether in Singapore or 
Manila’, the people’s opposition to Japan in light of the actions of what he referred to 
as ‘bad Japanese soldiers’ grew stronger and anti-Japanese sentiment continued to 
rise. Nevertheless, the journalist was optimistic that over the next three or four years 
feelings would become much more favourable towards Japan. In analysing the way 
Japan was viewed in Asia, Maruyama sensed a feeling of affinity as fellow Asians. 
He put this shift in opinion down to the recent rapid development of the Japanese 
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economy and a growing respect for the way Japan had overcome the total destruction 
of the war.  
In most countries of Asia, as Maruyama saw it, the feeling that there was 
something to be learned from Japan’s policies of high-speed growth was now very 
strong. Ōmori Minoru, head of foreign news for the Mainichi Shimbun agreed that 
feeling towards Japan’s present economy was completely different to the feelings in 
most countries during the war.25 By the mid-1960s, for many Asian countries the 
Japanese experience offered a path to economic success and development which 
would allow those post-colonial countries to stand on their own two feet. Of course, 
as the largest powers in the region, India and China could not be ignored. However, 
Maruyama pointed out that India was not liked by countries such as Burma, Ceylon 
and Nepal because of its ‘posturing as a leader on the world stage’, and also simply 
because, according to Maruyama, it was ‘difficult for humans to understand each 
other’ and Indians were ‘especially difficult to like’. Terasawa Hajime agreed that on 
aeroplanes ‘Indian people are bureaucratic’ — not just the civil servants, but the 
cleaners too were ‘bureaucratic in a bad way’. Nevertheless, as Maruyama 
acknowledged, the problem Japan had to come to terms with was that, difficult to like 
or not, the excellence of the Indian people which was ascribed to the greatness of 
British colonialism gave India a huge future potential in the region. Japan had no 
alternative but to recognise this future potential and find a way to deal with it.  
These comments clearly hinted at both the political issues of the Cold War and 
the question of Japan’s identity in relation to East and West. China had sharply 
criticised the Kishi government for renewal of the security treaty with the United 
States in 1960, seeing the alliance as ‘proof that Japanese militarism had already 
returned’. Despite efforts to improve relations throughout the early 1960s, Japan’s 
involvement in the Vietnam War and China’s testing of an atomic bomb at the time of 
the Tokyo Olympics presented serious impediments to improved relations.26 At the 
same time, under the Prime Ministerial leadership of Jawahalal Nehru, India had 
presented itself as the promoter and leader of the non-aligned movement, refusing to 
sign the San Francisco Peace Treaty because of the US-Japan Security Treaty. India 
believed the Security Treaty should only be concluded once Japan had become an 
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independent country. Moreover, as Japan sought to build up its economic influence in 
the region, investment in India often encountered red tape, which served to frustrate 
the growth of a commercial base there. Japanese investment in India constantly came 
up against the refrain from Indian leaders that ‘Japan is a big country economically. 
India is big in other ways’. So while on one level the Indians were similar to other 
Asian countries in their increasing respect for Japan as an ‘Asian country which had 
achieved modernisation’, the Japanese were nevertheless patronised as 
‘uncommunicative members of a derivative civilisation’.27  
Travelling around Asia, Ōmori had been struck by the wealth of Japan. During 
the discussion, he chose to emphasise the fact that Japan’s position in the Cold War 
under the protection of the United States nuclear umbrella was essential to this 
wealth. In a section of the debate entitled Blissful Japan, he explained how Japan’s 
wealth had come about predominately because of the security of the country. When 
he met with political leaders in Taiwan, Laos and Korea they had all told him that 
Japan was in a position to develop its economy safe from the fear of communism 
because Vietnam was the focus of the battle between the United States and the Soviet 
Union. Ōmori claimed that at first he didn’t pay much attention to these comments, 
but after thinking about it he had to admit that ‘having a military budget of 2 per cent 
of the people’s earnings and the ANPO treaty’ Japan had ‘absolutely no fear of 
communism’.28 Despite the fact that all over Asia the battle between left and right still 
raged, Japan was secure because of her ‘blessed geography’. 
As the participants in the round table debate pointed out, there was an 
emerging respect for Japan among many Asian countries, particularly with regard to 
the economic advances it had made. Japan was a role model for many countries 
hoping to overcome their positions as pawns in an ideological battle between the free 
world and the communist bloc. The commentators all saw Japan as having moved 
beyond those ideological struggles which had hallmarked of much of the debate over 
ideas of nation in Japan during the early and mid-1950s. Yet, as Ōbokata hinted, the 
problem of Japan’s apparent subordination to the United States could negatively 
influence feeling toward Japan in many Asian countries. While the Fujin Kōron 
debate presented Japan as a leader on the world stage and an example to other 
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countries in Asia, the low key diplomacy of the 1950s needed to appear further 
disengaged from US policy in the region if Japan was to be fully accepted as ‘one 
country in Asia’. The problem of finding the right balance between Japan as ‘west’ 
and Japan as ‘east’ was firmly embedded in the concerns of the Cold War. 
In his commemoration speech to mark Japan's accession to the United Nations 
in December 1956, Japanese foreign minister Shigemitsu Mamoru claimed that Japan 
could be ‘regarded as a bridge between East and West’.29 As Sang Mi Park has 
pointed out, Japan’s diplomacy throughout the late 1950s and early 1960s was 
characterised by attempts to ‘unobtrusively position Japan as an international 
mediator’ in Asia. Economic growth and booming trade with Asia meant that by 
1962, diplomat Suzuki Tadakatsu could claim that the country could ‘greatly 
contribute to world cultural development within the contemporary international 
context of an on-going Cold War’.30 As Maruyama Shizuo pointed out in Fujin 
Kōron, the nature of Japan’s re-engagement with Asia varied greatly according to the 
particular wartime experiences of Japanese Imperialism, as well as the postwar 
actions of the European and American colonial powers. 
Nevertheless, early in the postwar period Japanese intellectuals, politicians, 
and commentators of both left and right realised the need for Japan to define its 
position in Asia whilst seeking a niche in the western world. As Sandra Wilson has 
put it, a ‘self-conscious Asian-ness was thus juxtaposed with an image of Japan as a 
modern, westernized country at the forefront of science and technology’.31 Yet the 
west also understood the importance of accepting Japan as a member of the Free 
World and treating the country as ‘a full and major ally’, whilst using its successful 
economic policies as an advert for the Free World. The Tokyo Olympics provided the 
perfect opportunity to depoliticise Japanese influence in the region. By the time of the 
Tokyo Olympiad, the question of Japan’s influence in Asia asked by Fujin Kōron — 
‘How do Asian people caught up in the ideological battle between East and West see 
and think about a Japan which has recovered so surprisingly?’ — was no longer 
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solely premised on the amount of economic assistance provided by Japan. It was 
becoming a question of cultural understanding. 
In 1964 the Japanese foreign ministry made clear its policy of emphasising the 
introduction of Japanese culture to the world through the promotion of foreign 
cultural exchange. This emphasis on exporting culture was not solely a concern of the 
Japanese government. The diplomatic bluebook for 1964 pointed out that most 
countries were working towards the promotion of world peace through cultural 
exchange and mutual understanding. The Japanese government set up the Division of 
Cultural Affairs within the foreign ministry and emphasised that this cultural 
promotion was hard for non-governmental organisations to carry out alone. It stressed 
that whether through government efforts alone or together with private companies and 
aid agencies the Japanese government would make every effort to introduce Japanese 
culture to the world to promote mutual understanding and ultimately world peace.32 
To this end, in 1962, Kishi Nobusuke became the president, Ikeda Hayato honorary 
president, and Japanese foreign minister Ohira Masayoshi honorary vice-president of 
the Society for International Cultural Relations (KBS).  
This independent body, which had functioned during the war as the main 
organisation for overseas propaganda, took a leading role in revising cultural policy.33 
It was in the context of the strong emphasis on the promotion of Japanese culture 
abroad and the Cold War ideal of a Japan that could act as a role model for Free Asia 
that ideas of nation and the nature of Japanese national culture were discussed and 
debated in the domestic media. The Tokyo Olympics provided the opportunity for 
Japan to introduce its culture to the world, and to realise the ideal of a bridge between 
East and West. Through the transformations in infrastructure in preparation for the 
Games and given the nature of the Games themselves, culture and consumption had 
become deeply linked by 1964. 
Consuming the City, Consuming the World 
As noted in the previous chapter, the period from the late 1950s saw the emergence of 
a ‘mass-consumption consciousness’, in which popular magazines showed their 
readers what they should be, what they should aspire to, and what they should and 
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could consume. In doing so, they deliberately constructed the 1964 Tokyo Olympics 
as a consumer event. The Games became ‘a mechanism for the formation of 
consumer culture through a media which reflected the times, influencing society 
whilst changing people’s lifestyles and consciousness’.34 In the popular media the 
transformation of the country for the Tokyo Olympiad was one aspect of this shift in 
emphasis from a production oriented economics to a focus on the consumer as king. 
The design and development of buildings central to the games themselves, 
such as the stadia and the athletes’ village, were directly aimed at proving Japan’s 
modernity whilst reconciling its recent history. Kenzo Tange’s Yoyogi gymnasium 
with its imagined line of sight towards the resting place of the Meiji Emperor, 
deliberately proposed a continuation between Meiji era modernisation and the 
postwar transformation of the country.35 But wider transformations in infrastructure 
were also necessary in the light of the hasty reconstruction of the Occupation period, 
which had been followed by the rapid population growth brought about by the 
industrialization of the 1950s.  
Japan, and particularly Tokyo, was dramatically rebuilt to prepare for the 
Games, with much of the budget for the Games being spent on urban expansion and 
infrastructure improvement. Taking the previous Olympiad in Rome in 1960 as an 
example, the Tokyo Olympics became the trigger for large-scale urban 
improvement.36 Housing was a particular problem throughout the 1950s and 1960s, 
and even the end of the postwar government White Paper in 1956 accepted that 
housing was the slowest area of the national lifestyle to recover. Despite the 
formation by the Hatoyama cabinet of the Japan Housing Association in 1955 — a 
public, non-profit housing developer — and the implementation of a ten-year plan to 
address housing problems, the immediate postwar housing shortage had by no means 
been addressed by 1964. Nevertheless, the emergence of the Danchi as a solution to 
urban overcrowding and their status as the epitome of ‘modern living’ had already 
become firmly associated with a consumer lifestyle and modernity.37 This 
transformation also allowed the city to shed the perceived violent associations with 
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the America of the Occupation. 38 At the same time, it helped to create the city as 
‘Japanese’. 
According to the headline of an article in the young people’s magazine Shūkan 
Heibon in August 1964, massive building projects had, over the course of the early 
1960s, transformed Tokyo into a ‘dream modern city’.39 This had entailed a vast 
cleanup operation dating back to the late 1950s, which took in infrastructure as well 
as public morality with the aim of ‘beautifying Japan’ for the foreign visitors.40 To 
address the noxious smell emanating from the Sumida River, new sewers were laid 
and the government attempted as best it could to conceal the persistence of prewar 
hygiene conditions and various unsightly aspects of the city. The human side of the 
cleanup campaign saw the metropolitan police removing ‘malicious violators who 
would damage the capital’s appearance’, targeting wounded veterans begging on the 
streets outside major train stations and anyone caught ‘urinating in the street’.41 It was 
not just the homeless who were affected by this obsession with cleansing the 
unsanitary streets. Punch-kun of the young men’s magazine Heibon Punch brought 
his readers’ attention to the fact that with only thirteen weeks left before the Olympic 
games there was a distinct lack of public toilets. In Tokyo there were four hundred 
public toilets but, according to Punch-kun, this was only a tenth of the number in 
London. Clearly, with the new law against urinating in public, for the foreign visitors 
flocking to Japan, going out of the hotel during the Olympics to enjoy the bars and 
restaurants could pose a problem.42  
It had its critics, but the idea of Tokyo as a dream modern city helped fuel the 
discourse over Japan’s rebirth less than twenty years after the destruction of 1945. 
Debates revolved around the idea of consumption and consumer society. They looked 
forward rather than back in the search for the essence of Japan. In the popular media, 
it was the promise of a modern consumer lifestyle that was being touted as the true 
symbol of modernity. Even the efforts of the police to eradicate crime sought to 
present Tokyo as ‘a bright space where nothing could hide in its interstices’.43 The 
‘hanzai no nai akarui machi’ (crime free, bright town) touted by the metropolitan 
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police used ‘bright’ (akarui) in exactly the same way as the advertising gurus and 
corporate salesmen of the high-speed growth period in their promotion of a consumer-
driven economy. As noted in the previous chapter, the ‘bright life’ had emerged in the 
1950s as an ideological symbol which sought to imply ‘the housewife-centred family 
and the dominance of the middle class’.44 In this context, as the Olympics 
approached, the city and the country became sites of consumption both objectively 
and subjectively.  
In January 1964, nearly ten months before the start of the event, the Asahi 
Graph published images and commentary on the building work being carried out in 
Tokyo in preparation for the opening ceremony in October. The journal boasted that 
the Tokyo Olympiad would be ‘the first celebration of beauty and power in the East, 
adorned with the unique ideas of Japan and supported by world class civil 
engineering’.45 The rebuilding of Tokyo was a spectacular demonstration that Japan 
had achieved the standards of more economically advanced countries and the Asahi 
focused on those buildings that would host Olympic events. Meanwhile, Shūkan 
Heibon and Heibon Punch excited their young readers with the rapid growth of 
opportunities for a life of leisure. A high-speed monorail had been constructed to link 
the city centre with the country’s busiest airport, Haneda. New roads and highways, 
new subway lines and the stadiums and facilities which would be used to host the 
games were impressive examples of the dream modern city and brought vast changes 
to the experience of the city. ‘While breathing in the sea air of Tokyo Bay’, Haneda 
International Airport was now only thirty minutes away thanks to a fantastic new 
highway. 
The nature of these changes and their basis in consumer culture was 
underlined by the fact that while around 50,000 people per day visited the airport 
itself, 20,000 of them were there purely to see the airport. For these tourists there was 
a flight simulator, which gave the experience of ‘really flying in an aeroplane’. At 
four to five degrees cooler than the city, the airport was a great place to take in the 
view and the leisure mood was epitomised by a rooftop beer garden where the beer 
drunk in the evening while gazing at the amazing illuminations of the airport ‘tasted 
completely different’, according to Mr Nakazawa of the airport building management 
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company. With the opening in September of the high-speed monorail, it would be 
possible to travel from Haneda airport to the city of Hamamatsu non-stop in just 
fifteen minutes. At Hamamatsu a heliport was planned next to the monorail station, a 
bus terminal would be built, and eventually the monorail would be extended to 
Shimbashi.  
The changes above ground were impressive, but of greater interest to the 
magazine’s younger readers was the fact that Ginza would see a great new 
underground date spot once the underground lines and the marble shopping arcades 
were finished. Amorous young couples would be able to ‘see a film in Hibiya and 
then enjoy shopping in Ginza’. The article also pointed out that for those who wanted 
to soak up just ‘a smidgen’ of the ‘gorgeous atmosphere’ at the airport there was a 
hotel on the third floor of the international departures lounge which could be reached 
(rooms for two costing 2,800 yen for three hours!) via the escalator in the lounge.46 
Tokyo was undergoing huge changes, but for the young and predominantly single 
female readership of Shūkan Heibon, it was the promise of a lifestyle of consumption 
and leisure which framed those changes. Tokyo was Japan’s capital city but other 
areas would not be left out of the transformation. In July 1964, the world’s fastest rail 
network was unveiled. Capable of carrying people from Tokyo to Osaka in just three 
hours, the Shinkansen would begin passenger services right before the beginning of 
the games in October. As a sign of the rapid development of the country, this was a 
feat of engineering which would allow the intrepid Japanese office lady to skip work 
for the day, visit her boyfriend in Kyoto for lunch, after that visit some temples, and 
easily return home by 8.30pm, then ‘with a look of innocence, give the excuse of 
overtime work before joining in her sister’s birthday party’.47  
The shrinking of the country through the development of world-leading 
Japanese technology made travelling around the country much easier. At the same 
time the lifting of restrictions on foreign travel brought the world closer through the 
popular media. Up to the mid-1960s it was unusual for Japanese to travel abroad. 
Passports were valid for only one trip, there was a $500 limit on the amount of money 
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that could be taken out of the country, and the Ministry of Finance had to approve the 
trip. Tourism was not usually considered a valid reason. In any case the cost of travel 
was prohibitively expensive for most Japanese so that even when restrictions were 
lifted in 1964 only 15.1% of overseas Japanese travellers were classed as tourists.48 
Nevertheless, by the year of the Tokyo Olympics, magazines such as Fujin Kōron, 
Shūkan Heibon, and Heibon Punch were promoting not only tourism, but living and 
working abroad. In September 1964, Fujin Kōron published an article on Japanese 
women working abroad.  
According to the magazine, it was a reality that the ‘number of women saying 
“whatever the city, whatever the job I want to try working abroad”’ was increasing. 
The article explained which countries were the best for Japanese women seeking 
work (Argentina and Brazil if they learnt the language) and which would be difficult 
(Soviet Bloc countries of course).49 Shūkan Heibon celebrated the luxury of life in 
Sydney where ‘at the age of twenty there were typists who earn 80,000 Yen per 
month’. Not only that, the population was a fifth of Tokyo’s and ‘even at the young 
age of twenty, around the average age to marry, it is normal for a standard middle-
class household to own their own house and car’.50 In January 1964, the magazine 
published a travel essay by Kanetaka Kaoru a Tokyo Broadcasting Services (KBS) 
TV presenter. ‘Kanetaka Kaoru’s World Travels’ predicted that 1964 would be a 
boom year for travelling abroad.51 Then in May 1964, the magazine published a travel 
guide for those readers who were ‘fed up with living in small Japan’.52 The world was 
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getting smaller and easier to navigate. At the same time, readers of Fujin Kōron were 
urged not to look for cultural differences and ‘see the world as one place, like going 
from Kyushu to Tokyo’. Air travel had transformed the globe in the same way as the 
Shinkansen had transformed Japan. ‘From Tokyo to Kyushu takes 20 hours, on a jet 
you can be in America in the same time. And Europe too’.53 The world was shrinking, 
and Japan’s young people were urged to look at the world beyond their country’s 
borders. 
In May 1964, Heibon Punch also published a special article on the art of 
budget travel for young Japanese men. The article noted that with the liberalisation of 
travel restrictions the ‘hearts of young people were bursting’. It promised advice on 
topics from ‘women to toilets’ by four people who had successfully travelled on a 
shoestring budget. An accompanying column explained how to save money by 
staying in Youth Hostels in Europe or the YMCA in the US After listing the average 
prices in the red light districts of several countries — Greece, Turkey and Pakistan — 
unemployed twenty-five year old Tonegawa Masakasu offered his advice to those 
planning to travel. He urged those who were no good at languages not to travel, and 
those with a lot of money to stay and travel within Japan. Anybody who did plan to 
travel abroad should ‘shed their consciousness of being Japanese’ and travel as ‘so-
called human beings’.54  
Opening up culturally to the world was also important for Hayashi Shūji 
writing in Fujin Kōron. In an article in February 1964, Hayashi hoped to encourage 
Japanese women to travel more. At the same time, he raised criticisms of the nature of 
consumption in Japan and compared it negatively with Western Europe. Through the 
article, Hayashi sought to address the questions ‘What is Western Europe?’ and ‘What 
kind of thinking governs the daily life of the people of Western Europe?’ He also 
sought to decipher exactly what it was that Western Europe really meant at a time 
when the Japanese government claimed that their country was on a par with Western 
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Europe at least economically. Travel to Europe was becoming cheaper for Japanese 
tourists, and Hayashi recounted meeting a Japanese woman in Heidelberg who was 
travelling around on only three dollars a day. The woman did not speak German, so in 
Hayashi’s opinion the trip must have been difficult, but more freedom to travel would 
mean more people being able to gain this kind of experience. ‘Touching deeply 
embedded Christian culture and monuments, seeing the remains of the development 
of civic culture’ was all necessary in order ‘to make Japanese people into world 
people’.55 Despite what the Japanese government said, Hayashi saw Europe as a 
cheap place to live, work, and travel, and in contrast the cost of living and travelling 
in Japan was very expensive. The reason for this difference in living costs was 
cultural, according to Hayashi, and it was very evident in the significant differences in 
the modes and means of consumption that existed between Europe, and the US and 
Japan.  
Japan’s main experience of foreign culture had come through the US-led 
Occupation, and as a result, in Hayashi’s opinion, America was the only developed 
culture the Japanese people knew. In the US and Japan waste was natural, but in 
Europe Hayashi believed people were more careful in not throwing things away. The 
obvious example in Japan was housing. ‘In Japan if you live in a house for 50 years it 
is no longer habitable, but in Europe they last for many years’.56 Paris was a fantastic 
example of this, where, according to the author, Montmartre was in the same 
condition as when it was first built in the 19th century. London was much the same, 
and the London Underground, built almost one hundred years before, still served the 
1964 rush hour. For Hayashi the lesson was obvious, ‘if it is built, build it well and 
then use it for as long as possible’. Life was ‘cheaper’ in Europe because people 
placed more value on what they owned. In contrast, the problem in Japan was the 
adoption of an American attitude to everyday consumer society.  
For Japanese people to live at the same level as the people of Western Europe, 
to ‘have central heating, eat luxurious high-calorie food, wear Italian shoes and 
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English clothes’, they ‘would probably need four or five times the lifestyle costs of 
today’.57 Housing costs were more expensive in Japan, but watches, clothes, 
stationery, leather goods, jewellery and other goods were also more expensive in 
Japan. In a consumer society this meant that Western Europe was a much cheaper 
place to live than Japan. For Hayashi, things became more expensive if other people 
did them for you, and this was a fundamental part of the culture of consumption in 
Japan. Ignoring the fact that labour costs were much lower in Japan, when travelling 
in Europe Hayashi’s advice to Japanese people was simple, ‘drive the car yourself, 
stay in a pension, wash your own clothes and eat in self-service restaurants’. Japanese 
people thought Europe was expensive because they tried to travel like they did in 
Japan. The economic philosophy of a developed country (senshin koku) was simple in 
Hayashi’s opinion: ‘it becomes more expensive if someone else does it for you’. 
Japanese consumer society had developed on the basis of cheap labour and that had 
brought about a culture of service where everyday tasks were paid for.58 The 
implication was that Japan, through its somewhat different culture of consumption, 
was not yet among the ranks of the developed countries (senshin koku).  
Another difference between Japan and Europe centred on the concept of a 
‘European independent spirit’. Hayashi claimed that while people in Europe would 
deal with problems themselves, the Japanese in comparison lacked initiative and 
always found it necessary to rely on officials. Japan’s approach to solving problems 
was to create more bureaucrats, and this cost the people in tax. In Western Europe 
such problems were always sorted out independently. In Japan, because Japanese 
people were ‘always meddling in others’ affairs’, people didn’t care about causing 
other people inconvenience and so they didn’t try to solve issues amongst themselves. 
This led to a situation where the Japanese government treated the people like children, 
while in Western Europe they were treated like adults. Everyone was free to decide 
the best way to live but, Hayashi insisted, ‘if you don’t treat people like adults there 
will be no independence. In Europe the independence which is at the base of 
democracy runs deep’.59 Japan’s citizens lacked an independent approach to taking 
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their civic responsibilities seriously, and the high cost of living stemmed not only 
from the government’s economic policies but from a backward culture of waste.  
Hayashi’s evidence came from his experience travelling on a train in Western 
Europe. As a non-smoker he took a seat in a compartment with six other people. 
During the journey one man ‘forgetting he was in a non-smoking compartment lit a 
cigarette. Very quickly an old woman sitting next me scolded him’. The smoker 
apologised for being rude, claiming he had not realised the compartment was non-
smoking, and put out the cigarette. According to Hayashi, neither the old woman nor 
the man looked annoyed and were perfectly relaxed with one another, ‘it was a 
pleasing scene’.60 In Japan, the economic insecurity and inequalities brought about 
through the policy of high-speed growth were reflected in personal and civic 
insecurities compounded by cultural modes of consumption. This cultural 
explanation, when Japan was compared to what were clearly considered ‘developed 
countries,’ went beyond the economic though, pointing to broader problems of 
democratic accountability and individual independence. The Japanese had been 
rendered culturally insecure by such rapid alterations to their country's economy. This 
social insecurity was reflected at the individual level in lack of initiative and lack of 
confidence in personal situations. Tying the problems of the cost of everyday life to a 
culture which was not yet the culture of an ‘advanced country’ neatly deflected 
attention from the policies of the Japanese government and the political nature of 
high-speed growth.  
Sadly for Hayashi, although the government claimed Japan was becoming like 
Europe, in reality that day was still very far away. Japan was closer to Europe’s past 
than its present, and the deep gulf between the two was clear. At least by going 
abroad and gaining experience of the world Hayashi hoped that Japanese women 
might change ‘their thinking, their learning of housework, their means of putting 
themselves in society’.61 Importantly, Hayashi’s trip of discovery was about building 
a Japanese identity which could be part of a global modernity that would help those 
Japanese lucky enough to be able to travel to Europe to understand the importance of 
democracy and civil society, and also the value of culture. Shūkan Heibon and Heibon 
Punch celebrated the new opportunities for travel and presented the world as a place 
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of excitement in which Japanese people could take advantage of their new-found 
freedom to shed their cultural inhibitions and live as a ‘human being’. The readers of 
Fujin Kōron were urged to view the opening up of the country as an opportunity for 
reflection and cultural critique, setting themselves and their ideas of Japan into a 
universal (though western) global modernity. The magazines encouraged readers to 
celebrate how much Japan had achieved through its economic development, but at the 
same time they stressed the need to learn how to live better and offered glimpses of a 
future Japan. The debate in the popular media offered ‘the enticement of modern 
democratic access to global pleasures such as tourism’.62 Domestic travel companies 
expanding their own tour packages during the early 1960s followed the images of 
modern lifestyles as epitomised by the air hostess.63 Yet, this was not just happening 
at international levels. The changing landscape of Tokyo offered the vision of a 
modern lifestyle much more closely related to the everyday lives of the Japanese.  
Domestic ideas of nation often emerged from critiques of the rapid pace of 
change. The idea that hosting the Olympics and opening up to the world were not 
necessarily things to be celebrated was made more than clear in an article published in 
Fujin Kōron in August 1964. The eyes of the world were on Japan, and Furugaki 
Tetsurō described the coming games as a national ordeal which Japan, and 
particularly Japanese women, would have to pass successfully. All over the world the 
mood set by the Tokyo Olympics was overwhelming. In France, the US and Europe 
newspapers, radio, and television programmes were full of special editions about 
Tokyo, and Japanese cuisine, dance cabaret and restaurants had become fashionable 
around the world.64 According to Furugaki, Tokyo would need to prepare to welcome 
tourists on honeymoon, celebrating silver wedding anniversaries, people celebrating 
retirement by diving into Japan, and the Japanese people wanted to give them 
something to remember as a once in a lifetime experience. But the overarching worry 
was about the reputation of Japan, and ‘its position in the world’.  
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This was not simply a problem of changing the landscape of Tokyo and 
cleaning up the morals of the people in the same way as the public spaces. The real 
worry for Furugaki was after the visitors had departed. The people ‘should think our 
Olympics begin after the closing ceremony’.65 From the point of view of the Japanese 
people, the games themselves were in the author’s opinion like a school entrance test. 
The task for Furugaki was to think about how to pass the test while not forgetting that 
the real work would only begin after the spectacle of the Olympic Games was over. In 
this way, like Hayashi, Furugaki saw the Games as a chance for Japan to join the 
ranks of the advanced countries. The modernisation this entailed, however, was 
something the country could later come to regret. 
Regardless of what happened after the closing ceremony, in preparation for 
the games Japan was in danger of losing something important. Hayashi Shūji had 
appealed to Japanese women to go out and discover the basis of individual freedom 
and sensible patterns of consumption. Furugaki reminded readers of the eve of ‘the 
opening of the country’ one hundred years earlier in the Meiji era. In every area of 
society, politics, economics and manufacturing policies, ‘enlightenment and the 
catchphrase of freedom were put into practice’. At the beginning of the Meiji period, 
all over Japan but particularly in Tokyo, hotels, bars and restaurants catering for high-
class foreign tourists changed the nature of the country’s economy. The fear was that 
the transformation of the country in 1964 would, as happened in the Meiji period, 
entail the loss of something essential to Japan. Of course, without the familiarity of 
home-produced goods, services, language and even a recognisable alphabet, foreign 
guests would feel lost as soon as they stepped from their hotel rooms, yet at some 
point during their stay they would ‘want to eat tasty Japanese food which is close at 
hand, but without a Japanese person to tell them the best place to go they will be at a 
loss’.66 
Tokyo had been ‘painted with the brush of the Olympics’, a mistake Paris and 
London had avoided. The traditional Japanese culture, which would have been of 
interest to the huge numbers of tourists arriving in Japan, had gone. People had not 
only visited London and Paris to experience the sport, they had also taken in the 
culture and history of the respective cities. There appeared to be no cultural life in 
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Tokyo as far as Furugaki was concerned; sport and fashion had completely taken 
over. Furugaki wanted to know where the uniqueness of old Japan, or even of modern 
Japanese culture and tradition, had gone. Tokyo had completely given itself over to 
the Olympics. Foreign tourists would not be happy about this in his opinion because 
they were coming to see Japan. ‘The foreign visitors, coming from one hundred and 
ten countries have different languages, customs, laws, history and traditions we can’t 
reflect them all. But they will all want to know about our country’.67 If Hayashi Shuji 
hoped Japanese women would go out into the world to learn how to live better, 
Furugaki hoped that they would save traditional Japan from disappearing. In his 
opinion it was Japanese women who preserved traditional Japanese virtue. For those 
foreigners seeking to learn about Japan it would be easier for them to understand 
Japanese culture through its women.68 Japanese women were traditionally well-
mannered and had the tendency, more than men, to reflect on their weak points. The 
housewives and young women of Japan could explain Japanese cuisine, art, music, 
and culture to the world. 
 
Danger within and without 
In contrast, other commentators were more worried about the idea of thousands of 
foreign men learning about Japanese culture from its, ‘meek, well mannered, and 
beautiful women.’ In an article entitled Dangerous Foreigners, also published in 
Fujin Kōron, Fujiwara Yoshie offered her readers much needed ‘advice on how to 
skilfully get along with foreign men’.69 She agreed that many foreigners were not 
only coming to see the Olympic Games. ‘Foreigners are thronging. Fujisan can be 
seen, drunks can be seen and these two things are world famous. But this time one 
more thing which I think tourists will be particularly interested in is young Japanese 
women’. It was often argued that Japanese women had become stronger since the end 
of the war. Nevertheless, Fujiwara pointed out ‘our women, as well as still possessing 
a womanly side, have a character which gives them a double advantage over women 
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of other countries’. There was no room for doubt in Fujiwara’s mind that ‘for men, 
Japanese women are number one for charm’. This was not a particularly difficult 
position to achieve according to the author because, unfortunately, in ‘foreign 
countries, even beautiful daughters (young ladies) of 18 or 20 gradually become old, 
and at around 40 or 50 most of them, just like a tank, become fatter and fatter’. This 
was also a problem for Japanese women whose partners were foreigners. They were 
not immune from this sad fate, according to Fujiwara, because ‘if their partner is a 
foreigner (gaijin) they develop in the same way’.70 The attitude of these charming and 
attractive Japanese women towards foreign men was a big problem.  
According to Fujiwara it was ‘as if they have an open country policy to 
foreign men, and as with the popular famous actors, they are all unfortunately 
admired as being tall and handsome. How will they handle it when tens of thousands 
of these foreign men descend on Japan? It gives me indigestion to think about it’.71 
The idea, raised by Furugaki, that something unique to Japan would be lost with the 
coming of the Olympics, and particularly through the reality of foreigners visiting the 
country in pursuit of an ideal of Eastern Beauty, was for Fujiwara, literally embodied 
by the danger faced by young Japanese women given the flood of foreign men who 
would be arriving in the country. 
Nevertheless, despite the fact that as the Olympics approached many voices 
could be heard worrying about Japanese women, Fujiwara herself, regardless of the 
ample attractions and charms of the nation’s womanhood, not to mention their open-
arms policy towards foreigners, confessed to being confident that the women of Japan 
would cope. After defeat in the war, contact with foreigners had increased so Japanese 
people were much more used to it, and anyway she did not think ‘that the visitors 
coming from far away and having to spend lots of money will be bad people’. The 
high cost of the airfare from Europe would settle Fujiwara’s indigestion by keeping 
away those ‘bad’ foreign men with a curiosity in Japanese women. She admitted that 
‘western’ men posed less of a problem. At the end of the day ‘…if we have to be 
cautious, it is those close to us from Southeast Asia isn’t it? After all the travel cost is 
cheap and their attitudes are well known’.72 Japan had as much, if not more, to fear 
from Asia as from the West. Apart from the natural attractiveness of Japanese women, 
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the country’s traditional customs were part of the problem. Fujiwara noted that Japan 
had certain customs which demanded that Japanese women should put their heart into 
whatever men wanted. ‘As soon as a man takes out a cigarette they offer him a light, 
they put sugar in his coffee, help him on with his jacket, give a yukata to a man 
wearing only underwear’. Foreign men, even the married or attached ones, would be 
surprised by these actions and it would be only natural that they would think, ‘this 
woman is for sale’.73  
Worrying that she may be stereotyping foreign men a little too much, or 
perhaps not enough, Fujiwara felt it necessary to point out that even among Western 
European men, there were big differences. The ‘gentleman’ type was to be found in 
England and America; such men were full of tact and would wait till they passed to 
turn around and sneak a glance. It was the ‘Latin types’ that were the most dangerous. 
‘Italian, Spanish, South American; (these) are the Latin types that will pursue 
everywhere no matter how far and absolutely never give up’. They would take any 
chance to start a conversation, ‘Excuse me what is the time? Or do you speak 
English? Can you tell me how to get to…? Will you come and drink tea with me? 
You are beautiful. I really appreciate Japanese women.’ Such men always came 
across as astonishingly kind and courteous to women, mainly because they had been 
raised since childhood to see women as weak, and for Fujiwara Japanese women were 
indeed weak, particularly around alcohol. Fujiwara claimed that in Western Europe 
women could enjoy alcohol, but for Japanese women this was not the case. The 
problem was that in a nice bar, with some ‘mood music and a sweet cocktail, Japanese 
women could quickly come to believe they were in love’. Their weakness was even 
worse when it came to going for a drive. ‘Just putting them in the passenger seat of a 
cool car makes them feel like a queen’.74 The problem with the ‘Latin type’ was that 
they would then try to tempt you to stay overnight. ‘It’s too late to return, let’s stay 
one night and I will take you back first thing in the morning’. At this point Fujiwara 
advised readers to call home or ask for a taxi.  
In the same ‘Olympic special’ as Fujiwara’s article, thirty people ‘from 
different walks of life’ talked to the magazine about their worries about the coming 
spectacle of the Tokyo Olympic Games. Critic Ishigaki Ayako was, like Fujiwara 
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Yoshie, also worried about the inability of Japanese people — particularly young 
women — to say no. She claimed that when spoken to by men Japanese young 
women would often simply offer a coy smile and whatever the question this reaction 
would probably be taken to mean yes by the foreign men who descended on Tokyo 
for the Olympics. Japanese people needed to meet foreigners and clearly be able to 
say ‘no’. Ambiguity and evasion was not the best way to endear foreigners to Japan.75 
Novelist Hirabayashi Taiko was as worried as Fujiwara about the bad foreigners who 
would arrive in the country looking to deceive Japanese young women. For her 
another aspect of the problem was that Japanese men lacked etiquette towards 
Japanese women. Foreign men, on the other hand were good at hiding their inner 
feelings and putting on appearances.76 They could not be trusted. 
The ‘Japanese woman’, unable to see the threat, needed to be protected. The 
purity of all Japanese women was at stake. Yet it was not simply that all foreign men 
were dangerous and all Japanese women needed to be protected. The real danger for 
those writing in the middle class magazines such as Fujin Kōron probably had more 
to do with the need to control the behaviour of those readers of magazines such as 
Shūkan Heibon, who were young, single working women who frequented the 
shopping centres and entertainment districts where visitors from all over the world 
would be found. As Paul Droubie has pointed out, the leaflets distributed to such 
women, hotel staff and other service industry workers by the Tokyo Metropolitan 
government regarding the dangers of sexually transmitted diseases were brushed off 
as a revival of the ‘Black ships danger’. 77 In the middle class magazines the Japanese 
woman was a symbol of Japanese culture. As in the Meiji period, both were 
threatened by the arrival of foreigners and the changes wrought on the country in 
preparation for the Olympics. Furugaki saw purity threatened, and looked back to the 
Meiji period when the threat of Westernisation also entailed the loss of traditional 
culture. The rapid modernisation of the high-speed growth era and the welcoming of 
the world to Tokyo posed the same threat. So while commentators such as Hayashi 
Shuji saw knowledge of the wider world as essential for Japanese women, and 
travelling and working abroad appeared to be more common and enticing, others saw 
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the shrinking of the world as dangerous and focused on the negative aspects of the 
coming Olympic Games. Yet this fear was also grounded in the emergence of a class 
of young, female workers literally buying into the national ideal of a consumer 
culture.  
In this context, the weekly magazine Shūkan Heibon, aimed at younger and 
mainly single women, was a little less worried about the problem posed by foreign 
men, suggesting that talking to foreigners was a great way to gain knowledge about 
the world. The magazine even encouraged its readers to actively seek out foreigners 
to speak to. ‘If you have a chance to have a conversation with a foreigner, or if you 
optimistically make your own opportunity to get acquainted with a foreigner, through 
these exchanges young women can get the knowledge of the real world that they 
need’. The readers should not complain that they lacked the opportunity to talk to 
foreigners — everybody would have the chance. Japanese people should have will 
and pride, ‘and warmly welcome our guests from afar’.78 The magazine urged its 
readers to approach lost foreign tourists at train stations or department stores. When 
visiting temples, explaining things about Japan would make the tourists very happy. 
As an American teacher at the Patricia Charm School pointed out, it was usually male 
students and young businessmen who talked to foreigners. Young women may feel 
embarrassed, but they should find the courage to strike up a conversation. Questions 
such as ‘How do you like this country?’ and ‘Is it your first visit to this country?’ as 
well as ‘How do you like the food here?’ would be the ideal way to break the ice.  
However, it was important to avoid being ambiguous in conversation with 
these foreign visitors. According to Mizawa-san, a tour guide for foreigners, being 
ambiguous was the biggest mistake. In her opinion when you meet foreigners ‘if you 
say yes or no clearly there should be no excuse for misunderstanding’. Lynda Beech, 
possibly the most famous American woman in Japan, cautioned readers on how to 
dress. Fluent in Japanese and known to millions as the star of the late 50s early 60s 
TV hit Blue Eyes Tokyo Diary in which she played an inept American woman living 
in Tokyo, Beech offered readers the valuable insight of a ‘Western’ woman.79 She 
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informed readers that if women wore a low cut dress with lots of jewellery in the 
morning they would be thought of as cheap. She also advised caution when dealing 
with foreign men, and warned readers against going anywhere on a date where there 
would be no other people present. Not because foreign men were any different from 
Japanese men though, after all ‘If you walk together in the park late at night it’s the 
same danger as walking with a Japanese man … when you go out to the cinema there 
will be no mistakes’.  
A good example of how to stay safe while meeting foreigners was set by 
Imamura Reiko (22), who worked for a trading company. At work she knew one 
foreign gentleman who was ‘very gentlemanly and very kind’, nevertheless whenever 
she met him in the evenings outside of work she always made sure to invite along 
another female friend. Readers needed to bear in mind that foreign men were great at 
offering compliments and Japanese women must avoid being taken in by them. 
‘Foreigners will constantly flatter you with phrases like “your eyes are beautiful, your 
hair is fantastic”, indeed many foreign men considered it rude not to compliment a 
woman.’ An anonymous, presumably Japanese man, referred to only as A-shi (29), 
who had experience of living in a foreign country working for a trading company, 
echoed Fujiwara’s fears over the ‘open door policy’ of Japanese women towards 
foreign men stating that ‘because there are not many foreigners in Japan they are 
valued highly and there are many women who want to become good at dating 
foreigners (gaijin)’. Japanese women had to remember that there were ‘many awful 
gaijin with no education’. A-shi feared that Japanese women who were not used to 
being ‘spoken to sweetly will be excited by this, won’t they?’ Nevertheless, the 
readers of Shūkan Heibon had less to fear than those of Fujin Kōron, as the article 
asked it readers: ‘are they bad foreigners? That depends on your behaviour’.80 
The young men of Tokyo on the other hand, could look forward to the 
adventure of a Tokyo night scene that had become internationalised. In September 
1964, Heibon Punch featured an article which, under a photo of a smiling young 
blonde woman dining with two Japanese men, explained that dating ‘beautiful 
blondes’ was no longer a just a dream. Tokyo was a cosmopolitan city and the 
opportunities for young Japanese men to ‘associate’ with beautiful foreign women 
had rapidly increased. After the appearance of Ai George at Carnegie Hall and the 
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success of Astro Boy in the United States the increasing number of flights between 
the United States and Japan brought an influx of stewardesses who, coming to Japan 
more than ten times a year ‘probably lose the normal, everyday sense of virtue’. 
Women from all over the world were in Tokyo and the possibilities for dating them 
were huge. The problem according to one American woman was: ‘Japanese men may 
be very shy…nobody has asked me for a date. I wonder whether I am attractive or 
not…’81 For foreign men inviting women on a date was common etiquette and the 
stewardesses in Tokyo were waiting for Japanese men to make similar moves.  
As one American put it ‘among our friends there are very few Japanese men. I 
have been married for two years already but my body is my body and I want to enjoy 
adventures, yet I feel bored as soon as I touch down at Haneda…I always wonder is 
there nothing more to do than go shopping in the department stores, go to my hotel 
room and read…Japan is the most boring place…I wonder why…’ The availability 
and sexualisation of foreign women went hand in hand with the fears over predatory 
foreign men and the weakness of Japanese women. Of course it was not only the 
showgirls and the airhostesses that provided the aspiring young man about town with 
the opportunity for fun with a foreign lady. The rise in tourists offered the perfect 
chance to ‘catch a foreigner’ and waiting around the hotels would pay dividends in 
that respect. The young female tourists would, according to the magazine, be very 
grateful for anyone offering information on the customs of Japan, explaining the rules 
of Judo and following up with ‘how about a dinner tonight?’ was sure to end in 
success. As a page from ‘P Hotel’ in Akasaka put it ‘if you are looking for a one night 
stand there are many housewives in tour groups’.82 But as the magazine explained, 
these older ladies were usually attracted to the luggage-carrying bell boy so, for the 
readers of Heibon Punch it was the groups of young athletes about to descend on the 
cosmopolitan city who were the best targets.83  
While middle class readers were urged to see young Japanese women as weak 
and under threat, young working female readers of Shūkan Heibon were encouraged 
to associate with the tourists coming to Tokyo and take responsibility for their own 
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actions and safety. The Tokyo Metropolitan Welfare Division’s 1964 Handbook for 
Young Women also warned of the dangers posed by foreign men, and this became a 
recurring theme in the mass media.84 But the focus in Shūkan Heibon was on how to 
date a foreigner, and often emphasised the differences between Japanese men and 
foreign ones. Foreign men were always polite and knew how to ‘act like a 
gentleman.’ While the more middle class journals and magazines fretted over the 
threat, it was not their readers, the middle class housewives of Fujin Kōron for 
example who were personally under that threat. For the young, free and moderately 
well off working woman, the Olympics was an opportunity. The worker at the 
Imperial Hotel who referred to the Tokyo Metropolitan government’s pamphlet as 
‘nothing more than a black ship uproar’ no doubt felt the same way about articles by 
Furugaki and the opinions of Fujiwara and others.85 Clearly, in the eyes of some 
commentators, the huge number of foreign men who would arrive in Tokyo for the 
Olympic Games posed a danger to young Japanese women. Just like their country, 
Japanese women were easily susceptible to misunderstanding and being 
misunderstood. The obsession with the experience and safety of Japanese women 
during the games was a metaphor for the nation as a whole, but the mixed reactions to 
the coming of large numbers of foreign tourists and the danger they posed to Japanese 
women also reflected the differing experiences off consumer culture.  
 
Opening the System 
As Yoshimi Shunya has argued, by the mid-1960s Japan’s consumer lifestyle was no 
longer mediated by America. By the time of the Tokyo Olympics, the emphasis had 
shifted to a unique or authentic Japanese quality to consumer goods.86 This search for 
Japanese-ness was by no means restricted to household appliances, or the three sacred 
treasures. Many everyday items were discussed in relation to quality and price and, as 
domestic demand grew, in comparison to those produced abroad. Because the 
economic changes under the Prime Ministerial leadership of Ikeda Hayato required an 
opening up of the Japanese economy, by the mid-1960s Japanese people had a greater 
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exposure to foreign-produced goods and services. Yet these foreign goods were often 
quite expensive compared to their Japanese equivalents. 
The magazine Fujin Kōron published a special section in July 1964 under the 
sub-heading ‘As we move towards a more open system our lifestyles are undergoing 
big changes’.87 Daimon Kazuki, a professor at Kanto Gakuen University, discussed 
the prevalence of foreign made goods in Japanese shops. There had been dramatic 
changes in the shopping centres of Japan. In those areas given over to imported items 
in the large department stores, the goods being sold were gradually becoming more 
luxurious, and even in small shops it was becoming normal to see lots of foreign 
made goods lined up. As Daimon pointed out, there was no doubt that in Japan 
imported goods were ‘gradually beginning to widen their presence in the everyday 
life of the people (nihonjin no seikatsu)’. Imports had been steadily increasing, and 
compared with 1959, golf goods, toys, toothbrushes and instant coffee had increased 
by between 40 and 60 times. Imports of cigarette lighters had risen by 300 times, and 
mechanical pencils 100 times.88  
The usual assumption among Japanese people was that these foreign made 
goods were of better quality than those produced domestically. It was hard to dispute 
that Swiss watches and Italian shoes both had a very high quality image. But Daimon 
questioned if they really were so much better in quality and hoped, by introducing the 
results of a survey commissioned by the magazine, to ‘get a true sense of the value of 
foreign made and domestically produced goods’, adding, ‘we are at a stage where we 
have to decide which is more important — the price or the quality?’ According to the 
survey, which asked 200 people to rate the quality of thirty three different items, the 
domestically produced goods which were favoured over foreign ones were cameras, 
tobacco, soap, vegetables, fruit, televisions, radios and sewing machines. The razor 
was rated number one among foreign made goods and the camera number one among 
domestically produced goods. Cameras came out on top for domestically produced 
goods as seventy-two versus ten of the respondents agreed that Japanese cameras 
were well made. Daimon concurred with this result pointing out that two thirds of the 
stock of the number one US camera retailer, Willoughby’s, was produced in Japan. 
Thanks in part to the advent of hire purchase and the desire for fashionable cheap 
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clothes among young single women in the cities, Japanese-made sewing machines 
had overtaken US products as the most preferred among housewives. Indeed the 
sewing machine was fast becoming ‘number one among presents bought by tourists 
coming to Japan’.89 
Tests were carried out on both foreign and domestic goods in order to 
ascertain the differences, if any, in quality. Daimon claimed that, in cutting paper, 
there was no difference between foreign made and domestically made razors, 
concluding that Gillette’s success was based purely on the company’s good 
reputation, much of which was simply down to the amount of money spent on 
advertising. As for English wool, tests for strength, stains, and stretching showed it 
was not ‘significantly better’ than Japanese wool, and unfortunately for the Swiss, the 
results for watches were evenly split. Those people who preferred foreign watches 
touted the ‘accuracy and design’ as the selling point, but many people found domestic 
watches ‘cheap and efficient.’ Cars were also closely split, at 22-20. Those who 
preferred foreign cars cited good design, but also the fact that they had ‘good quality 
parts so they last forever’. Domestically produced cars were ‘good for bad roads’ and 
‘easy to get repaired,’ but given that the roads in Tokyo were being rapidly improved 
Daimon predicted that ‘the value of foreign cars will increase’. Among those goods 
favoured by women, make-up raised a few interesting problems. According to most 
women who preferred Japanese make-up, the reason was that it was more suited to 
Japanese skin. According to Daimon this advertising ruse by the domestic 
manufacturers riled the foreign make-up producers. ‘Japanese make-up suits Japanese 
skin, but if we ask foreign manufacturers they get angry and storm out saying “please 
ask a doctor”’. Like make-up, domestic butter suited the Japanese according to the 
respondents, though the writer admitted it was impossible to objectively test these 
things ‘as we can only rely on the subjectivity of the individual person’.90 There were 
economic considerations to take into account though.  
The Japanese admired foreign goods as intrinsically better. At the same time 
Japanese brands were considered weak. Domestic companies did not spend a lot of 
money establishing their brand but ‘buying the trust in the company’ was more 
important for consumers than the products themselves. A low level of domestic brand 
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awareness, brought about by a lack of spending by Japanese companies, meant that 
foreign manufacturers ‘loved’ the Japanese market.91 This comparison of foreign and 
domestic goods necessitated a value judgment based on numerous cultural 
considerations, and there was no doubt that the Japanese people were facing more and 
more opportunities to make such judgements. The huge amount of foreign products 
for sale in the department stores and the debate over buying foreign or domestic, were 
a symptom of the economic liberalisation of the Japanese economy.  
The opportunities for comparison between Japanese and foreign goods helped 
to bring about a ‘Japanese’ consumer society which further distanced the Japan of the 
mid-1960s from the previous decade. By the time of the Tokyo Olympics, a strong 
sense of pride in products ‘made in Japan’ was emerging domestically. Ideas of nation 
could begin to focus on a lived consumer lifestyle which was as much Japanese as 
Western. The changing lifestyle choices of young Japanese were an important aspect 
of the physical changes taking place as a result of the redevelopment of Tokyo in 
preparation for the Olympic Games. These changes transformed the lifestyle horizons 
of the readers of magazines such as Fujin Kōron, Shūkan Heibon and Heibon Punch, 
as the opening up of the country economically was mirrored by the opening up to the 
outside world which the hosting of the games would entail.  
High-Speed Growth and Standards of Living 
Visible changes in the landscape of Japan and a welcome rise in living standards were 
naturally seen by many Japanese and much of the popular media as signs that the 
country had overcome the worst of the post-war deprivations and was on course to 
join the ranks of the ‘advanced countries’ once again. The Japanese government had 
released an economic white paper in 1964 claiming that as far as living standards 
were concerned, Japan was now on a par with Western Europe. Yet the idea of high-
speed growth and the obsession with the opinions of foreigners were not without their 
problems and critics.  
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Rising prices fuelling increased living costs were a concern in 1964 for 
housewives’ magazine Fujin Kōron. The magazine published a ‘Focus of the Month’ 
discussion in March, under the headline High Speed Growth and National Lifestyle 
(Kōdo Seichō Seisaku to Kokumin Seikatsu.)92 Then in the August edition an article 
by Sumiko Takahara set out to explain the reasons for the rising cost of living.93 The 
sub-heading of the March article raised the question: ‘how long will the worrying 
increase in the cost of living continue?’ Tokyo University professor and management 
guru Hayashi Shūji began a round table debate by pointing out that although the 
Japanese economy was pursuing a policy of high-speed economic growth, opinion 
was divided over whether this was a good thing, with some people arguing that the 
policy had already gone too far.  
For Sumiko Takahara, writing in August, there was a contradiction in the 
government’s economic liberalisation plans that came as part and parcel of the policy 
of high speed growth. The aim of lowering the cost of living was not properly being 
met and, for Takahara, lemons were a case in point. ‘In the meals in our house there 
has been a “lemon revolution”. Thanks to liberalisation the cost of one lemon has 
gone down from 70-80 yen to 30 yen’. This drastic price drop meant that the author’s 
fridge was full of lemons and she had become particularly skilled at slicing them 
thinly. Unfortunately, the preponderance of lemons had not made balancing the 
household budget any the easier. On the contrary, ‘I don’t think the reduction in the 
price of lemons has been of any use in reducing the cost of living’. In Takahara’s 
opinion, the reduction in the price of lemons, as well as the reduction in the price of 
new cars, was of no consequence. They were not necessary for everyday life, but the 
price of essential items such as rice, milk, and utility charges was continuing to rise.94  
According to a recent poll conducted by the Asahi Shimbun, 22 per cent of 
housewives had responded that prices were increasing faster than earnings and this 
was making life difficult for them. The Ikeda cabinet had begun moving away from 
the idea of focusing solely on the high-speed development of the economy and had 
recently touted the term ‘welfare state.’ While high-speed development was 
fundamentally production-centred economics, the concept of a welfare state was a 
form of economics based on the prosperity of the Japanese people. For its critics 
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though, the government was not tackling rising prices, which were having the most 
serious impact on the welfare of the Japanese people. In Takahara’s opinion, the 
government needed not only to preach about administering consumption but also to 
set to work ‘earnestly doing something about it’.95 As the Olympics approached, the 
contradictions between the government’s promotion of high-speed economic growth 
and its promotion of a consumer-driven mass economy were becoming apparent.  
Recently, Japan had risen to fourth in the world in terms of its production of 
manufactured goods, and it was hard to deny that the focus on production to bring 
about high-speed economic growth had been successful. The country was behind only 
America, the UK and West Germany in production, and in the March edition of Fujin 
Kōron, the Economic Planning Agency’s Sakisaka Masao proudly pointed out that 
even in foreign countries people were ‘surprised by the development of the Japanese 
economy’. The country was still in the process of catching up with Western Europe, 
and in this respect, Japan was still young, but it was for this reason, in Sakisaka’s 
opinion, that the policy of rapid economic development was the right one if Japan was 
to become part of the developed world. The Japanese people needed to keep faith with 
the government’s plans. Moreover, the political realm was not the only driving force 
behind this policy of rapid economic growth. According to Sakisaka, Japanese private 
companies had ‘grown a lot in recent years.’96 Nevertheless, inflation was causing 
problems for the everyday life of the Japanese people.  
Hayashi Shūji conceded that without the government’s policy there would 
have been no improvement in the livelihood of the people (kokumin seikatsu). But he 
also pointed out that the policy had at the same time brought much upset. Rising 
prices were not always matched by rising wages. According to Yamamoto Susumu of 
the Economist, it was the middle-classes who were the worst affected. A shortage of 
labour in Japan meant that starting wages for young Japanese workers were rising 
quite rapidly, and that rise in income had a knock-on effect on the cost of living for 
everybody. It had the most severe effect on older workers, however.97 Even Sakisaka 
admitted that the shortage of labour could have future problems of inequality, 
problems which would directly affect the middle-classes.  
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The wages of public officials and salarymen were declining in real terms, 
while the policies of economic growth were leading to an increase in wages for 
factory workers, who tended to be younger and generally not from middle class 
backgrounds. Sakisaka insisted, however, that because Japanese income had been half 
that of Western Europe it was necessary for the country to develop at a fairly quick 
pace. This development was, as Sakisaka pointed out, creating a class of young 
consumers apart from the traditional university educated middle classes. By the time 
of the Tokyo Olympics, broader ideas of nation strongly linked to the growth of 
consumer culture put forward in the popular magazines came to appeal to these young 
factory workers who were uninhibited by the political projections of middle class 
intellectuals in the ‘general interest’ highbrow magazines such as Sekai and Chūō 
Kōron, which had dominated the discourse in the early 1950s.  
Yamamoto Susumu went further in criticising the inequalities brought about 
by the policy of high-speed growth. He claimed that for most people in the cities, it 
appeared that the only thing the policy had brought was higher rent and house prices, 
resulting in a higher cost of living. ‘There is no feeling of stability in Japan’s present 
economic situation. Just saying “please wait a moment and everything will come 
good”, somehow does not have any persuasive power, and it is pretty awful as a 
[government] policy’.98 Indeed, for Nakamura Takafusa, the fact that in the midst of 
the consumer revolution the Japanese people were the biggest savers in the world 
proved that there was no feeling of stability. As prices continued to rise, people only 
saved more money, and this fact clearly indicated the fear of instability that the 
government’s policy had created. The newly published weekly men’s magazine 
Heibon Punch took a satirical approach to this problem when, on the Punch survey 
page, a letter purportedly from a Tokyo Housewife, claimed that buying land was 
impossible and infuriating, ‘you save money it goes up, you save money it goes 
up…what is the best thing to do!’99  
Far from transforming and uplifting the hearts of the people, for many 
commentators the policy of high-speed economic growth and the positioning of the 
‘consumer as King’ brought more worries and greater inequality. For some 
commentators it was the aping of American ideas of consumption that caused 
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insecurity and fear of instability. Economist and Tokyo University President Ōkōchi 
Kazuo claimed that as Japan approached the standard of living of America, Japanese 
people were adopting the same patterns of consumption as the American middle 
classes. ‘It is not that you freely choose to buy what you like when you like…You are 
forced to live and spend within the system of production’.100 Constantly having to buy 
new products in a consumer driven modern economy led to insecurity and rising 
prices. Ōkōchi was involved in the activities of the Japan Productivity Centre, which 
had played a role in introducing and promoting the pursuit of a consumer driven 
economy. He played an important role in developing production ideas which aimed to 
provide higher wages for large numbers of people, ‘and revenues for reinvestment 
through expanded export opportunities’ as a means of tackling the problem of the 
‘dual economy’.101 For many intellectuals, the goals of reforming the two-tier 
economy and raising wages for the lowest paid were wiped out by the increased 
economic instability and higher prices for everyday essentials.  
By 1964, rapid economic development was becoming problematic. Buying 
more expensive and better quality goods was no problem for the upper classes, who 
could decide how to spend their money. Even Daimon Kazuki, in his comparison of 
foreign and domestic goods, saw potential problems when the middle classes became 
attracted to these things. ‘All sorts of foreign goods are allowed to come and satisfy 
the appetites of Japanese people, but if there is no wise choice the liberalisation which 
promises happiness in everyday life risks the danger of having the opposite effect’. 
For Daimon, Japan was the victim of its own economic success. Liberalisation had 
brought many foreign goods to the market, and Japan’s growing purchasing power 
had made the foreign manufacturers ‘mouths water.’102 Hayashi Shūji saw similar 
problems with the pattern of consumption in Japan. While admitting in Fujin Kōron 
that economic development in Japan enabled Japanese people to experience more of 
the world, he nevertheless indirectly criticised the growing pattern of consumption in 
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Japan, unfavourably comparing it with Western Europe, which was cheaper and 
retained more of its cultural and historical character.103  
What the debate and discourse made clear, by the time the world arrived in 
Tokyo for the Olympic Games, was the necessity for a ‘Japanese’ consumerism. This 
would provide a cultural explanation which could disavow the overtly political and 
clearly subordinate relationship underpinning Japan’s adoption of an economic model 
fuelled by mass consumption and the social changes that entailed. At the same time, 
the United States could retreat from the scene in Asia as Japan came to serve as a role 
model for a ‘Free Asia.’ As the young factory workers or the readers of Shūkan 
Heibon and Heibon Punch saw their wages increase and found in consumer society 
the cultural capital necessary for a stake in that society, a generation of Japanese born 
after the devastation of 1945 could identify with the ideal of an independent Japan 
acting as a ‘bridge between East and West’. Yet as the economy continued to grow 
rapidly and society became more and more structured, the contradictions of the 
country’s position became more and more evident. With the growing emphasis on 
consumption in the popular media, Shūkan Heibon and Heibon Punch reflected a 
youth culture which sought to reject the structured nature of Japanese society yet 
struggled to escape the everyday life of consumer society.
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Chapter 5 
A Mad Age? 
‘Isn’t it hard to find a reason to be angry in Japan today…? If Japan’s young writers 
are writing angry novels it is simply because anger has become a commodity.’ 
 
Ooya Soichi.1 
 
 
Following the resignation of Prime Minister Kishi after the forced ratification of the 
US-Japan Security Treaty in June 1960, Ikeda Hayato’s government set out to re-
establish the centrality of the Diet in politics, improve public welfare and raise the 
people’s standard of living.2 Announcing his Income Doubling Plan at the end of 
1960, Ikeda promised tax reductions, improved welfare and public works projects. 
The shift in emphasis helped to associate the government with the economic growth 
Japan had achieved since the mid-1950s. At the same time, the government could take 
advantage of these transformations ‘to ease and displace the memory of naked state 
force and thwarted demands for democratic participation’.3 As shown in previous 
chapters, the inherently unequal and subordinate political and economic relationship 
between Japan and America became depoliticised through the juxtaposition of the two 
countries in the popular media’s promotion of a consumer society. The explicit 
connection of ideas of Japan to domestic consumption, which was tied to American 
military and economic power, was one more assault on popular sovereignty.4 What 
gradually emerged formed the basis of a depoliticised cultural nationalism that could 
appeal, through the growing popular media, to a younger generation of workers and 
students experiencing the alienation of life in the cities. 
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For many journalists and commentators writing in the popular media, ANPO 
was a social movement that played a large role in bringing about the political 
subjectivity of young Japanese.5 For a few weeks in May and June 1960, divisions 
between class, gender and the generations had appeared negligible.6 Workers came 
out on strike and onto the streets, joining students and housewives to protest the 
renewal of the Security Treaty. Even though many protesters were acting 
independently and from a sense of individual concern at the actions of the Kishi 
government, the very fact that people had come together in such large numbers was 
viewed as a success for democracy by many progressive thinkers. As Wesley Sasaki-
Uemura has pointed out, ‘the protests forced the ruling Liberal Democratic Party to 
give up the confrontational tactics it had employed’ and made clear the popular desire 
for retaining the reforms of the Occupation era.7 For Maruyama Masao, the protest 
movement helped to indigenise democracy in postwar Japan. It was clear evidence 
that the 1946 constitution had at last become an established part of people’s lives.8 
Takeuchi Yoshimi lamented 1960 as a failed revolution, but he nevertheless 
optimistically believed ANPO to be the pivotal moment when large numbers of 
Japanese people ‘picked up democracy’ and came together as citizens.9 For 
Takabatake Michitoshi, the protests marked a new form of civic resistance, and 
philosopher Kuno Osamu ‘triumphantly announced the formation of a civic ethos’.10 
Yet at the same time, through its actions in passing the revised ANPO treaty in face of 
popular opposition, the government had destroyed the function of the Diet and left 
protest as the only recourse of the people.11  
The ‘ANPO struggle’ appeared to have begun as structured, ideological left 
wing agitation led by student groups and the unions working together, and the Kishi 
government came to portray them as a tide of humanity, or a ‘violent, irrational mob’. 
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Yet after the forced ratification vote on May 20th, small-scale movements came 
together to join the larger protests. On a human scale the demonstrators were 
‘conscious actors with diverse points of view,’12 and for many historians the failure of 
the anti-treaty protests brought about the end of a united left. As Simon Avenell has 
pointed out, the ANPO struggle ‘marked the end of Japan’s brief (1958-1960) postwar 
flurry with national mobilizations’ and also marked the peak of organised intellectual 
influence over mass political movements.13 Yet the emergence of these ‘New Left’ 
movements would come to define the social issues of the next decade,14 despite the 
fact that the leftist campaign against the treaty had always taken a multi-faceted 
stance, with different left wing organisations instructed to support the campaign in 
ways suited to their own special concerns.15 During the mid-1960s, the concept of the 
citizen as the key actor in the public sphere was to become useful to social 
movements, after ANPO came to employ this ‘more encompassing, less ideological 
term to appeal for support’.16 Importantly though, ANPO was about ordinary people 
deciphering the ways in which political engagement related to daily life, the nation 
and democracy.17 As has been shown, this played out against the background of an 
increasingly consumer-driven society. 
It was the students, as the ‘shock troops’ of the left, who had helped keep the 
Security Treaty issue in the popular consciousness throughout the negotiations of the 
late 1950s.18 While the split between student movements and the established political 
parties has been overplayed,19 criticism of established politics deeply affected young 
Japanese people. For Yoshimoto Takaaki, it was not the political groups leading the 
ANPO protests that embodied democratic subjectivity. Throughout, the communists 
‘stood in the middle, dividing the people like a shrewish hag from an old-fashioned 
household, throwing a wet blanket on creativity and spontaneity’.20 The apolitical, 
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self-interested masses going about their everyday lives were the locus of true 
subjectivity (Shutaisei). The privatisation of postwar Japanese society and its 
increasing distance from politics had not led to the apathy that some intellectuals had 
feared during the emergence of mass society in the late 1950s.21 For Yoshimoto, the 
treaty crisis was evidence that privatisation was the basis of postwar protest because 
thousands of ordinary students and citizens came on to the streets to make their 
feelings known.22  
During the 1960s then, there was a growing feeling that the students had been 
let down by the intellectuals and the leaders of the left. But at the same time, the 
growth of consumer society as presented in the popular media worked to de-politicise 
subjectivity in favour of consumerism as the mark of a modern, democratic society. 
Although the ANPO struggle was a significant issue for the unions between 1958 and 
1960, work and wages remained the focus of the majority of the 20,000 unions 
affiliated with Sōhyō.23 Naturally, throughout the 1950s and 1960s the unions 
demonstrated their overwhelming concern for the economic well-being of their 
members.24 As noted in Chapter 4, the joint efforts of the US and Japanese business 
and government elites under the auspices of the Japan Productivity Center focused 
social institutions around consumer-led economic growth. But changes in everyday 
life brought about by the Japanese government’s economic policies to promote high 
speed economic growth required the creation of a technical elite; the development of a 
technically advanced economy called for educated white collar workers.  
In this context, university students during the 1960s became what Ōno 
Tsutomu called ‘a reserve army of salarymen’.25 The increasing competitiveness of 
education and the channelling of students into technical subjects brought about a 
backlash against the standardisation and mechanisation of work and education.26 In 
the view of many young people, state control over national institutions increased ‘the 
insidious nature of the academic industrial complex’.27 Indeed, by mid-1969 
protesting high school students bluntly bemoaned the fact that ‘the Japanese capitalist 
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system underpins high school education’.28 Student movements in Japan were 
attempting to assert control over the power structures of everyday life and became 
‘very much part of an international movement focused on the defence of the self’.29 
At the same time, those involved in the protests experienced that self, as well as 
everyday life, within the context of the growing mass media and its emphasis on 
consumerism.  
As Jurgen Habermas pointed out in relation to the student movement in 
Germany, ‘…all motivations of a society based on status competition become 
especially dubious in a social environment in which the young…encounter reality 
only through the filter of consumer orientations and mass media’.30 In Japan, students 
and intellectuals pressed notions of the authenticity of the everyday in order to combat 
the alienation brought about by increasing rationalisation of politics and daily life. Yet 
as Marilyn Ivy has shown, constructions of authenticity are ‘a modern endeavour’ 
caught up in the historical conditions they hope to escape.31 At the same time, as Guy 
Yasko points out, in the postwar period as the political shrank in relation to the 
economic sphere, some attempted to critique that process by moving into the field of 
culture, mainly because conservative supporters of the state and those in the ‘New 
Left’ ‘had pushed their domain into new realms with state-sponsored consumerism’.32  
At the very moment when culture became political, the political nature of the 
economic was being effaced by consumer society. This process came together in 
popular culture and the growth of popular weekly and monthly magazines aimed at 
young people, which from the late 1950s altered the very nature of cultural critique of 
the American-led political economy of Japan. By the late 1960s, ‘the ethnographic 
populism of Yanagita in the study of popular culture literally and figuratively spoke 
for consumerism’.33 As shown in the previous chapter, high-speed economic growth 
had literally paved over the folkways of the major Japanese cities and tied this 
transformation to new ways of living. Such economic and social changes were not 
restricted to Japan, and clearly formed part of a postwar transformation of values 
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dependant on and reflected in the Cold War free world rhetoric of international power 
politics. 
As William Marotti has made clear, in 1968 ‘the spectacle of mass protest 
made visible the international, shared nature of the political imperatives of the 
moment, and promoted the possibilities of direct action’.34 The increasing intensity of 
the Vietnam War in the mid-1960s connected student movements in France, 
Germany, and Japan to the international situation and helped fuel a belief in the 
efficacy of violence against the state among student leaders in Japan.35 The fight for 
national independence, epitomised in the popular media by the war in Vietnam, was 
juxtaposed against the domestic struggle of individual young people for their own 
independence in an increasingly structured and unified social system. For students 
across the developed world the symbolic importance of the Vietnam War lay in its 
role in making evident that society, apparently driven by emancipatory norms and 
with the potential for their realisation, had actually ‘widened the gap between 
industrial and developing nations, exporting misery and military violence along with 
mass hygiene’.36 As the student protests grew more intense and more violent, public 
sympathy for the students and their tactics increased as a result of media coverage. In 
Japan this was part of a wider recognition that Japan had become a developed country 
and was complicit in, and profiting from, the continuation of the war. From the mid-
1960s, wider social questioning of the role of Japan in Vietnam exposed the 
contradictions of economic growth and further undermined the developmentalist 
nationalism of the early postwar period. This will be discussed in more detail in the 
following chapter.  
This chapter, after outlining the context and the nature of the protests, will 
show the ways in which the popular media worked to depoliticise and deradicalise the 
student movement by tying the protesters themselves into consumer culture and the 
development of capitalism. The chapter will go on to show how this discussion was 
juxtaposed with wider issues of the time. The instability and unpredictability of the 
US role in the region, evident in the escalation of the Vietnam War, came to the fore 
and ultimately led to a sense of ironic, individual detachment towards the very issues 
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being fought out on the streets and in the media. The media encouraged a sense of 
distance and powerlessness, which was in many ways an important element in the 
development of postwar consumer society. Within this process, and in large part as a 
result of the Tokyo Olympics, what Oguma Eiji terms ‘unconscious nationalism’ 
reflected the ambiguous nature of ideas of nation.37 The harsh examination system for 
entry into university allowed the university to become a place detached from the 
formal rules of society, and this also worked to depoliticise the majority of young 
students. 
As Donald Wheeler has noted, the first student movements in the early 1950s 
had a strong orientation towards serving society and worked to defend ‘peace and 
democracy’ by rejecting the return to positions of power of militarists and imperialists 
seen as responsible for leading Japan into war. In the late 1950s and early 60s the 
movements questioned the established political structure. By the late 1960s, their 
orientation was increasingly dominated by ‘play’, as they looked inward in order to 
question their own role in the structure of capitalist domination in postwar Japan.38 
This introspection was an important element of the student movement and often the 
cause of the serious violence carried out by certain sects.39 The radical students saw 
the need to examine their own elite consciousness as members of a privileged class 
within Japanese society, and to challenge their own personal role in perpetuating the 
system. Yet in the popular media journalists and commentators reintegrated that 
challenge into the system, and magazines such as Heibon Punch offered a place of 
ironic detachment whilst firmly tying its readers into the consumer driven society 
many of them were violently protesting against. In this way, by framing the everyday 
lives of the Japanese people around the overarching nature of state driven 
consumption, the media co-opted protest against the state by transforming anger into 
apathy and trivialising the issues being fought out on the streets as selfish youthful 
individualism. 
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Angry Young People 
During the 1960s, student protests in South Korea succeeded in bringing down the 
government of Synghman Ree. Elsewhere, protesters were killed by police in Mexico, 
causing the near cancellation of the 1968 Olympics, and there were student protests in 
Turkey, the United States, Germany, Canada and France. As Toyomasa Fuse put it, 
student radicalism was ‘fast becoming institutionalised’ across the world. Nowhere 
was this more evident ‘than in Japan, where student radicalism constitutes one of the 
three top priorities in national politics’.40 Certainly in the Japanese mass media of the 
1960s young Japanese people were very angry. Oguma Eiji has argued that the idea of 
a late 60s ‘cultural revolution’ fuelling student protests is somewhat of a myth. The 
Beatles’ generation came late to Japan and blue jeans were not evident until the late 
1960s. In any case, the students preferred jazz to rock and roll.41 Yet this comment 
misses the connection between the political and consumer culture in Japan and the 
rest of the free world. Indeed, in France after the events of May 1968, the myth of 
change in cultural consciousness served to obscure the fundamental basis of the 
protest movements.42  
As Sakamoto Hiroshi has recently pointed out, in Japan an elite bias in studies 
of the 1950s and 1960s has worked in the same way in relation to the ‘problem of 
young people’.43 Nevertheless, according to an editorial in the Yomiuri Shimbun at the 
start of the decade, like the Angry Young Men of England, the Beat Generation in 
America and the New Wave movement in France ‘fleeing from the anxieties of the 
present in jazz and sex’ the anger of some young Japanese was a form of ‘anarchism’. 
Epitomised in Japan by the student movement Zengakuren, the Kaminari Tribe, and 
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through the writings of Ishihara Shintaro and Oe Kenzaburo this younger generation 
accepted no responsibility for the direction in which the world was heading. Their 
hope was that by refusing the order of Japanese society and Japanese tradition 
‘something new would be born’.44 The angry young men of the late 1950s were a 
product of ‘the social and cultural transformations associated with high growth 
capitalism, liberal democracy, nuclear tensions and anti-communism’.45 Whilst they 
brought their anger to the fore in their literary and intellectual writings, as a 
commodity in Oya Soichi’s terms, by the late 1960s a new generation vented their 
frustrations in radical violence.  
On 17th November 1969 Satō Eisaku, the Japanese Prime Minister and 
younger brother of Kishi Nobusuke, boarded a Japan Airlines flight at Haneda airport. 
Satō was heading to Washington for a meeting with President Nixon to discuss the 
security treaty between their two countries. The circumstances of his departure 
echoed in many ways that of his brother ten years earlier, when protests and 
demonstrations turned violent as student groups attempted to prevent the prime 
minister from leaving. In November 1969, the only people present at the airport to 
witness Satō’s departure were ‘riot police, journalists, airline workers, and a few 
members of the government and LDP’.46 Across Japan, 50,000 uniformed and plain 
clothes police officers had been deployed in readiness for this single event. According 
to one journalist, the pre-departure mood was ‘just like before a civil war’.47 Over the 
night of the 16th –17th November, over 1,700 people were taken into police custody, a 
number which remains the largest arrest in postwar history.48 According to the young 
men’s magazine Heibon Punch, the Prime Minister’s plane left at 10.04am but 5000 
riot police had been waiting at the airport since the day before. The airport, which was 
closed to all air traffic both domestic and international from 8am on the morning of 
the prime minister’s departure, was a fortress. 
The precautions taken when Satō left for Washington in 1969 were no 
overreaction. Journalistic talk of civil war may have appeared to be a throwaway 
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remark, but one year previously Heibon Punch had reported on running battles in and 
around Shinjuku station in Tokyo. From 9pm to midnight on October 21st 1968, 
students and ‘the onlookers following them had the platform at Shinjuku station all to 
themselves’. Train seats were torn out and set on fire, glass was broken. As the 
busiest train station in the country was trashed, in the surrounding streets cars were set 
ablaze and a police box was burned down with a Molotov cocktail. In the magazine’s 
opinion, ‘the people who probably felt worst on this night were the workers at the 
station’. Indeed the station announcers repeated warnings in ‘a pained voice’ that 
being on the track was dangerous fell on deaf ears.49  
Outside the station, way before the fighting began, Oda Makoto, the leader of 
the Anti-Vietnam War movement Beiheiren, implored people to ‘take a look at the 
riot police. They are holding truncheons for beating people and are surrounding us. Is 
this the face of Japan, a supposedly peaceful country?’ On an ‘anti-war day’ when, 
according to police estimates 170,000 people attended 270 rallies nationwide, 60,000 
commuters ‘stood by as riot police stormed the barricades and finally subdued the 
radicals after midnight with hoses and tear gas’.50 But if the unfortunate workers and 
commuters at Shinjuku station were taken aback by the violence of what was 
happening on that night in October 1968, it was not for want of media coverage of 
violent protest. The end of 1967, and the whole of 1968, had witnessed violent clashes 
between student groups and riot police, and also clashes among student groups. 
Violent attempts by students to stop Satō leaving Haneda airport in 1967 had 
twice brought the issue of violence between protesters and riot police into the 
mainstream media (the so-called Haneda Incidents). On the 8th October, members of 
Zengakuren, the largest association of student groups51 forcibly tried to prevent Satō 
leaving for a trip to Southeast Asia. In the protests surrounding the departure one 
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student, Yamazaki Hiroaki, died. One month later, as the Prime Minister prepared to 
leave for the United States he was again met with violent protests. On November 11th, 
seventy-three year old Tadanoshin Yui set himself on fire outside the prime minister’s 
house in protest at the War in Vietnam, where he believed the United States was 
repeating the mistakes Japan itself had made in China during the Second World War. 
Yui died in hospital shortly before 4pm the next day, just five minutes before the 
prime minister’s jet took off from Haneda airport for Washington. 
The riot police expected trouble and were well prepared for protests against 
the Prime Minister’s departure. They surrounded the airport with 7,000 officers 
carrying large duralumin shields and quantities of tear gas. ‘Twenty police boats 
patrolled nearby rivers, canals, and sections of Tokyo Bay, and helicopters were 
deployed overhead’. Meanwhile ‘the Liberal Democrats assembled 1,600 youths 
wearing blue ribbons and waving small Japanese flags to bid Satō farewell from the 
roof of the terminal building’. Not far from the airport, ‘about 3,000 students from the 
anti-JCP (Japan Communist Party) factions of Zengakuren fought the police with 
stones and staves near Ōtorii station, resulting in more than 500 injuries and 300 
arrests’.52 
As the year-end approached, the Yomiuri Shimbun explained that the Haneda 
incidents were not just student protests. They were tied up with large-scale opposition 
protests over ‘autonomy for universities, our country’s policy towards Vietnam as 
well as the security problem’.53 The result of the two incidents at Haneda airport in 
1967 though, was not only the virtual lockdown of the airport when the Prime 
Minister left for Washington in November 1969, but also the prevalence in the media 
of images of violent clashes between students and riot police and a broad ranging 
discussion over who was responsible.54  
Following the 1967 Haneda Incidents, 1968 began with clashes between 
Sampa Rengō students ‘armed with helmets, shields and poles, and rocks’ and armed 
riot police brought in to protect the US naval base at Sasebo. Over four days of 
fighting, 62 students were arrested and more than 200 were injured.55 Violence on 
both sides was notable, prompting one concerned reader, a doctor from Shinjuku, to 
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write to the Yomiuri Shimbun that in his opinion ‘rather than a force to protect the 
people (kokumin) (the police) gave the impression, just like Zengakuren, of being a 
fearsome group quick to turn violent’.56 The October 1968 clashes at Shinjuku station 
were just a small part of a massive nationwide demonstration against the Vietnam 
War, and the students themselves were merely the most physical aspect of this. By the 
summer of 1969, protests in Japan against the war in Vietnam had reached a new 
level. The largest New Left rally took place in Hibiya Park in June with almost 70,000 
people present, and the October 21st protests drew nearly half a million people across 
the country. The student-led violence of October 1969 was far worse than the year 
previously, and a new record for postwar arrests was achieved — a record, which, as 
noted above, was broken a week later when Satō left for Washington. 
Between 1967 and 1970, the magazine Fujin Kōron carried many articles and 
special sections attempting to understand or explain the reasons for the students’ 
violent protests.57 The Vietnam War and the Japanese state’s deep involvement in 
American Imperialism were noted. In April 1968, Shimada Kazuko, a first year 
student at Hosei University, explained that the trigger for her involvement was 
‘making Japan a nuclear armed country and a state which participated in the Vietnam 
War through the docking of the Enterprise (at Sasebo)’.58 In a round table discussion 
in the January 1969 issue, when asked why they used violence, student ‘D’ explained 
that ‘violent students (Bōryoku Gakusei) is not the label we ourselves use. It’s a word 
used by those in power because it is convenient. It’s a campaign of bourgeois 
journalism’. When asked who the enemy was ‘C’ explained ‘the whole of 
Imperialism. Some people will say that American imperialism is the enemy. That is 
not correct. If we say that, it implies there is good and bad imperialism. That’s too 
vague’. ‘E’ took a more anarchic stance claiming that ‘for the people the enemy is 
everything that oppresses. If I want to do something and somebody is against it they 
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are the enemy’. For ‘F’ the enemy was rather more abstract, ‘for me the enemy is 
oneself personally’.59 As Riki Kersten has noted with respect to Todai, the students, 
‘with the prospect of a glorious future ahead of them merely because they had been 
accepted as students there, in 1968 began to ask themselves whether they were 
personally complicit in the inequality and exploitation that pervaded a Japanese 
society drunk on rapid and high economic growth’.60 This critique was one the media 
immediately latched onto and used to deflect the power of the protest movement, and 
would ultimately help to channel the overtly political issues of the student and anti-
war protests into wider concerns related to the ‘problems of youth’.  
Yet, in January 1968, Sociologist Sakuta Keiichi of Kyoto University urged 
the readers of Fujin Kōron to look for wider elements of the roots of the violence. 
Adults needed to try harder to understand Japanese young people. Sakuta noted that 
no age group looked inside themselves more than the young. The discourse of anger 
and violence used in the popular media to define the students risked simply equating 
their protests with gangsterism. The heroism of the students, as people willing to turn 
their internal frustrations outwards and take on the power of the state assumed a one 
to one correlation between the internal and the external. For most people, internal 
thought leads directly to external action. So when students charged at riot police with 
wooden sticks the students came to see themselves as heroic, putting their emotions 
into their actions when they took on the riot police.61 This type of ‘psychological’ 
explanation was common in the newspapers, but it disgusted Sakuta. The heroism of 
doing things other people could not do was ‘mob heroism’, but the students needed to 
be seen as different from the mob to be truly understood. The political issue of the 
Japanese government’s support for the Vietnam War, along with the increasingly 
competitive education system and its failings, were beside the point. ‘As far as 
horizontal relations between people and group relations are concerned, competition 
and the aim of cooperating only in order to win have developed immensely in this 
society’.62 The deepening of competition and the weakening of the bonds of 
cooperation were caused by the development of postwar capitalism.  
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Sakuta examined a note by Yamasaki Hiroaki, the student who had been killed 
in the protests at Haneda airport. In it Yamasaki claimed he was ‘fundamentally a 
pacifist’ and saw this as a negative thing, explaining that although he was ‘a weak 
human being…all humans are weak’. The important thing was for human beings to 
exert themselves, to impose themselves on the world. In Sakuta’s view, these 
sentences could only have been written ‘by an introspective person negative about 
himself’. Such people had interiorised the guilt of society and needed to throw 
themselves up against that society just to reaffirm their existence. Some students 
could not explain their radical behaviour. But in terms of the social conditions that 
influenced them, the Japanese government was far from neutral in Sakuta’s opinion. 
‘The fact that they [the Japanese government] have chosen to stand only on the side of 
the Americans’ was one of the conditions which affected the consciousness of 
Japanese young people.63 Capitalism had weakened the bonds of cooperation as it 
promoted competition, and students and young people had internalised this ethic of 
competition more than any other section of society. At the same time, the older 
generation no longer listened to or cared about what the young people thought. Sakuta 
believed ‘we need to look closely at the idea that external problems are external and 
internal problems are internal.’64  
International War and International Lifestyles 
The magazine Heibon Punch neatly tied the international to the psychological 
difficulties of adjusting to the social and economic changes that many commentators 
and journalists saw as driving the student protests. On August 26th 1968, the fourth 
anniversary of its debut publication, the magazine announced the results of a readers’ 
poll to find ‘Mr International’. In an important indication of the connection between 
the national and international, and the growth of a consumer society in Japan, the 
magazine teamed up with the Japanese company National to attract its readers to 
vote.65 184,471 votes were cast and French President Charles De Gaulle 
overwhelmingly took first place, with 52, 833 votes. David Condè, a special 
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correspondent for the political magazine Canadian Forum, celebrated the choice of 
the French president. For him it demonstrated that the readers of Heibon Punch 
realised De Gaulle’s international importance. The General ‘carried the spirit of 
national independence (minzoku dokuritsu)’ in an international arena dominated by 
the United States.  
Although there was a somewhat old-fashioned nature about the former 
General, Condè praised his role in standing up for the sovereignty and determination 
of small countries such as ‘France, Vietnam and Japan’ in their partnership with the 
powerful United States. ‘As a champion of national independence he will probably 
continue to be a hero fighting for real independence’.66 Condè avoided any mention of 
the French colonial experience in Southeast Asia or indeed the protest movements of 
May 1968 in France, which had emerged directly out of protests against French 
government colonial policy in Algeria.67 Nevertheless, the overwhelming victory of 
De Gaulle and the third place given to Ho Chi Minh reflected the growing centrality 
of the Vietnam War, and possibly anti-Americanism, to the everyday lives of young 
people in Japan. The readers’ positive linking of two clear political and military 
enemies clearly reflected the ambiguity and the irony of the French President’s 
position as a promoter of independence for Algeria, and the popularity of his anti-
American, pro-European policies. 
Second place exposed the social tensions and ambiguities of the domestic 
situation. The writer Mishima Yukio garnered just half of the tally of De Gaulle with 
26,265 votes. Illustrator Yokō Tadanori doubted whether the people who voted for 
Mishima had ‘all read his novels’, nevertheless everyone knew he was ‘an 
international man of literature’. Ultimately, the iconic writer offered hope to the 
magazine’s young readers because ‘within an increasingly systematised system, at a 
time of a tendency towards uniformity’ Mishima denied the specialists and pressed 
ahead with his own personal revolution. For this reason he was seen as the ideal cool 
male. It was ‘rare to find a person as egotistical and lacking in the service spirit as 
Mishima’, nevertheless ‘his stubborn, deep attachment to his own things may 
conversely come to be seen as a service’. Furthermore, ‘(his) individual challenge to 
the unfathomable possibilities in his universe, and his mysterious behaviour’, made 
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him ‘a support to young people of any generation’. Mishima was important to the 
readers of Heibon Punch because he challenged the same transformations in society 
that the students were protesting. Importantly, Mishima’s revolution was an internal 
and individual one at a time when the students were also becoming introspective. 
Although Mishima was a right-wing romantic he was concerned, as were the students, 
with overcoming the alienation at the root of everyday life. Yet Mishima and his 
carefully constructed image were very much products of consumer society and neatly 
demonstrated the interconnectedness of culture, economics and politics.68 His position 
in the readers’ poll in Heibon Punch reinforced this. It also reinforced the connection 
between the domestic struggles of the individual against an increasingly systematised 
society as they played out on the streets of Tokyo and the fight against the neo-
imperialism of American involvement in the Vietnam War.  
After Ho Chi Minh in 3rd place, fourth-placed Matsushita Konnosuke, founder 
of the electronics company which traded under the brand name National, stood as a 
further indication of the importance of consumer society in representing ideas of 
nation and their boundaries. According to the magazine, he was essential to the times 
because of his vast business empire which astonished those members of the economic 
intelligentsia who ‘insisted on the economic assistance of an old power like 
America’.69 In building up a successful Japanese electronics empire and almost 
singlehandedly creating ‘Japanese’ products, Matsushita’s attraction for readers of the 
magazine was explicitly nationalistic, yet it was more than simply a natural 
expression of the zeitgeist. National provided 2.3 million Yen worth of goods to be 
dished out in a prize draw to 1,609 readers who cast their vote. The prizes on offer 
exposed the priorities at the centre of daily life for the young male readers of the 
magazine. The ‘National Young man products’ included a luxury nine-piece 
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collection for lucky winner nineteen year old Yamada-san from Kyoto. This included 
a stereo, bicycle, transistor television, car stereo, portable television, tape recorder, 
transistor radio, as well as a trouser press. Second placed twenty-one-year-old 
Hashimoto-san from Hiroshima received a five piece collection and 23-year-old 
Oguchi-san from Tokyo a three piece. Five hundred winners received a Heibon Punch 
tiepin and one thousand a Heibon Punch handkerchief. The one hundred and six 
winners of the fourth prize had the opportunity to choose from nine different prizes. 
Of these only two chose a stereo while twenty-eight chose the trouser press.70  
Popular consumer culture came together with international politics in the 
subsequent results of the Heibon Punch poll. John Lennon came in 6th place followed 
by Ishihara Shinatro then Mao Tse Tung in 8th. While De Gaulle offered national 
independence to the small country standing up to the power and influence of the 
United States, and Matsushita Konnosuke offered the economic equivalent for Japan, 
Mishima Yukio offered the individual Japanese a role model challenging the 
normality of an increasingly standardised society.  
A few months after the poll, on November 4th 1968, Heibon Punch carried a 
special section entitled Mad Age: Mishima Yukio is mad! Accompanied by a picture 
of a bare-chested Mishima practicing Bushidō, the article proclaimed the advent of a 
‘Mad Age’ in which Japan had been taken over by a ‘decadent’ (seikimatsu-teki) 
mood. According to the article, this mood had seen the emergence of a new type of 
person: the ‘Mad Man’. As a man in his 40s, who often removed his clothes to pose 
naked in the popular media, was obsessed with body-building, ‘sang love songs on 
stage’ and shared a passionate on-screen kiss with Maruyama Akihiro, Mishima often 
stood in front of masses of students challenging anyone brave enough to come and 
kill him. The article left it to the reader to decide if Mishima, rumoured to be Nobel 
Prize nominated, was ‘normal or mad’.71 The article noted that there was no one who 
understood the spirit of Bushido as much as Mishima Yukio, but found it very strange 
how such an authority on the Bushido spirit could act so frivolously. Providing many 
more examples from popular culture of men in or approaching middle age who did 
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not abide by the usual ‘value judgments of society’, the article presented itself as an 
urgent inquiry into the state of Japan in the latter part of the 20th century.  
For some guidance in understanding the situation, the article interviewed 
psychologist Tago Akira, who saw the division between ordinary behaviour and 
strange behaviour as based on the ‘variation from a norm’. The problem for Japan in 
the late 1960s was precisely the lack of normality. Recently, according to Tago, 
deciding what should be considered ‘normal’ had 
become a problem. In Tago’s view, ‘the value 
concepts which establish whether behaviour is good 
or bad’ were becoming complicated.72 The magazine 
tried to explain this to readers with the rather bizarre 
medical analogy of dental cavities, because if ‘for 
example we say all Japanese have cavities…it is not 
the case that all people who don’t have a cavity are 
mad. In this case it is a medically accepted value 
judgement that it is bad to have a cavity, and this is 
clearly understood’. Dealing with value judgments of 
what was mad and what could be considered normal 
in everyday social interaction was much more 
difficult in late 20th century Japan, because value 
judgments were constantly changing with the times. 
‘One summer 23 years ago Japanese people’s 
values changed one hundred and eighty degrees’, the 
article continued. The pace of this change only 
increased over the intervening quarter century. So 
while it may have been true that ‘looked at in the light 
of previous social conditions’ Mishima was certainly 
mad, ‘at present MAD is normal, so what is normal 
today is what was MAD in the old days’.73 Social 
changes in Japan had destroyed the old values 
because what the magazine referred to as, ‘high-speed mass production’ had been 
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joined by a ‘high-speed information society’. Echoing the argument of Sakuta Keichi 
in Fujin Kōron, the article noted that this acceleration in the pace of social change and 
in the communication of new social and cultural trends or movements meant that 
values often taken for granted had to be continually reinvented and reinterpreted. 
Ideas of nation were not immune to this process of rapid change.  
As the magazine made clear with examples from popular culture, people were 
now stepping onto the stage with ‘new values for the twenty-first century’. In order to 
communicate these values to the masses the article claimed that ‘very high speed’ 
would be essential. Communicating with young people using the old-fashioned 
method of ‘not being MAD’ would require a lot of time and effort in this new age. 
Being ‘MAD’ was now the best way to satisfy people, and TV commercials took it to 
the limit. According to the article, ‘those who use MAD well are the ones who will 
move the times’,74 and Mishima was one of those rare people who knew how to 
control his ‘MAD’-ness. The present age, in terms of human psychology, was no 
longer about suppressing deep desires and keeping up appearances. For Tago Akira, 
people in this new age were, more and more, allowing their suppressed consciousness 
to take over the superficial appearance of everyday life. Nobody, in the magazines 
opinion, was more in control of this process than Mishima Yukio.  
But the pressing question for young Japanese people was deciding who should 
judge present day social values such as ‘madness’ and ‘normality’ in Japanese 
society. Who had the right to ‘move the times’ as Heibon Punch put it? The answer 
was definitely, as far as the November 1968 article was concerned, the masses of 
young people, particularly young men, at whom the magazine was aimed. The article 
began by stating, ‘here we will begin the trial of the MAD. You read this with the aim 
of being the jury’. As student violence and anti-war protests raged on the streets and 
filled the television news, the article concluded with a warning to its readers to ‘make 
a judgment!’ If they were unable to decide one way or the other, they would find 
themselves ‘unable to live through the 21st century!’75 As what defined Japan became 
increasingly problematic for the young, the rapid changes within Japanese society 
were complicating ideas of what it meant to be Japanese. The old value systems could 
not keep up with the growth of a consumer society which constantly altered what was 
                                                
74 Ibid.  
75 Ibid, pp. 34-39. 
177 
 
acceptable and what was unacceptable. Ultimately though, the danger of the unsettled 
international situation had entered into the everyday lives of young Japanese people, 
and the growing popular media were representing the ambiguity and ambivalence of 
ideas of nation in the 1960s. 
War and the Importance of Everyday Life 
Those readers of Heibon Punch who had been able to decide between ‘MAD’ and 
normal may have been forgiven for thinking they had wasted their time. ‘Tomorrow is 
Japan’s last day’, declared a headline in the magazine on January 27th 1969. If 
Japanese society had become dominated by 
high speed industrial production and the high 
speed flow of information and had forced its 
young people into an existential crisis of social 
criticism, then all this rushing about could 
ultimately turn out to have been in vain. The 
high speed economic growth of the late 1950s 
and 1960s and the transformation of Tokyo for 
the international audience watching the 1964 
Olympic games were wasted, because, 
according to Nosaka Akiyuki, there was a very 
real danger of a nuclear explosion in the capital 
city and the outbreak of a third world war.  
In the opinion of Nosaka, there was no 
more dangerous capital city in the world than 
Tokyo. Anybody who lived in the city but 
refused to believe this only needed to take a 
night time drive around to realise that the 
whole place was surrounded by military 
bases.76 It was not only within Japanese society 
that ideas of normality were being questioned, 
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the whole world was living through dangerous times, and Japan, particularly its 
capital city, was right in the firing line. As Nosaka explained ‘if there is a split 
between East and West then there will be explosions, and Tokyo will be the target’.77 
Echoing Richard Nixon’s fears of China gaining a ‘significant deliverable nuclear 
capability’,78 and bringing together the insecurities and ambiguities of the 
international situation of the late 1960s, Nosaka’s article was a good reflection of the 
idea of a ‘MAD age’79 in Japan. Of course, readers of the magazine had no idea of the 
seriousness of the situation as far as Nosaka was concerned. While they may have 
kept up with current affairs, knowing all about the attractions of the Crown Prince’s 
wife Michiko, and other incidents regularly flashed up on the TV news, the 
seriousness of Tokyo’s predicament was lost on them.  
Most of the daily news on the television and in the newspapers was ultimately 
trivial, but there was one news story, yet to be broadcast, which Nosaka believed 
would easily capture the public’s imagination: ‘the Third World War has broken 
out!’80 When the war came the television screen would go blank. Viewers would most 
probably want to tune in to the state run television channel NHK ‘because, like it or 
not, NHK is the most powerful channel in this situation’. Once tuned in to the stoic 
NHK, viewers would be able to witness the normally ‘happy’ news reader give a 
sorrowful look and announce in a serious voice: ‘according to news just in, beginning 
in Beijing, the principal Chinese cities and industrial areas have suffered a nuclear 
attack’. In Nosaka’s apocalyptic scenario, the stratosphere would rapidly be filled 
with one ton of TNT for every person on the earth. Traffic regulations would need to 
be put in place above the earth ‘as the multi-coloured nuclear bombs of America, 
China, the Soviet Union, France, and Britain fly’. New York and Moscow would be 
fine; if anything as serious as World War Three were to break out, those cities would 
be the last to be affected. It was Japan, and in particular the residents of Tokyo, who 
needed to worry.  
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But just exactly what were the people of Tokyo supposed to do when the 
outbreak of the ultimate war jammed up the air space above their city? Thinking 
about this very fact was itself an important means of coming to terms with the social 
upheavals of the age of the ‘MAD man.’ The explosion of just one of the many 
nuclear bombs in the vast arsenals of the powerful countries would be enough, as 
Nosaka saw it, to spark another world war. Yet the majority of people did not act as if 
the end of the world was nigh. The writer took issue with this stupidity: ‘The 
foolishness of the idea that there is a tomorrow! People hoping that the missiles don’t 
fly during the night! Please think about it carefully, who can definitively say that 
tomorrow is going to come?’81 With China in possession of nuclear weapons and the 
escalation of the war in Vietnam with the 
Tet Offensive, the young men of Tokyo 
needed to start seriously thinking about 
the reality of nuclear conflict. The 
Americans appeared to be losing control 
of the war and Nosaka’s comments no 
doubt struck a chord with readers as they 
witnessed the increasing violence of the 
protests on the streets in Tokyo.  
There was no room for 
complacency. They needed to realise 
they were in a war, and as ‘young men of draft age’ they were ‘probably nothing more 
than a defence force for a lonely island discovered by the Americans’. Completely 
unaware, the young people of Japan passed ‘every day in a more and more dangerous 
situation’. But this was the destiny of small countries like Japan in the present 
international situation. According to the article, there was nothing readers could do 
about it because everything was in the hands of those powerful countries that had ‘the 
right to wield the power of life and death thanks to the nuclear weapons they had 
created’. In Nosaka’s opinion, powerful countries no longer had a heart, and it was the 
smaller countries like Japan, which would be asked, rather eloquently, ‘to go first into 
the darkness’.82 
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(Fig. 9.) Watching the end of the world. 
Heibon Punch, January 27th 1969. 
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The burning question remained as to how readers should face this pessimistic, 
apocalyptic scenario? The only answer lay in everyday life. Nosaka urged the young 
men of Japan to ‘make life worth living by benefitting from the present’. As the 
article’s headline stated ‘the least you can do is forget about tomorrow and make life 
fresh and vivid today’. Being aware of the fact that nobody could possibly know when 
a nuclear war might break out presented readers with the obligation to think about 
what made life worth living. This obligation permeated every level of everyday life, 
and in order to survive, people needed to live with a Zen-like devotion to the here and 
now. ‘Even if you are working or chatting up a woman, even when you are eating 
dinner, do it earnestly…If you think you will die tomorrow, all the more feeling will 
go into being intimate with a woman’. For those who felt they needed no help in the 
romance department, or even those lacking any courage at all, the feeling of imminent 
death would allow them to feel as if they could do anything. And they should indeed 
do anything, as far as Nosaka was concerned. As he helpfully pointed out ‘if there is 
someone you really don’t like, today is a good day to smack them one’.83 People 
should refuse to be deceived by the trivial distractions that consumed the intellectuals 
and the highbrow journals like the hundredth anniversary of the Japanese state. Nor 
should they be won over by the various ‘rose coloured visions of the 21st century’. 
Instead they should take personal satisfaction in getting on with everyday life and 
doing the things they had always wanted to, because when the end came it would 
come all too quickly.  
‘This is a news flash. A missile launched from a ‘certain country’ is making its 
way to the Kanto area. It is thought that this missile is a nuclear device armed with 
two megatons of explosives. To all the inhabitants of the city, to avoid the heat 
quickly put on white clothes and take shelter. The missile is expected to arrive in 15 
minutes 30 seconds…’ In Nosaka’s opinion, this was the way destiny would play 
itself out, and it was OK for people not to struggle, fight, or fear. Preparation was far 
more important. Of course there was a chance that the worst would not happen, but 
Nosaka insisted that by not thinking about tomorrow, and being well prepared to live 
today, readers would be able to live a full life. What was more, if they could ‘find 
enlightenment in the idea of death’ everything on earth would feel fresh.84  
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The rapidly changing social and economic conditions meant that concepts, 
ideas and beliefs were constantly changing. The contradictions of Japan’s position in 
the international environment — as a peaceful country unwilling and unable to 
involve itself in military conflict abroad which nevertheless benefitted greatly from 
the wars carried out in Southeast and East Asia over the previous two decades — 
were hard to ignore. If Mishima was ‘MAD’, and ‘MAD’ was acceptable, it was 
because the domestic social environment was changing constantly. But so was the 
international situation, and young people held the key to deciphering rapidly changing 
social and cultural ideas. In the international environment of the late 1960s, living in 
the everyday was the best way to approach life when reality and idealism clashed. 
Cynicism towards ideas of nation came to offer the best means of dealing with these 
contradictions.  
Another Occupation 
The laid-back attitude of young Japanese to the dangerous situation in Vietnam was 
certainly not overestimated by Nosaka. In 1966, novelist and anti-war activist Oda 
Makoto noted his impressions of the change in attitude of young Japanese towards 
nationalism. Since 1960, there had been an ‘acute change in the consciousness 
towards nationalism among young people’. Six years previously, in answer to the 
question ‘what do you think about Japan? Maybe one out of ten would reply “Japan is 
great.’” When asked whether they would give their lives to protect the country if it 
was invaded ‘mostly they would laugh and say that they would run’. Even those who 
claimed to love their country would have difficulty understanding the concept of 
protecting it. Six years later and Oda found probably eight out of ten would answer 
‘Japan is great’ when asked the same question. Nevertheless, when asked whether 
they would give their lives to protect the country ‘they answered as if it were self-
evident. But could not give a clear answer when asked “for what reason?” or what 
would you protect about the country?’ Oda jokingly put the emergence of this 
‘irresponsible nationalism’ (musekinin na nashonarizumu) down to the Tokyo 
Olympics.85 Oguma Eiji suggests that the increasing social stability brought about by 
high-speed economic growth helped to firmly establish an ‘unconscious 
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nationalism.’86 The popular media drove this emerging national sentiment and helped 
to further depoliticise ideas of nation. 
 
 
In 1968, Heibon Punch carried out its own survey on the national sentiment of 
the Japanese. Envisaging another Occupation, the magazine asked people from 
different areas of Japanese popular culture about their actions in the event of war. In 
this case, the scenario was not totally apocalyptic like Nosaka’s nuclear holocaust, 
rather the magazine asked what it referred to as ‘people who symbolise modern 
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(Fig. 10.) ‘What would you do if an army invaded?’ Heibon Punch, September 16th 1968. 
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Japan’ how they would respond if the country was invaded and the Japanese people 
were faced with an army of occupation. The international situation made the question 
pertinent because, as the magazine pointed out, Japan may have been a peaceful place 
compared to Czechoslovakia or Romania, nevertheless ‘we cannot say that there is no 
chance of Japan becoming like Czechoslovakia!’87 The article’s sub-title declared a 
‘New Japanese Yamato Spirit’.  
Graphic Designer Yuno Akira thought such a scenario would be okay as long 
as the occupation of the country was carried out under a capitalist system. But he 
admitted he ‘wouldn’t want anything to do with it if it was a communist occupation 
which tried to unify thought’. Fortunately, possessing ‘the skills to make a living 
anywhere’, hair designer Mr Miyazaki declared he ‘would move to New York and 
compete in the fashion industry there’.88 Fashion model Honda Shineo also had no 
problem leaving the country when the occupation army invaded. He believed he could 
find work in any country and claimed to be saving money for just such a moment. He 
would flee to New York leaving ‘many girlfriends’ in his wake. Nevertheless, he 
would not come back to Japan while it was under occupation, because in his opinion, 
patriotic feeling (aikokushin) was ‘a worthless thing’, and anyway something which 
he did not possess. Souta, a ‘Film Reporter’ took a completely opposed stance to 
Honda, calling for people to ‘show the Yamato spirit’ under occupation, and 
confessed to being ‘the sort of patriot (aikokushin-sha) who worships the Emperor’. 
He even pledged that ‘if Japan was occupied by a foreign army’, he would be 
prepared to ‘fight with all my strength to protect the Emperor’. He saw himself as ‘a 
brave young person’ and believed occupation would be the perfect chance to 
‘demonstrate the Yamato spirit’.89 Songwriter Ichiyanagi Toshi was a little bit more 
pessimistic about the ability of the Japanese people to resist an armed occupation, 
pointing out that in Czechoslovakia at least ‘they had the goal of freedom’. In 
Ichiyanagi’s opinion, in Japan there was ‘no autonomy’. The Japanese were unable to 
fight like the Czech people because Japanese thought only ‘about their own well-
being’, and only acted ‘for their own gain’. For Ichiyanagi, an occupation ‘would be a 
good chance to think about and discover what Japan was’ (nihon to wa nani ka), and 
at the same time to question ‘what it means to be Japanese’ (nihonjin to wa nani ka). 
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He worried that he would feel the limit of what it meant to be a human being keenly, 
as he discovered whether he was the sort of person who could oppose an occupation.90 
While Ichiyanagi, Honda and Sōta all saw the question of an occupation of Japan as 
an opportunity to reflect on what the country and love of country meant, not all those 
interviewed took the question as seriously.  
Perhaps unsurprisingly in light of his profession, and somewhat echoing 
Nosaka’s point that people did not really take the threat of war seriously, one film 
maker who was interviewed came up with a very practical but extremely creative 
means of challenging any military force occupying Japan. He saw any occupation as a 
long way in the future and at that time expected there to be ‘a lot more homos in 
Japan’. This would be a stroke of luck, as in his opinion any occupying army would 
be ‘full of homos’, leading to the perfect solution whereby ‘all of Japan’s homos dress 
up and go to an underground bar inviting the occupation army. They will sell 
themselves all together and there will be no need to resist with bullets’.91 Sugimura-
san, an illustrator, took the prize for the most inventive and enjoyable, though perhaps 
somewhat impractical response to an occupation of Japan. In his opinion, a mass 
‘masturbation competition in front of the occupation army’ was the best means of 
opposing the invaders. Pointing out the usefulness of the transformation of places like 
Ginza and Hibiya, where many underground bars and restaurants had opened up, he 
would first send all the women and children underground. Next, using the speakers 
from many houses he would play rhythm and blues music at full volume. Because the 
occupation army would be made up of people from rural areas (inakajin) ‘they would 
feel like country bumpkins listening to the music’. The finale would bring together 
‘all the young people in Japan’ who would ‘all masturbate together in front of the 
army’. In place of gunpowder, the streets would ‘be filled with the smell of semen’. 
Blue films would be shown at various places and eventually the occupation soldiers 
would ‘become sexually dissatisfied’. The genius of the plan, as Sugimura saw it, was 
that there would be ‘no women because they are all underground’. The ensuing 
sexually driven chaos among the occupying troops would result in the enemy leaders 
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losing control of their forces, consequently ordering a retreat, at which point Japan 
would be saved.92  
Clearly most of the interviewees did not take the question posed by Heibon 
Punch at all seriously, and many showed a startling lack of urgency that would not 
have surprised Nosaka Akiyuki. But some of the responses, particularly those of 
Honda, Sugimura, Ichiyanagi and Sōta, did at least touch on the issue of what Japan 
would mean to them in such a situation. While Honda claimed he could see no 
attachment to Japan and dismissed the idea of possessing anything like patriotic 
feeling ‘aikokushin,’ Sōta’s apparent respect for the Emperor was a throwback to an 
era of Japanese history which he himself was perhaps comfortable knowing would 
never return. It was also a stance which few of the readers of Heibon Punch would 
have agreed with. In a survey of students at Meiji University in Tokyo carried out the 
previous year, 60% of respondents claimed they felt nothing towards the Emperor and 
his family. Indeed only 5% said they had respect for the Emperor, and less than half 
agreed with the presence of the Emperor in Japan’s political system.93 The approach 
of many of the ‘symbols of Japanese society’ — celebrities and opinion formers — to 
the question of a new occupation was the result of those forces of high speed growth 
and high speed information which the November 1968 article pointed to as the cause 
of constantly changing social values. In many ways, if the world was always changing 
and nothing could be certain of staying the same, if those who were ‘MAD’ yesterday 
may not be today, and a nuclear war could end everything, then attachment to the idea 
of nation held similar fluid and ever-changing qualities. It could be dismissed as 
unimportant or seen as vitally important, but ultimately a matter of personal 
preference
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Chapter 6 
The ‘Real’ War 
‘In today’s Japan, in the family, in the school, in society the smiling faces are 
disappearing. As the smiling faces become poorer, war, crime and unrest are 
increasing. From ancient times the Japanese minzoku were a bright minzoku which 
never forgot to laugh...Let’s face the New Year with smiling faces.’ 
 
Mr Suzuki, retired teacher.1 
 
 
In the summer of 1968 businessman Matsushita Konnosuke won fourth place in the 
‘Mr International’ poll in Heibon Punch, and his company provided electrical 
consumer goods in the prize draw for those who voted. Back in 1946, Matsushita had 
set up the PHP foundation (Peace and Happiness through Prosperity) to ‘bring peace 
and fulfilment to human society by ensuring both material and spiritual abundance’. 
As a businessman his duty was ‘to ensure products were available to consumers as 
readily as running water’.2 By the late 1960s, they were, but by then student protests 
and their coverage in the mass media had begun to highlight the contradictions 
inherent in the country’s postwar economic growth. While students realised the need 
to examine their own role in creating and maintaining social inequality in Japan, the 
country’s role in the Vietnam War gave the same issues of responsibility and 
participation a national perspective. Nevertheless, just as the students’ attempts at 
introspection were subverted by the dominance of a consumer economy of which they 
were an integral part, so too was the international situation refracted through the 
internal dynamics of economic growth.  
As the Vietnam War increased in intensity, Japan began to challenge the 
United States economically. As noted in relation to the Tokyo Olympics, one result of 
the United States’ approach to the Cold War in Asia was the return of Japanese 
economic dominance in Southeast Asia. In the late 1950s, Japanese-based companies 
had begun to emerge as a key element in the political economy of Asia as Japan 
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gradually became a model for its former colonies. By the late 1960s and early 1970s, 
many companies were relocating operations to countries, which were formerly part of 
the Japanese Empire.3 Between 1956 and 1969, Japanese exports to South Vietnam 
quadrupled, and by 1972 imports of raw materials from South Vietnam had increased 
seven times over 1958 levels.4 At the same time, the United States emphasis on 
military production in its own domestic economy and its inability to produce 
consumer goods cheaply meant that the US economy ‘soaked up Japanese colour 
televisions, chemicals, auto parts, electric cable, and machinery’. ‘Even the vaunted 
American aircraft industry strained under the war, so that a regional US airline had to 
order thirty YS-11 passenger planes from Japan’ and ‘Fuji heavy industries exported 
seven helicopters to Bell Helicopter Corporation’. By 1967, exports to the United 
States attributable to the war are thought to have increased by $260 million over the 
previous year, and overall ‘Japanese exports to America between 1965 and 1972 grew 
at an average annual rate of 21 per cent, partly through normal growth but also 
because of Vietnam’.5 Largely funded by the US and Japan, the Asian Development 
Bank was established in 1966 to provide funds to non-communist Southeast Asia, and 
with the official declaration of the Guam doctrine by President Nixon on July 25th 
1969 it became clear that the US expected Japan to take on a greater financial role in 
the region.6 
With the support of the United States, Japan’s economic growth had taken it to 
the position of the world’s second greatest capitalist power by the time of the Tokyo 
Olympics.7 In 1952, the Korean War had taken up an estimated 63% of Japanese 
exports, and the US spent $600 million every year for the rest of the decade on 
maintaining its bases in Japan. The war in Vietnam was not as significant as the 
Korean War for Japan, whose economy had grown six times larger than it had been in 
1952. Nonetheless the Vietnam War ‘became another lever for Japanese companies to 
pry open American pocketbooks’ due to the fact that many corporations in the United 
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States found it difficult to raise capacity fast enough to manufacture retail items.8 The 
tensions this created in the US-Japan relationship became clear in the popular media 
and on the streets. As Walter LaFeber has pointed out, it was no surprise that the 
effects of US-Japan trade began to gain attention around 1965, just as Americans 
began to die in large numbers in Vietnam. ‘A trade balance long favourable to the 
United States turned unfavourable; by 1968 the US deficit had quadrupled the deficit 
of 1967’.9 After encouraging the liberalisation of the Japanese and world economies 
after the war, by the late 1960s America was trying to impose restrictions on goods 
imported from Japan. 
In Japan, domestic opposition to the Vietnam War was intense. From 1969 
onwards, the anti-war group Beiheiren attracted huge numbers of people as they 
reached out beyond students to involve far more people than before. Yet as noted in 
the previous chapter, the protests against the war were tied up with the issue of the 
social and economic changes wrought by high-speed economic growth. Okinawa was 
tied to both. As Thomas Havens has pointed out, with the security treaty again due for 
renewal in 1970 the leaders of Beiheiren realised the importance of Okinawa as ‘a 
corollary to the upcoming treaty issue’.10 Discussion of ‘the return’ of Okinawa was 
rife in the popular media. The ambiguity in discussions between the US and the 
Japanese governments over the return and the amount of time they were taking led 
some commentators to fear that the people on the mainland would soon lose all 
interest. Even for people living in Okinawa the agreement on the return was not well 
thought of.11 Yet as this chapter will show, the discussion and debate in the media 
connected the issue to high-speed economic growth on the mainland, and in doing so 
brought out the contradictions of growth on the mainland and the relationship between 
Japan and the United States. As with the student protests, consumerism and 
‘Americanisation’ were seen to have brought about de-politicisation, rendering the 
Japanese people insensitive to the war and the plight of Okinawa.  
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Okinawa is Cheap! 
Veteran anti-war protester and Beiheiren leader Iida Momo, writing in Fujin Kōron in 
December 1969, claimed that the ‘Golden Sixties’ championed by President Kennedy 
were over. He quoted the present US President, Richard Nixon, as saying that the 
latter part of the 20th Century carried the serious threat of a third world war. 
According to Nixon, the danger area was not America, Europe, South America or 
Africa, but Asia. Although Iida had studied geography in school, he nevertheless went 
to check his atlas and desperately implored his readers to do the same, pointing out 
that yes, ‘Japan is in Asia!’ Moreover he asked his readers to run their finger over 
Japan because ‘that’s right, Okinawa is there’. The ‘island in the middle of a military 
base…sinking under the weight of armaments’ was not only supporting the Vietnam 
War but becoming home to most of the armaments in the Pacific area.12 As Newsweek 
explained in August 1965, Okinawa was ‘one vast supply dump, training ground and 
advanced staging area for US forces in the Far East’. Every possible item in 
America’s war arsenal was stored there ‘from jungle knives to nuclear weapons…’, 
and Kadena Air Force Base, just north of Naha, was one of the world’s busiest 
airports, with camps, firing ranges and supply depots scattered ‘the length and breadth 
of the island’.13 For this reason Okinawa was right at the heart of the discussions 
between Japan and the United States over the Security Treaty in 1970, and one of the 
most pressing issues in the popular media. 
But what exactly was the significance of Okinawa? What was the Island’s 
importance for people on the mainland? Here, the contradictions and ambiguities of 
economic growth on the mainland became apparent. For Iida, Okinawa’s importance 
seemed clear on the map. Yet as one high school student noted, ‘in the classroom 
teachers don’t talk about it. They don’t want to be asked about it’. A Kanagawa 
School’s head teacher banned the Okinawan Research Group from discussing 
anything other than tourism at the school’s culture festival. Iida feared that because of 
the postwar education system people on the mainland were ‘in danger of forgetting 
the simple fact on a map: that Okinawa is in Japan and Japan is in Asia’.14 As Tobe 
Hideaki has noted, for Okinawa high-speed economic growth was part of a neo-
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colonial political system, and never reached the levels of high-speed growth 
experienced on the mainland. What it did do was deepen ‘dependence on the 
American military’.15 In this context Mark Selden has pointed out that by the late 
1960s, the Okinawan economy was overwhelmingly dependent on the spending of the 
US military. After 1965, the value of Okinawan exports declined as inflation outpaced 
the increase in foreign sales while exports never climbed above a meagre twenty per 
cent of imports. This massive trade deficit was stemmed only by a desperate reliance 
on the US dollars provided by the salaries and expenditure of the military bases.16 The 
problems and consequences of the postwar settlement for Japan, Asia and America 
were clearly evident in Okinawa, where the contradictions of the rapid growth of a 
consumer society within the context of the postwar settlement were also becoming 
clear.  
In the terminal shop of Naha airport, whisky imported by America was 
extremely popular. Indeed, more than one thousand three hundred bottles of Johnny 
Walker Black Label ‘sold out very quickly’ according to the explanation in a picture 
book of the Ryuku Islands that accompanied a recruitment campaign for workers for a 
ferry between the mainland and Okinawa. Iida admitted that, even though he didn’t 
have an entry permit to visit Okinawa, his mouth was watering at the thought of 
Johnny Walker Black Label for six dollars, Red Label for two dollars, Napoleon 
Brandy for ten dollars, and White Horse whisky for two dollars. No doubt he was just 
as tempted as the workers belonging to Sohyo who continually visited the island to 
protest for the return of Okinawa to Japan, but nevertheless took full advantage of the 
duty free sales war to stock up on the three bottles of Johnny Walker, six hundred 
Okinawan cigarettes and four hundred foreign cigarettes allowed by the Japanese 
government.17 Iida took aim at the ideas of ANPO prosperity which had firmly taken 
root on the mainland. The PHP (peace and happiness through prosperity) economics 
of Matsushita Kōnosuke was no longer just an intellectual concept, in Iida’s opinion it 
was the reality. ‘My-homeism’, peace and well-being were the driving aims of the 
Japanese. Iida claimed that an ‘economic monster’ had been born from the ANPO 
system, describing it as ‘grotesque’. Nevertheless, the irony of the system was 
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overwhelming. Everyone went about clutching ‘the neutral-coloured paper bags from 
the duty free shops’, and buying headbands and sleeve ties proclaiming ‘ANPO Haiki’ 
(abolish ANPO).18 
Yet the former head of Sohyo saw this consumerist aspect of the reversion 
movement as a good thing. Oda Kaoru believed it was natural if workers wanted to 
drink ‘Johnny Walker and Napoleon to make them feel better’. Over twenty years of 
attending Sohyo meetings he had seen a clear difference between the feelings of 
Okinawan people and those on the mainland. ‘Up to now if there was assault or rape 
by US soldiers, that incident would rapidly spread across the territory because it was 
not right to be seen to cause problems’. For Oda, ‘at least if Johnny Walker Red Label 
can achieve an end to this it is good’.19 The important thing for the trade union was to 
bring prosperity to the people of Okinawa, and for this it was necessary to demand a 
‘western level of lifestyle’. Through twenty-six years of effort, Okinawa had moved 
from ‘being able to eat Japanese rice in the morning’ to having what Oda termed a 
‘mainland level of lifestyle’. For Iida though, the problem with this desire to be like 
the mainland or like the west in both Japan and Okinawa was the implication that it 
would follow the same ideas of development that had been sparked by the Meiji 
revolution of the 19th Century, when it had become clear by 1969 that this path of 
modernisation and development through prosperity had been fundamentally brought 
into question.  
The ‘arrow of development’, as Iida called it, led directly to the adoption of 
American ways of life in Okinawa, an opinion backed up in Heibon Punch by 
Kitayama Osamu a year or so later. At the time Kitayama was a popular folk singer 
most famous for the song For Children who don’t know War (Sensō o Shiranai 
Kodomotachi), first performed at the Osaka Expo in 1970 and released in February 
1971. On a visit to Okinawa, Kitayama found that most of the young people there 
were far more americanised than the young people on the mainland. ‘Even more than 
the spiritually, internationally mixed-blood young people of Tokyo and Osaka are 
westernised, aren’t those born in postwar Okinawa americanised? The people I was 
introduced to were urban Okinawans and so may be only a small section. 
Nevertheless, surrounded by and influenced by American things from birth there must 
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be a lot of young people who have taken this to heart’. Language was a big problem 
between Kitayama and the young people in Okinawa. ‘Especially in conversation 
about music or customs it seemed to get the point across much better to suitably mix 
Japanese and English.’20 Indeed, young people in Okinawa had little time for Japanese 
culture according to one music fan Kitayama spoke to. ‘Here we also have Japanese 
programmes on the radio, but it is my grandparents who listen to them. The cool 
people all listen to those radio stations aimed at the American bases. Japanese radio is 
also full of American music, but it is very late. Popular records in Okinawa are all two 
or three months behind (on Japanese radio) so we don’t really want to listen to 
them.’21 The real issue though was the overwhelming political apathy of young 
Japanese on the mainland, and this extended beyond a simple lack of interest in 
Okinawa.  
For Kitayama, many young Okinawans would have a hard time understanding 
the idea of Okinawa’s return to Japan. ‘The land they happened to be born in will be 
returned to Japan because a long time ago it happened to belong to Japan. They 
cannot be satisfied with that reason…’ Could anybody really promise them that Japan 
was the Furusato of their dreams? His argument took aim at those young Japanese 
who saw themselves as political. As he pointed out, ‘it is a trend among our 
generation to be uninterested in politics, it’s seems cool to mock politics’. At one 
university on the mainland the students went on strike over the issue of the return of 
Okinawa. Yet while deciding whether or not to boycott lectures in opposition to the 
signing of the agreement on the return of Okinawa many of them returned to their 
hometowns. ‘The number of student rail passes increased as students went home 
claiming ‘Okinawa has got nothing to do with us!’ ‘Nothing to do with me’ was a pet 
phrase in Kitayama’s opinion. Young people used it during elections. ‘I don’t 
understand their feelings. OK, so they go home and take a look at familiar faces, 
decide that going bowling is more interesting. That I can understand’. Kitayama 
claimed that according to political scientists the system attracted and worked for all of 
the people (kokumin) and that the state should forget about the silent ones. If the 
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young generation continued to be uninterested, they would become a ‘social blind 
spot. Can we really live with no interest in politics?’ 22  
Kitayama had recently met on old high school friend who had once wanted to 
be a politician. He no longer had that desire, and believed that all politicians were 
stupid. ‘Look at the bad sense of politicians. They only know about politics, 
professional politics makes politics stupid. I don’t want to be that stupid’. But 
Kitayama believed that if no young people had an interest in politics ‘when our 
generation takes over power won’t the situation be even worse than now? ... Is it 
really only people who know little of the world who want to tread the path of 
becoming a politician? I can’t help being terrified! Is it really true!!! Those young 
people who want to be politicians — do you have the mental ability? What do you 
think of Okinawa?! What should we tell the young people of Okinawa?!!! What kind 
of “Japan” do we plan to make in Okinawa?!’23  
Iida Momo also expressed doubts about the nature of politics on the mainland. 
The basis of postwar developmental trajectory may well have been democracy, but it 
needed to be remembered that this American democracy was ‘killing Vietnamese 
outside and killing black people inside’. The Americans were losing morally and 
militarily in Vietnam, and so the goal of a western lifestyle was nothing more than ‘to 
be frank, peace and prosperity built upon the blood of Vietnamese people’.24 Sadly, 
the Japanese only thought about ANPO in terms of their own advantage or 
disadvantage. According to Iida, French President Charles De Gaulle’s joke about the 
Japanese Prime Minister being a ‘transistor salesman’ had led to the Japanese ruling 
class ‘without regard for appearances’ talking about the country playing ‘a leading 
role in Asia.’25 The government’s talk about prosperity and lifestyle meant that the 
questions of ANPO and Okinawa were only discussed in terms of their profitability. 
In Iida’s opinion, it all quite simply boiled down to one question: whether ANPO and 
Okinawa were ‘as profitable as Johnny Walker Red Label’. 
The discrimination and cold-hearted calculation which Iida complained about 
was one fundamental aspect of the developmental path of democracy that Japan’s 
leaders had followed. Democracy, as Iida saw it, had western style discrimination 
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built into it. ‘(In) American democracy white women are free, black people are 
lynched, while Vietnamese are napalmed’.26 But people in America and Japan went 
about their everyday lives turning a blind eye to this problem. Students and young 
people were ignored in Japan, and considered naive by their teachers. Young people 
were constantly told to ‘study, study, study’, and wait until university to begin 
thinking about such problems. The pressing question was: ‘how do the supposedly 
mature teachers oppose the war in Vietnam?’ The answer was simple, ‘they grind 
their teeth and say “me I am a wife and I have children” just as if it has no relation to 
them at all’. Those wives and mothers clearly forgot that ‘most of the people being 
killed are wives and have children’. If society put high school tests before thinking 
about the realities of the discrimination inherent in the system Iida believed it was 
time to rethink the relationship between mother and child. Allowing B52s to take off 
from Okinawa every day whilst talking about peace, happiness, and anti-violence was 
a terrible contradiction, which for Iida held racist connotations. Japanese people and 
the state took the advantages offered by economic power and prosperity and 
conveniently ignored the fundamental injustice it was built on. In short, it was 
‘ignorant, arrogant, negligent, and decadent’.27 
A year before Iida’s article appeared, the writer Ōshiro Tatsuhiro published an 
article in the same magazine, Fujin Kōron, which sought to find out how the 
Okinawan people ‘really felt’ in relation to the idea of ‘returning to the mainland.’ 
While the Japanese mass media earnestly covered the demonstrations and protests, 
they didn’t capture everyday life in Okinawa. The feeling in Okinawa was one of 
resignation. The protests made no difference, and while people thought they should 
return to the mainland they didn’t believe they ever would. This passivity was ‘not a 
brief illness, but a chronic one which came to infect the entire body’.28 Such a sense 
of resignation was not without its advantages though, because in Ōshiro’s opinion 
without it Okinawa could not have lived with ‘the American nuclear bases for twenty 
years’. Since the military bases had never actually brought harm to Okinawa itself 
there was a ‘weakness in the power of imagination’ which was responsible for the 
relaxed attitude of the people. In addition, the economic support the bases provided to 
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the people of the island meant that for the most part there was no urgency on the part 
of Okinawan people to ‘return to the mainland’.  
Ōshiro also discussed the fact that under American rule in Okinawa there had 
been concerted efforts by the military administration to raise an Okinawan sense of 
nationalism and separate it from Japan. These efforts, in Ōshiro’s opinion, brought 
back the consciousness of discrimination inflicted on Okinawans when Okinawa was 
a part of Japan. For a while, ‘the romantic notion of an independent country floated 
around’.29 In Ōshiro’s opinion, it was a small number of people who called for a 
return to Japan and took an anti-base position, and whenever the bases did start to 
become a problem it was because of the issue of earnings from land used by the army. 
Ultimately, ‘economic development was achieved by the enlarging of bases and the 
growth in earnings from the bases’.30 Okinawa embodied the very dilemma facing the 
Japanese people as the economy developed rapidly under the military umbrella of the 
United States.  
The businesses around the bases may have welcomed the increase in income 
because of the Vietnam War, but Ōshiro did not dwell on the many undesirable 
consequences of the presence of US bases in Okinawa. In just two years, between 
1964 and 1966, the number of so-called ‘atrocious and violent crimes’ carried out by 
American servicemen or civilian base employees had almost doubled. Not to mention 
the many ‘mechanical disasters’ such as an incident of drinking water and crop 
contamination by leaking fuel oil on 4th January 1968.31 The contradictions between 
everyday life, the economy, the international situation and the treatment of young 
people in Japan were becoming increasingly evident by the late 1960s. Okinawa 
clearly reflected the ambiguous situation in which the vast majority of people on the 
mainland found themselves benefitting from the hegemony of the neo-imperialism of 
the United States whilst opposing the war in Vietnam and taking pride in the idea of 
their country as a role model in Asia. 
Race War? 
Japan’s role in supporting the American action in the Vietnam War raised issues 
similar to those debated during the Tokyo Olympics — Japan’s position in Southeast 
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Asia and the way other Asian peoples perceived Japan. A few months after Satō’s 
departure to Washington from the fortress of Haneda airport, the Asahi Graph 
published an article entitled ‘Are Japanese people Yellow Whites?’ Written by critic 
Kugai Saburō, the article addressed the massacres being carried out by US forces in 
Vietnam with the support of the Japanese government. Kugai was worried by the lack 
of concern in Japan after the massacre at My Lai in March 1968. News of My Lai had 
begun to emerge in late 1968 and, as someone who travelled widely, frequently to 
Hanoi, he noticed that more fuss was being made in European countries than in Japan 
concerning the actions of American forces in Vietnam.32  
Kugai had heard about the massacre for the first time in November 1968 when 
he left Tokyo for one of his trips to Hanoi. Time magazine published graphic photos 
of the massacre, reports of which, according to Kugai, had first become known in 
Britain and then spread across Europe before becoming an explosive political problem 
in America. Kugai stressed, however, that he got all this information from his time in 
Hanoi, and not through the Japanese media. In Vietnam he was often asked why such 
things were taken up by the western media, leading to large protests, while the same 
did not seem to happen in Japan. This led him to pose the question: ‘Are we Japanese 
so insensitive and dehumanised through the process of high speed economic growth 
that we cannot show a humanitarian response to such an inhuman action?’33 In 
Kugai’s opinion, it was partly the Japanese proximity to the war that meant the people 
did not appear to respond to reports of atrocities in Vietnam. He believed that, 
‘compared to Americans and Europeans’, the Japanese had more information about 
such events, but the corollary of this was that there was ‘no fresh surprise’, and, at the 
same time, ‘no protests in response like in Europe and America’.34 It was important to 
insist that this over-exposure was not an excuse, and keeping quiet only helped the 
Americans. As Asians, Kugai believed the Japanese had a duty to protest and make a 
noise about the crimes of America in Vietnam. The war was ‘a war of white America 
against Asian people…a massacre and genocide against Asian people’. A journalist in 
Hanoi had rammed this point home to Kugai by pointing out that America tested its 
new weapons on Asian people first. In Hiroshima it had been nuclear weapons and 
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now, in Vietnam, napalm and chemical weapons were being used. The journalist 
warned him that as an Asian, this fact was something Kugai should never forget. 
Nevertheless, Kugai did not see the Vietnam War as a racial war, although he 
did believe that American policy was ‘shot through with the same discrimination 
which imprisons black people’.35 The Japanese had become more similar to 
Westerners than to ‘the Koreans, Chinese and Vietnamese’, and this was more than 
simply a sense of affinity with the West. As Japan approached the standard of living 
of the West and gained economic influence in the international arena, finally ‘stepping 
foot in the white pool of African Republics’, Japanese people had ‘come to feel the 
same racist scorn as Westerners towards Vietnamese and Koreans’.36 The Japanese 
who stayed in Phnom Pen, for example, stayed in the same hotels and wore the same 
clothes as Americans, and they felt the same need to distance themselves from the 
people of Southeast Asia.37 The same scornful attitude was evident in the expression 
of two Khmer ladies who served him at the ship’s offices in Phnom Pen as he made 
his way back to Japan. They wore French make-up and miniskirts and were fluent in 
both French and English and, for Kugai, after returning from Hanoi where ‘all the 
women wore minzoku uniform’ he really felt ‘the ladies’ elite consciousness’. ‘Those 
expressions said: I am the same as a white person. I am totally different from the poor 
Southeast Asian people’. As the woman handed him his ticket, Kugai was ‘taken by 
the feeling that as a Southeast Asian she was reflecting Japan’s position back on 
itself’.38 Japanese people had exactly the same consciousness. Their economic 
superiority allowed them to see themselves as equal to white people, and consequently 
different from Asians. Affluence trumped ethnicity. 
As Kugai saw it, Japan’s role in and responsibility for the war in Vietnam was 
seen by most Japanese people to be due to its enforced position as a base for the 
American attacks. So for the majority of Japanese people, if Japan was at fault it was 
because of passive cooperation with the Americans. But over the previous two 
decades, the economic links between the countries had increased and the Japanese 
economy was profiting enormously from the war as exports grew. This was clear 
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according to the leaders of the South Vietnam Freedom Front when they addressed 
Kugai, claiming: ‘Vietnamese people like Japanese products, but economic aid and 
skill support helps the puppet power in Saigon. This is a problem because it helps to 
continue the American invasion’. Japan’s economic development was inseparable 
from the actions of the United States in the eyes of the people of Southeast Asia. 
An old Japanese soldier who had remained in Vietnam after the Second World 
War and had just recently opened his own Japanese language school backed up this 
claim. At first he had struggled with only about 70 students, but after the 1968 Tet 
Offensive this number quickly increased. The Vietnamese newspapers were full of 
discussions of the US military but after that there was ‘a lot about how the Japanese 
economy was developing’. Indeed the school was in the position of having to turn 
away students as the number rapidly increased, ‘because being taught by Japanese 
people is really popular’.39 On a visit to the mountain tribes north of Saigon, journalist 
Honda Katsuichi returned to one village and, on hearing music coming from a kite, 
‘immediately assumed that some Japanese transistor radio had been introduced even 
to this remote village, and was lashed to the frame of the kite’.40 Evidence of Japan’s 
influence in Southeast Asia was everywhere. The foreign minister in Hanoi got 
straight to the point. He warned Kugai that a ‘new Japanese colonialist expansionism’ 
(shin-shokuminchi shugiteki bōchyōshugi) was developing.41 In Kugai’s opinion, 
President Nixon’s plans for Vietnam were based on Japanese economic development, 
and all of Southeast Asia knew this. It was this economic involvement in the 
economies of East and Southeast Asia, under the protection of the umbrella of 
American nuclear power, which was disavowed by the Japanese people.  
For Kugai and other journalists covering the conflict, it was no longer 
justifiable to separate the Japanese people from the actions of the Japanese state. As 
Honda Katsuichi explained, after being mistaken for Korean when visiting the 
National Hospital in Vinh-Long, the people’s ‘look of hatred would gradually die 
away, but it left me with a bitter aftertaste. Considering the difference between 
Korea’s open participation in the war, and Japan’s present attitudes and policies 
towards Vietnam, we can no longer exonerate ourselves by saying “No we are 
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Japanese”’.42 The contradictions of Japan’s situation were becoming clear. In the eyes 
of the people of Southeast Asia, the Japanese protested against their government’s 
support of the United States because it restricted Japan’s autonomy as a sovereign 
state. For them, Japan’s involvement in Vietnam was a problem tied to the ANPO 
treaty. For the people of Southeast Asia encountered by Kugai and other journalists 
though, the problem was the economic dominance of Japan in the region, which the 
United States was supporting through its war in Vietnam.  
The people of the region saw the economic development of the Japanese 
economy into Southeast Asian markets, and it revived the memory of the wartime 
actions of the Japanese in Southeast Asia. In 1945, the Japanese army exported rice to 
Japan to prevent starvation in the homeland, while nearly two million people starved 
to death in Vietnam itself. Any Japanese citizen over the age of 26 or 27 ‘must have 
benefitted from this policy, indeed they were only able to eat because of it. We 
Japanese were able to continue living through the sacrifice of unknown numbers of 
Vietnamese. This is a shocking historical truth which cannot be denied’.43 When the 
Japanese did think and protest about the inhuman actions of America in the My Lai 
incident, they had to keep in mind that it was the Japanese who were there first. 
Vietnamese people absolved American people for the crimes their country committed 
under the belief that American imperialism and American people were different. In 
the same way, they saw Japanese fascists and Japanese people as different. 
Yet Japanese people should not just nod at this in agreement, because if it 
were not for the foreign rice in 1945 many young Japanese people would not have 
been alive. It was impossible to separate the people from the policies of their state. 
Kugai himself ‘couldn’t shake off the terrible idea that during the horrible experience 
of war I had eaten foreign rice’.44 The Vietnamese had an ethnic national 
(minzokuteki) pride far stronger than that of the Japanese. ‘They have a minzokuteki 
pride that is needed to become a yellow white man that far exceeds what we can 
imagine as Japanese’. After all, the Vietnamese were opposing the most powerful 
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military in history and winning.45 Ultimately, the economic superiority of Japan 
distanced the Japanese people from the struggles of the Vietnamese, and the growth of 
a consumer society under the shelter of the US-Japan alliance deflected the political 
nature of Japanese economic influence in Southeast Asia. At the same time, as 
Beiheiren discovered, the war and the issue of Okinawa allowed the Japanese to 
disavow the country’s connection to US imperialism. Nevertheless, in blaming the 
state and consumerism for people’s lack of interest or empathy towards Vietnam, the 
debate in many ways combined the post-ANPO trope of an authoritarian state and the 
introspection of the student protests. In this context, calls for a re-evaluation of the 
prewar nature of Japanese imperialism were deflected by a concern for the nature of 
postwar Japanese national identity and its subordination to the United States. 
Domestic Discrimination 
The apparent distance between Japanese and other Asian peoples extended to the 
treatment of Southeast Asians studying and living in Japan. In Fujin Kōron in June 
1970, Haruki Wada, an assistant professor at the University of Tokyo, wrote of the 
extent of this discrimination. For Wada, proof that discrimination against foreigners 
living in Japan was widespread came from the Japanese government’s treatment of 
Vietnamese living in the country who were called up to fight in the war.46 Like Kugai, 
Wada feared that the Japanese people had become used to the atrocities and massacres 
carried out by the American military in Vietnam. After the photographs of the 
massacre at My Lai were published in the Asahi Graph and Mainichi Graph, Wada 
‘stood outside the train station shouting please look’, but was frustrated in his efforts 
to make people take notice. The Japanese people had become used to the idea of the 
deaths of huge numbers of people and no longer thought about them as individuals. 
The response may have been understandable on one level. As Wada admitted, it may 
be hard to face eating dinner after seeing the photos. Nevertheless he found people’s 
lack of interest in the deaths of large numbers of Asians depressing.47  
According to Wada, there were two categories of people living in Japan who 
could neither forget nor ignore the slaughter that was taking place in Vietnam. One 
was the wounded American soldiers recuperating in Japanese field hospitals. ‘As a 
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living part of the apparatus for carrying out these massacres, (they) were forced to 
become involved in the war’.48 The second group was the Vietnamese students living 
in Japan who were part of the Vietnamese masses, and ‘must be killed or fight (in 
order) not to be killed’. There were around one hundred and fifty students from South 
Vietnam studying in Japan, and many of them had arrived to study in the country 
‘without being taught about Dien Bien Phu or the Geneva accord’. When they came to 
Japan, Wada claimed, ‘it was the first time they had heard the true history of their 
country’.49 Discovering the true history of their country naturally led to the students 
protesting against the war and their refusal to be drafted when called up by the 
government in Saigon. 
On June 9th 1969, President Nixon and South Vietnamese president Thieu met 
at Midway, where Nixon agreed to withdraw 25,000 US troops. At the same time, the 
issue of a larger role for Japan was becoming pressing for other countries in the 
region.50 Around twenty protesters entered the Vietnamese embassy in Tokyo to 
demonstrate against the United States as the June meeting began. Although small in 
number they formed a group (Beiheito) to fight for peace and unification in their 
home country. In October 1969, three students received their conscription papers from 
the government in Saigon and refused to answer the call up. In doing this, they had 
refused to recognise the sovereignty of the government in Saigon and, in Wada’s 
opinion, faced the same problems as objectors avoiding the draft in America. 
According to the announcement by the students, the government of President Nguyen 
Van Thieu and his vice president Nguyen Cao Ky was ‘nothing more than a tool for 
the accomplishment of the US government’s war policies’. In refusing the draft, the 
students’ goal was ‘not only to stay in Japan, but to continue studying and make the 
situation in Vietnam better known’. For Wada Haruki, the important question was 
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what did ‘the Japanese people and the Japanese government think about the actions of 
the students?’51  
Would the Japanese support these fellow Asians living and studying in Japan? 
To answer the question, Wada went back to the Meiji period, when Japan first began 
to receive students from Asia coming to seek ‘enlightenment to free the rest of 
Asia’.52 The largest group of students came from China and, particularly after the 
Sino-Japanese War, many of those who came wanted to overthrow the existing 
Chinese regime. During the early 1900s, the number of Chinese students in Japan 
stood at 8,000, and according to Wada many student groups were set up to resist the 
Chinese government. This agitation by Chinese students studying in Japan began to 
cause problems for the Japanese government, particularly after the 1905 war with 
Russia and the annexation of Korea and Manchuria. Japanese victories in Asia gave 
hope to the Vietnamese under French colonial rule. In 1905, the independence 
campaigner Phan Boi Chau came to Japan to ask the Japanese government for help 
and weapons to fight the French. The Japanese government refused his request, but 
Phan Boi Chau returned to Vietnam and promptly set up a movement to send students 
to Japan.  
In 1907, those students came together to form a political group, and by 1908, 
there were more than two hundred Vietnamese students in Japan. All their efforts 
were brought to an end by matters outside their control though, because on June 10th 
1907, Japan and France signed an agreement to recognise each other’s influence in 
Asia and Indo-China. Then in 1908 the French government began to arrest the 
families of students studying abroad and requested that the Japanese government hand 
over anti-French members of the Vietnamese royal family who were in Japan leading 
the resistance movement. According to Wada, ‘the Japanese government happily 
agreed and banished the foreign students’.53 By February 1909, only thirty students 
remained in Japan. In Wada’s opinion, in its quest for recognition by the West in the 
Meiji period, Japan had betrayed its Asian neighbours. Japanese Imperialism sought 
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to enlighten Asia even as the country turned its back on those who came to seek that 
enlightenment. 
The international goals of the Meiji state could not be derailed by sympathy 
for fellow Asians in Japan. In the context of the Vietnam War, the way Japanese 
people viewed ‘Asian’ people had not changed at all. Even after August 15th 1945, the 
concept of ‘Modern Japan’ was deeply tied up with imperialism, and as imperialism 
developed it ‘betrayed the hopes of exchange students from Asia and oppressed 
them’. While defeat had seemed to offer a new starting point for Japan, in Wada’s 
opinion the problem was that there had been no ‘national soul-searching in relation to 
colonialism’ among the Japanese. The goals of building a democratic, peaceful and 
cultural country were, in Wada’s view, the main reason for this lack of reflection on 
imperialism and Japan’s relations with Asia. It was also the reason why the Japanese 
people’s way of looking at Koreans and Taiwanese had ‘not changed since the 
wartime’.54 Reaction to events in Vietnam was evidence of this.  
The lack of soul-searching with regard to the country’s imperialist past meant 
that when, as a result of the economic growth of the 1960’s, Japan again began to 
expand into Asia, ‘cases of oppression against exchange students re-emerged’.55 
Wada reported how in 1964 the Japanese government stopped the funding of a 
Malaysian student at the request of the Malaysian government, and he was 
subsequently expelled from Chiba University. Then in 1966, a sick student from 
Malaya had his medical insurance cut off by the Japanese government and was sent 
out of the country. Two years later, the government refused to extend the permit of 
stay for a Taiwanese student and forcibly repatriated him. A military court later 
sentenced him to death. The Japanese state’s economic policy and its alliance with the 
United States — in other words the state’s desire to keep up with the West — 
overrode any feeling for the Vietnamese as fellow Asians. The Vietnamese students 
who had refused the draft were now facing the same discrimination as those who 
studied in Japan in the prewar period.  
In February 1970, it became clear that the Saigon government had not renewed 
the passports’ of three students, and they informed the justice ministry of this. ‘As a 
result, in March, forty people visited the office in Shinagawa to request to extend their 
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stay without passports’. The justice ministry’s response was that they would be 
allowed to stay in Japan as long as they promised not to engage in any political 
activity. The students signed a pledge to this effect at the Ministry of Justice, but the 
government in Saigon reiterated its request to have them sent back. Wada believed the 
Japanese people were not moved by the plight of the students. For the Japanese state, 
good relations with the government in Saigon were more important than the freedom 
of expression and conscience of the students. In the opinion of the Vietnamese 
students being anti-war was ‘the minimal duty of a human being’.56 The Japanese 
state’s definition of ‘political activity’ went to very heart of the problem. If the war 
was a political issue the students could not protest it. If their right to protest against 
what was happening in their own country was severely restricted they could no longer 
trust the Japanese people.  
As the high growth policies began to show results, the problem of Japan’s role 
in international affairs became more acute. The contradictions were becoming clear 
and the de-politicisation of the people created apathy towards the suffering of others. 
In their writings, Kugai, Honda, Wada and Iida emphasised the connections between 
high-speed economic growth and United States military protection. The goal of 
economic growth and prosperity was reviving the spectre of the Japanese imperial 
past in Southeast Asia. At the same time, in the domestic sector the Japanese people 
were enjoying the benefits of a consumer society which deflected their attention from 
the actions of the United States in Vietnam and the plight of Southeast Asian students 
living in Japan. But, as Kitayama noted, the problem of political apathy was far more 
widespread. The attitude towards politics and politicians among young people was 
evidence of a lack of any sense of responsibility for Okinawa or for the War in 
Vietnam. Moreover it was dangerous for the future of Japan. What emerged in the 
debate and discussion was a questioning of the nature of consumer society and its role 
in increasing the apathy and de-politicisation of the Japanese people. 
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Conclusion 
 
‘In the winter holiday I went on vacation to stay at my grandfather’s house in Nagano. 
When Kimigayo was played on the television at New Year my grandfather corrected 
his sitting position and listened intently. When I asked “what’s wrong?” he replied 
“it’s the Japanese national anthem, you have to listen to it sitting in the seiza style!” I 
asked again, “Is Kimigayo like a sutra?”’ 
From a grade four primary school student in Tokyo.1 
 
National Symbols? 
On the 4th of January 1964, just before a televised world championship boxing match, 
the popular Japanese singer Ai George sang the ‘national anthem’ of Japan, Kimigayo, 
live. The song was not legally recognised as the national anthem and in the run up to 
the Olympic Games its use sparked a debate in the popular media that raised 
important historical issues and polarised opinion. The debate also made evident a 
generational divide centred on issues of war and defeat. In the opening quote, the 
primary school student’s unfamiliarity with the ‘national anthem’ and the connection 
to religious observance neatly encapsulated the political nature and historical legacies 
of political symbols of nation in the postwar period. The report of Ai George’s 
performance in January 1964 raised these deeply political and historical issues within 
the boundaries of a popular culture that had emerged through the development of a 
consumer society since the mid-1950s.  
According to Shūkan Heibon, his performance deeply impressed the entire 
audience. This performance of the song itself was not broadcast live on television, but 
according to the magazine it was ‘a well-known fact’ that in September 1963, at the 
beginning of a flyweight title match, the soon to be golden disc recipient Sakamoto 
Kyū did sing Kimigayo live on Japanese television. The song was controversial but, as 
the magazine pointed out, to many young people it was almost unknown. Indeed in 
the 1950s, with little experience of either the song or the flag, many school children 
believed both the Hinomaru and Kimigayo to be the flag and song of the national 
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television broadcaster NHK.2 Yet at the start of the year of the Tokyo Olympics, Ai 
George believed that the value of Kimigayo was increasing. Indeed, it was for this 
reason that he sang it. ‘On January 4th I had to turn down all other New Year work in 
order to sing that song. That’s how much effort I put into singing it.’3  
In 1945, at the start of the US Occupation and around the time most of Ai 
George’s fans were born, the issue of the status of the Japanese flag and national 
anthem was unclear. Because of their relation to the prewar and wartime Emperor 
System, defeat meant that the symbolic representation of nation that was explicitly 
connected to the state needed to be re-imagined. Immediately after the surrender, 
there were reports of American servicemen taking down the flag as they secured the 
mainland. Unsurprisingly, these reports led many to believe the anthem and the flag 
would be banned.4 Nevertheless, rather than enforcing an outright ban on the flying of 
the Hinomaru or the singing of Kimigayo, Occupation authorities took a more 
ambivalent approach to dealing with them. The government section of SCAP, 
particularly MacArthur, had little problem allowing the flying of the flag or the 
singing of the anthem on certain occasions. Christian Tagsold has argued that it was 
the hosting of the Olympic Games in 1964 that provided the opportunity to ‘recreate 
the flag as a symbol of shared beliefs’. In this context, the publically redesigned flag 
that was unveiled in 1964 ‘could be seen as a product of democracy and 
internationalism’.5 But this democratic effort to redesign the flag, which ultimately 
only came to adjusting the size of the sun disc and the parameters of the flag itself, 
was premised on a discourse developed under the US Occupation as the Cold War in 
East Asia developed.  
In his notes on the new Japanese constitution, General Douglas MacArthur 
had stated his hope that the Japanese flag would symbolise ‘the coming of a new era 
of permanent peace based on individual freedom, dignity, magnanimity, and 
justice…’6 Moreover, as former Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru recalled, in 1949 
SCAP issued a directive that it had no issue with the flying of the flag ‘anywhere 
                                                
2 Tanaka Nobumasa, Hinomaru, Kimigayo no Sengoshi (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2000), p. 76. 
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4 Yoshida, The Yoshida Memoirs: 1961, p. 174. 
5 Christian Tagsold, ‘The 1964 Tokyo Olympics as Political Games’, The Asia-Pacific Journal, 
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within the limits of our own territory.’7 Certainly in his 1949 New Year message to 
the Japanese people, General MacArthur made clear his permission for all groups in 
society to use the flag ‘without limit’. He also made it clear that the Hinomaru would 
stand for international peace and cooperation.8 MacArthur’s hope was that the flag 
would serve to integrate Japan into the international system of nation-states. It would 
be a symbol of the democratic and peace-loving nation created by the reforms of the 
US Occupation. Yet at the time of MacArthur’s speech, the absence of the Hinomaru 
in everyday life was striking.  
According to an Asahi newspaper survey in 1950, 73% of those surveyed 
admitted to having a flag at home, but of those only 30% took the flag out on festival 
days. Nevertheless, the prelude to the article emphasised that the survey was carried 
out to get to the bottom of the reasons why ‘the flag was not seen in the streets on 
festival days as much as in the old days’. Disillusion with the wartime state and the 
national symbols which reminded the people of it was not discussed by the article. 
Indeed, the newspaper claimed that the destruction caused by the heavy bombing of 
urban areas during the war was one reason for the disappearance of the Hinomaru. 
Not only did many people not possess a flag, they did not even possess a home from 
which to fly it!9 MacArthur’s statement made clear that, after 1945, the symbolic 
meaning of the Japanese flag would change. Rather than the militaristic Emperor 
system, the flag would have to represent a new, democratic and peaceful Japan. In the 
early 1950s, as the newspaper article showed, the flag was not commonly seen. 
Throughout the 1950s, in order for the new meanings to become convincing for the 
Japanese people, the flag would need to assume greater prominence in the everyday 
life of the people. 
Around the same time, partly as a result of the resurgence of nationalism with 
the start of the Korean War and preparations for the Peace Treaty, a debate raged over 
the status and desirability of the ‘national anthem’ Kimigayo. According to the Asahi 
newspaper, many Japanese believed Kimigayo did not ‘match the new era’ and saw no 
reason why the song could not be changed. For Shimizu Ikutaro, the song was based 
on an old way of thinking and was ‘out of keeping with the times’.10 Early in 1951, 
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the Yomiuri Newspaper asked the question of whether it was necessary to write a new 
national anthem. Of the readers polled, 364 thought the anthem should be kept, while 
290 believed it should be abolished. For those in favour of keeping it, Kimigayo was 
‘already merged into the feelings of daily life’ and in the context of ‘a democratic 
Japan under the symbolic Emperor there is no contradiction’. For those on the 
opposite side of the debate, the anthem was nothing more than ‘barefaced praise of 
feudalism’.11 Both the anthem and the flag were strongly contested as the Occupation 
came to an end. It was through raising the profile of both in the everyday life of the 
Japanese people that the state sought to rehabilitate the symbols. 
With the end of the Occupation in 1952, the Japanese government sought to 
increase the public profile of the flag and the anthem. Kimigayo was played at the end 
of the NHK broadcast of the signing of the San-Francisco Peace Treaty. The flag was 
shown whilst the anthem played as a set scene in September 1953 with the first 
television broadcast. Throughout the 1950s, especially with the growth in access to 
television, people became used to seeing the flag in everyday life.12 With the 
awarding of the Olympic Games to Tokyo in 1959, the fact that there was no legal 
basis for the Hinomaru as the Japanese flag, along with the problem of whether Nihon 
or Nippon was the correct way of referring to the host country, brought the question of 
the national anthem to the fore in the popular media. Within the political world, the 
question of whether to give a legal basis to the Hinomaru and Kimigayo was ‘gaining 
strength’. Moreover, 80% of respondents to one survey claimed to like the song.13 Ai 
George was certainly correct in thinking that public feeling towards the national 
symbols was changing. 
By 1964, the performance of Kimigayo was becoming increasingly prevalent 
in public places. Shūkan Heibon recounted the opening ceremony of the Nissei 
Theatre. The Berlin Opera was in Japan to perform at the opening and before the 
curtain rose the ‘national anthems’ of West Germany and Japan were performed. 
Similarly, when the Polish circus visited Tokyo in the same year, Kimigayo was 
performed before the show began. Ikejima Shimpei, Editor-in-Chief of monthly 
magazine Bungei Shunjun and of the generation raised before the war, listened to the 
performance of the song at the Nissei Theatre with what he described as a ‘large wave 
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of emotion’. The performance reaffirmed, for him, ‘the excellence of Kimigayo’. But 
thirty-five year-old Nitta Akio, who came of age during the Occupation period, 
witnessed the performance at the Polish circus. He described it as a strange feeling 
and was unsure how to respond. An ‘uncomfortable, complicated feeling, should I 
stand or sit down, I was lost in some feelings of opposition’.14 According to the 
magazine, Nitta’s opposition was understandable. He was of the generation that had 
grown up during the war. Having come of age during the Occupation period the 
conflicting nature of prewar and postwar state symbols clearly rendered the anthem 
ambiguous.  
For fans of Sumo wrestling, usually of an older generation, the singing of the 
national anthem was not at all unusual. Starting with the summer Bashō of 1952, 
Kimigayo was performed at the closing of the tournament.15 According to Sumo fan 
and shop owner Tanaka Eizō, who never missed a Bashō and always watched the final 
day: ‘when I am there singing Kimigayo I strongly feel that I am Japanese (Nihonjin). 
There really is no other chance to feel this way. That’s the reason I always attend the 
final day of a tournament. The feeling you get is great’.16 On the other hand, the 
article pointed out that there was no shortage of people who watched the last day of a 
tournament on TV and who turned off the TV set when Kimigayo began. According to 
one 36-year-old teacher, ‘the idea of a national anthem should be more big-hearted, 
more optimistic and rhythmical in my opinion. Also Kimigayo brings with it all kinds 
of unpleasant memories of the war’.17 So while the national anthem was gradually 
being heard in more and more public places across Japan in 1964, and popular culture 
was helping to re-incorporate the flag and the anthem into everyday life, the reaction 
and feelings of the people were still very mixed.  
While acknowledging that in America it was usual to see the Stars and Stripes 
in school classrooms, the Liberal Democratic Party’s Hasegawa Takashi noted it 
would never be seen in a Japanese classroom in the postwar period. Indeed, despite 
the efforts of the Ministry of Education, which had attempted in 1958 to incorporate 
the flag and anthem into compulsory education, many children did not even know that 
the Hinomaru was the national flag of Japan. The Olympic Games offered the chance 
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15 Tanaka, Kimigayo to Hinomaru, p. 75. 
16 ‘Kimigayo to Hinomaru o Anata wa Dō Omou?’ p. 107.  
17 Ibid.  
210 
 
to embed these national symbols in the consciousness of the Japanese people and 
media debate and discussion aided this.18 Yet Yasukawa Yoshitsugu, who was due to 
attend the coming of age ceremony at the beginning of 1964 and so was born at the 
end of the war, saw the flag as an ominous sign. ‘When the Hinomaru is flying in the 
ceremony hall I can’t meekly accept that. I have no particular memories of the war 
period, but behind that Hinomaru I feel the dark hand of the re-emergence of Japanese 
militarism’. On the other hand Hata Hiroyasu, who worked in a Chinese restaurant 
and would attend the same ceremony as Yasukawa, claimed ‘I like the Hinomaru. I 
think it’s a great flag. It is only natural that it would be flying in the ceremony hall’. 
Divided opinions on the flag and the anthem did not just separate the generations. The 
political nature of these symbolic representations of the nation also divided the 
postwar generation.  
Nevertheless, according to Shūkan Heibon, Yasukawa was in the minority of 
young people, and most accepted the flag and the anthem. The memories of war 
needed to be forgotten, and according to one interviewee, ‘to reject your national flag 
and national anthem is stupid’. Japanese people needed to respect Japan in the opinion 
of Ikejima, part of the pre-war generation. ‘If Japanese people (Nihonjin) don’t 
respect Japan (Nihon), how can we get foreigners to respect Japan?’19 For the 
politician Hasegawa, the Tokyo Olympics provided the opportunity to make the 
‘kokumin love the Hinomaru’. ‘Young people are gathering from all over the world, 
different races, overcoming discrimination between different countries deliberately 
fighting for people’s hearts, the flag can do this’. In line with the ideological goals of 
the Olympic movement Hasegawa saw the flag as a symbol of ‘fair play, freshness, 
and health’. 1964 was a great chance ‘to reverse the dark wartime image. It is with 
this meaning that I want to see many Hinomaru flying at the Olympics’.20 The issue 
of the flag and the singing of Kimigayo were tied to feelings of pride in the country. 
The Olympic Games was an event that provided the perfect opportunity to begin to re-
integrate these divisive symbols into everyday life. In view of the ideological premise 
of the Olympic movement it was also the perfect opportunity to reinforce the 
Hinomaru as symbolic of international peace and democratic development. As 
discussed in chapter four, at a time when the country would be on display to the 
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world, Ikejima’s question about respect for Japan was more than merely rhetorical. 
Certainly the official image of Japan portrayed at the Tokyo Olympics was no longer 
the enemy of a long and brutal war but rather ‘a peaceful internationalist’.21 But even 
in 1964, the rehabilitation of these divisive national symbols had as much to do with 
popular consumer culture as political posturing. 
‘Seeing the Hinomaru I feel excitement!’ claimed a headline in Heibon Punch 
in the summer of 1971. Posing the question ‘What do you think of the Hinomaru?’ the 
article reported on the feelings of young people towards the Japanese flag. Seven 
years after the Tokyo Olympics, the magazine’s survey asked five hundred male and 
female high school students about their feelings towards the national flag. According 
to the results, ‘tying it to past links with the war and screwing up your face to it’ was 
apparently old-fashioned. 70% of the students claimed to ‘love the Hinomaru’, while 
only 20% reported that they did not like it.22 Regarding the flag’s design, when asked 
what they most associated with it the favourite responses were ‘cool’, ‘passionate’, 
‘symbolic’ or ‘plain’, but only 20% described it as ‘worthless’. The article expressed 
surprise that for a generation who had not known the war at all, high school students 
were surprisingly aware of the flag.  
When they were asked about what they associated the Hinomaru with, the men 
and women differed. For both sexes, the number one response was not too 
surprisingly ‘the country’s flag’, and for men, militarism came second. Third place 
was taken up by ‘bentō’, fourth right wing movements, and fifth place was given to 
the Emperor. The magazine concluded nonetheless that, among men, ‘apart from the 
innocent desire to eat a hinomaru bentō’ and even though these high school students 
‘didn’t directly have experience of the war’, there was still a strong anti-authority, 
anti-dictatorship consciousness. Next to this, the women were ‘righteously peaceful’ 
in the magazine’s opinion, associating the Hinomaru secondly with ‘the song’, third 
with festivals and a feeling of being on holiday. Perhaps surprisingly, according to the 
magazine, in fourth place women associated the flag with war but, ‘hopefully 
unrelated, in fifth place they claimed a feeling of excitement’. Other answers given by 
the students ranged from pickled plums (umeboshi), fried eggs (medamayaki), getting 
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on a ship, momotarō, tokkōtai, as well as what the magazine described as ‘other 
strange answers’. One student complained that ‘for our generation to associate it with 
militarism and war is sad. But bentō and festivals is also deplorable! Why is it not 
peace or the Yamato spirit which comes out?’ The magazine declared, ‘depending on 
how you look at it, it could be said that among high school students a new kind of 
nationalism (minzokushugi)’ was being nurtured.23   
The new kind of nationalism that was becoming apparent by the end of the 
1960s was intimately tied up with the growth of a consumer society in Japan since the 
mid-1950s. This took place in a specific historical context that tied representations of 
nation not only to the country’s wartime past but also to the future. In the context of 
state policies for creating rapid economic growth, the forward-looking nature of ideas 
of nation did not entail a subduing of cultural representations of nation. Rather, as 
consumer society developed and became increasingly associated with the everyday 
lives of the Japanese people, the nation itself became a commodity given shape by the 
mass media.24 As this thesis has argued, both democracy and consumption were in the 
process of becoming ‘Japanese’ as the transwar period gave way to the postwar. Yet 
this worked both ways. It transformed ideas of nation.  
In the early 1950s intellectuals, journalists, and commentators grappled with 
the problem that nationalism and internationalism were indistinguishable. The country 
began to experience economic growth thanks to the boom provided by the Korean 
War, and with the end of the Occupation ideas of nation became a major focal point 
for subjective and collective identification. Yet attempts to link ideas of nation to 
peace and democracy, subjectivity and universalism were a reflection of the 
international Cold War, the desire to exorcise the wartime state, and the reforms of the 
Occupation. In this context, building a future Japanese nationalism around the goals 
of peace and democracy was unavoidably shaped by the objective historical 
circumstances within which the Occupation came to an end. The ambiguity of terms 
such as kokumin, minzoku, kokkashugi, aikokushugi plagued the theoretical discussion 
of nation. Far from deciding which term to use depending on a certain conception of 
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what the nation was, during the 1950s the inability of many thinkers to define the 
nation shows that the changing nature of the economic, political and social left 
ambiguity as the best, if not the only option. Ultimately, this preoccupation with the 
wartime experience and Cold War power politics diverted attention from the 
emergence of new lifestyles and new forms of popular culture that were used to create 
representations of nation in the popular media. 
Through contestation over the place of rice in the Japanese diet and a Cold 
War connection between nutrition and individual wellbeing, economic and political 
concerns were represented in the early 1950s in the housewife magazines and 
newspaper discussions as questions of ‘national culture’. In this way a nutritionally 
poor diet was not simply due to government policy and the Korean War. It also raised 
questions about the place of rice as a ‘traditional food’ in the Japanese diet. Through 
media representation, economic and political problems of the period around the end of 
the Occupation could be deflected onto the issue of culture and representations of 
ideas of nation. Ultimately the Cold War political context of the early 1950s was 
disavowed and transposed onto questions of national identity. 
Throughout the late 1950s and 1960s, media representation of ideas of nation 
shifted the emphasis on ‘peace and democracy’ to notions of ‘peace and prosperity’. 
This process was accelerated by the shift in the mid-1950s from a production-led 
economy to one fueled by consumption. Socially, politically and economically new 
patterns emerged which altered the everyday lives of the Japanese people. While these 
conditions were not unique to Japan, they helped Japanese people to integrate cultural 
ideas of nation into an apparently de-politicised popular culture. Just as the political 
economy of food had been projected onto Japanese foodways, consumer culture de-
politicised the Cold War context of Japan’s economic growth. As with other countries 
of the Free World, Japan emerged economically and politically within a universal 
vision of modernity closely tied to American hegemony. In Japan, within the context 
of the Cold War in Asia, the contradictions of this position became clear in the 
debates and discussions within the popular media. Yet as the media not only 
advertised but also discussed and promoted new ways of living, the political nature of 
these contradictions was defused.  
By the early 1960s, the apparent thaw in the Cold War marked by the Soviet 
leader’s visit to the US in late 1959 seemed to make the renewal of the Security 
Treaty redundant. The ANPO issue became tied to the protection of postwar 
214 
 
democracy, but although the treaty symbolised a subordinate client-state relationship 
between Japan and the United States, the increasing prospects brought by economic 
growth allowed debate and discussion to press ideas of nation which appeared to 
relate more concretely to the everyday lives of the people. In this way, the public 
celebration of consumerism in the popular media helped deflect attention from the 
political to the realm of everyday lived experience. The media helped to separate the 
Japanese state and its relationship to the United States from an image of ‘America’ 
which offered consumer lifestyles and leisure time to the Japanese people. The idea of 
the ‘consumer as king’ reflected the political imperatives of the Cold War, yet through 
the popular media these were deflected onto the opportunities and possibilities of a 
rapidly growing economy. This was especially important for a magazine like Shūkan 
Heibon which was targeted at young working people living away from home and with 
some, if only a little, money to spend.  
The hosting of the Olympic Games in 1964 brought the world to Japan and 
focused the media debate and discussion on the global nature of the transformations of 
the everyday lives of the Japanese people. This brought to the fore international 
comparisons, which helped to connect media representations of nation to a wider 
debate over the nature of consumer society in Japan. The necessity for a ‘Japanese’ 
consumerism became clear. The young factory worker, the reader of Shūkan Heibon 
and Heibon Punch, saw his or her wages increase, and found in consumer society the 
cultural capital necessary for a stake in that society. Yet as the economy continued to 
grow rapidly and society became more and more structured, the contradictions of the 
country’s position became more and more evident. As the Vietnam War gathered in 
intensity, the postwar ideals of peace and democracy lost their potency. The irony of 
the country’s situation became clear. While the student and anti-war protests became 
more and more visible on the streets, the popular media juxtaposed the serious nature 
of the issues facing the country with the ephemeral and detached nature of popular 
consumer culture. In the magazines of the 1960s, the constraining pattern, inseparable 
from the very nature of the medium, of what Baudrillard has described as the 
‘disarticulation of the real into successive equivalent signs’, in Japan allowed for the 
‘miraculous transition from Vietnam to variety, on the basis of a total abstraction of 
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both’.25 The representation of nation in the 1950s and 1960s took place within this 
growth of popular mass circulation magazines. It was both constrained by and created 
through this connection of consumer culture with national development. 
It is in this context that we have to understand the emergence of a cultural 
nationalism in the early 1970s. The Nihonjinron (theories of Japaneseness) were not 
simply expressions of economic power and a search for meaning in the light of rapid 
economic development. Nor were they just a response to the Nixon shocks and the oil 
crisis of the early 1970s. The shift lay not in the bankruptcy of developmentalist ideas 
of nation stemming from economic crisis, but in the very nature of consumer society 
itself. From the mid-1950s, everyday life became tied up with consumer culture. This 
connection was political and ideological. It served to tie Japan into the global Cold 
War on the side of the free world. At the same time, it turned culture itself into a 
commodity. With the literal disappearance of the folkways of Yanagita Kunio and the 
‘disneyfication’ of the imperial house, a detached, apathetic and ironic stance to ideas 
of nation allowed a new kind of nationalism to emerge.  
As Jean Baudrillard argued in 1970, advertising ‘turns the object into an event. 
In fact, it constructs it as such by eliminating its objective characteristics. It constructs 
it as a model, a spectacular news item’.26 The popular media in the postwar period 
constructed the Japanese ‘nation’ as an event, but not only through the growing 
prevalence of advertising. The ANPO protests, the coming of the Tokyo Olympics, 
the student movement and the Vietnam War were discussed and debated as 
‘spectacular news items’. The popular mass media then served to disavow the 
objective characteristics of Japan’s postwar development by juxtaposing these issues 
with popular culture. If, as Benedict Anderson argues, ideas of nation are imagined 
through the emergence of the print media then they are sustained, altered and 
contested by the development of that medium as it becomes a commodity. In this way, 
taking Marshall Mcluhan’s point that ‘the medium is the message’ helps to 
contextualise the growth of Nihonjinron as a ‘genre’ in the 1970s.27 The discourse 
                                                
25 Jean Baudrillard, The Consumer Society: Myths and Structures (London: Sage, 2003), p. 122. 
26 Ibid. p. 126. 
27 Marshall McLuhan, Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man (Cambridge M.A, MIT 
Press, 1994). See Yoshino Kosaku, Cultural Nationalism in Contemporary Japan (London: 
Routledge, 1992) for an examination of the writers and consumers of this discourse. Also see Peter 
N. Dale, The Myth of Japanese Uniqueness (Routledge: London, 1986) for a refutation of the 
arguments.  
216 
 
became popular among certain sectors of the population and strongly emphasised 
homogeneity and uniqueness. Yet its appeal lay in large part in the fact that Japan 
appeared to be neither homogeneous nor unique in the late 1960s. Its development 
was one aspect of a global paradigm. 
Marilyn Ivy has traced the way in which, during the 1970s, ‘a high-level 
advertising executive, a powerful culture broker and image purveyor who scans the 
fringes of Japan’s youth culture’ could head up a team of advertising executives 
within Dentsu, the country’s largest advertising company and create the ‘Discover 
Japan’ campaign to lead people to ‘national-cultural and subjective discovery’.28 That 
this advertising campaign was so successful speaks to the fundamental basis of the 
representation of ideas of nation in postwar Japan. Yet in thinking about the 
development of ideas of nation and nationalism in the postwar period we need to take 
into account that the unconscious ‘flagging’ of the nation takes place at the level of 
popular culture. Examination of the growth of the popular media in the context of the 
emergence of consumer society shows that this ‘flagging’ does not only happen 
through advertisements but also in the debate and discussion of real events. This helps 
to draw out the ways in which the ideas of nation framed by that media make possible 
the detachment of political and cultural ideas of nation from the political economy in 
which they emerge, thus making possible the separation of the civic and the ethnic in 
the theoretical debate over nation and nationalism more broadly.  
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